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ELRCStruck OutNot stated in the judgment· [2019] KEELRC 228 (KLR)

Julius Gikonyo Mwangi v National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation & another [2019] KEELRC 228 (KLR)

Employment and Labour Relations Court
5 December 2019
LNLINNET NDOLO
403 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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A Kenyan employment court struck out a claim over a 2004 suspension because it was filed 13 years late—six years is the hard limit.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This ruling of the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa determines a preliminary objection dated 3rd January 2018 raised by the 1st Respondent on the ground that the Claimant's claim, filed on 27th November 2017, is time barred under Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(3) of the Limitation of Actions Act, Cap 22. The parties agreed to dispose of the objection by written submissions, but only the 1st Respondent complied. The Claimant, by Memorandum of Claim dated and filed 27th November 2017, sought a declaration that his indefinite suspension without pay was unfair, unjustified and unlawful, and pleaded December 2004 as the effective date of that suspension. The court adopted that date as the accrual of the cause of action, following the Court of Appeal's definition of cause of action in Attorney General v Andrew Maina Githinji. Relying on Divecon Ltd v Samani, the court held that the six-year limitation period for contract actions under Section 4(1) is absolute and cannot be extended. With a lapse of thirteen years, the claim was out of time and the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The claim was struck out with no order for costs.

Key legal issues

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Whether the claim filed in 2017 on a suspension effective December 2004 is time barred

Holding

Yes; the cause of action accrued in 2004 and the six-year contractual limitation period under Section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act applies, leaving the claim thirteen years out of time and outside the court's jurisdiction

Reasoning

The court identified the indefinite suspension pleaded as effective December 2004 as the act causing the complaint, hence the accrual date of the cause of action. Actions founded on contract must be brought within six years under Section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act, a period Divecon Ltd v Samani affirms is absolute and non-extendable. With a thirteen-year lapse, the claim was time barred and the court struck it out, declining to exercise jurisdiction.

p. 1

Legal principles established

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  • The six-year limitation period for actions founded on contract under Section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act is absolute and no court has power to extend it

Court orders

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  1. 1.The Claimant's claim is struck out for being time barred
  2. 2.No order for costs
Jurisdiction invoked
Employment and Labour Relations Court (article 162(2) jurisdiction; no provision expressly cited)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Julius Gikonyo Mwangi v National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation & another [2019] KEELRC 228 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2019). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2019/228/eng@2019-12-05

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.