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ELRCDismissedCause No. 2365 of 2017· [2018] KEELRC 473 (KLR)

George Owino v Postal Corporation of Kenya (Cause 2365 of 2017) (Employment and Labour) [2018] KEELRC 473 (KLR)

Employment and Labour Relations Court
7 December 2018
856 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Employment Court dismissed a six-years-late unfair termination claim, confirming the three-year filing clock starts the day you are told of your dismissal.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Claimant was dismissed by Postal Corporation of Kenya with effect from 11 November 2010 by a letter dated 2 February 2011. He faced criminal charges of stealing by servant and obtaining money by false pretences before the Homa Bay Magistrate's Court, and was acquitted on all counts on 2 February 2016. Relying on the acquittal, he filed a Memorandum of Claim on 29 November 2017 raising unlawful termination, malicious prosecution, refusal to pay terminal dues and compensation. The Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection contending the Cause was time barred under section 90 of the Employment Act, 2007 and section 24 of the Postal Corporation of Kenya Act. The Court upheld the objection. It held the cause of action for unlawful termination accrued on 2 February 2011 when the Claimant was informed of his dismissal, some six years before suit. It rejected the continuing-injury argument, holding that termination is complete once the employee is informed; and even if a continuing injury, section 90 required suit within twelve months of cessation, which the Claimant missed. Reliance on Articles 50 and 159(2)(d) of the Constitution failed because limitation goes to jurisdiction. The suspension letter was not an estoppel under section 39 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The malicious prosecution plea failed for non-joinder of necessary parties. The Memorandum of Claim was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Key legal issues

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01

Accrual date of cause of action for unlawful termination

Holding

Cause of action accrued on the date of dismissal, 2 February 2011, making the 29 November 2017 claim time barred under section 90 of the Employment Act

Reasoning

The Court held that the letter dated 2 February 2011 informed the Claimant of his dismissal, so the cause of action for unlawful termination accrued on that date. Proceedings lodged on 29 November 2017 were about six years later, far outside the three-year limitation period prescribed by section 90 of the Employment Act, 2007. The preliminary objection on limitation was therefore upheld.

p. 1
02

Continuing injury doctrine

Holding

Unfair termination is not a continuing injury; even if it were, suit must be brought within 12 months of cessation of the injury

Reasoning

The Claimant argued the cause of action was a continuing injury accruing on his acquittal in February 2016. The Court rejected this, holding termination is complete once the employee is informed. Further, even on the continuing injury theory, section 90 requires institution within 12 months of cessation; the acquittal was on 2 February 2016, so suit should have been filed by 1 February 2017, yet it was filed on 29 November 2017.

p. 2
03

Constitutional override of limitation

Holding

Article 159(2)(d) cannot assist a claimant where limitation goes to jurisdiction

Reasoning

The Claimant contended that limitation was a technicality curable by Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution. Citing Divecon v Samani, the Court held that limitation is not merely procedural but goes to jurisdiction, and therefore the constitutional provisions relied upon could not rescue a statute-barred claim.

p. 2
04

Estoppel from suspension letter

Holding

The suspension letter did not amount to an undertaking or estoppel that the Respondent would await the criminal trial

Reasoning

The Claimant suggested the Respondent was estopped from pleading limitation because of the suspension letter, purportedly under section 39 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The Court found no such undertaking in the suspension letter that the Respondent would await the outcome of the criminal trial before taking disciplinary action, and rejected the estoppel argument.

p. 2

Legal principles established

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  • Termination of employment is complete once the employee is informed of it and is not a continuing injury for limitation purposes
  • Limitation is not merely procedural but goes to jurisdiction and cannot be overridden by Article 159(2)(d)

Court orders

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  1. 1.The Memorandum of Claim is dismissed with no order as to costs

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Employment Act, 2007section 90
  • Postal Corporation of Kenya Actsection 24
  • Limitation of Actions Actsection 39
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Articles 50, 159(2)(d)

Cases cited (2)

  • Attorney General & Ar v Andrew Maina Githinji & Ar
    (2016) eKLR
  • Divecon v Samani
    (1995-1998) EA 48
Jurisdiction invoked
Article 162(2) of the Constitution / Employment and Labour Relations Court Act (Cause under the Employment Act, 2007, s. 90 invoked on limitation)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "George Owino v Postal Corporation of Kenya (Cause 2365 of 2017)  (Employment and Labour) [2018] KEELRC 473 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Cause No. 2365 of 2017. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2018/473/eng@2018-12-07

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.