George Owino v Postal Corporation of Kenya (Cause 2365 of 2017) (Employment and Labour) [2018] KEELRC 473 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Employment Court dismissed a six-years-late unfair termination claim, confirming the three-year filing clock starts the day you are told of your dismissal.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Accrual date of cause of action for unlawful termination
Cause of action accrued on the date of dismissal, 2 February 2011, making the 29 November 2017 claim time barred under section 90 of the Employment Act
The Court held that the letter dated 2 February 2011 informed the Claimant of his dismissal, so the cause of action for unlawful termination accrued on that date. Proceedings lodged on 29 November 2017 were about six years later, far outside the three-year limitation period prescribed by section 90 of the Employment Act, 2007. The preliminary objection on limitation was therefore upheld.
Continuing injury doctrine
Unfair termination is not a continuing injury; even if it were, suit must be brought within 12 months of cessation of the injury
The Claimant argued the cause of action was a continuing injury accruing on his acquittal in February 2016. The Court rejected this, holding termination is complete once the employee is informed. Further, even on the continuing injury theory, section 90 requires institution within 12 months of cessation; the acquittal was on 2 February 2016, so suit should have been filed by 1 February 2017, yet it was filed on 29 November 2017.
Constitutional override of limitation
Article 159(2)(d) cannot assist a claimant where limitation goes to jurisdiction
The Claimant contended that limitation was a technicality curable by Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution. Citing Divecon v Samani, the Court held that limitation is not merely procedural but goes to jurisdiction, and therefore the constitutional provisions relied upon could not rescue a statute-barred claim.
Estoppel from suspension letter
The suspension letter did not amount to an undertaking or estoppel that the Respondent would await the criminal trial
The Claimant suggested the Respondent was estopped from pleading limitation because of the suspension letter, purportedly under section 39 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The Court found no such undertaking in the suspension letter that the Respondent would await the outcome of the criminal trial before taking disciplinary action, and rejected the estoppel argument.
Legal principles established
#- Termination of employment is complete once the employee is informed of it and is not a continuing injury for limitation purposes
- Limitation is not merely procedural but goes to jurisdiction and cannot be overridden by Article 159(2)(d)
Court orders
#- 1.The Memorandum of Claim is dismissed with no order as to costs
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Article 162(2) of the Constitution / Employment and Labour Relations Court Act (Cause under the Employment Act, 2007, s. 90 invoked on limitation)
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "George Owino v Postal Corporation of Kenya (Cause 2365 of 2017) (Employment and Labour) [2018] KEELRC 473 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Cause No. 2365 of 2017. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2018/473/eng@2018-12-07
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.