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ELRCDismissedPetition dated 26th June, 2015· [2016] KEELRC 1530 (KLR)

Samuel Kipkoech Keter v County Government of Bomet & 3 others [2016] KEELRC 1530 (KLR)

Employment and Labour Relations Court of Kenya
16 March 2016
5,152 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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·~21 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A Kenyan court dismissed a County Attorney's challenge to his removal because he couldn't prove his appointment and skipped vetting.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The petitioner, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya, petitioned the Employment and Labour Relations Court challenging the revocation of his appointment as Bomet County Attorney by a letter dated 16th June 2015 issued on behalf of the 2nd respondent (Governor). He sought declarations that the revocation was unlawful and ultra vires Section 12 of the Bomet County Office of the County Attorney Act, 2014, orders of certiorari to quash the revocation and the PIC/PAC committee's direction, reinstatement, payment of salary and emoluments, and injunctions against interference with his office, alleging violations of Articles 27, 28, 41, 47, 50, 73, 75 and 251 of the Constitution. The respondents opposed, contending the petitioner was a political appointee serving at the Governor's pleasure, that the office of County Attorney had not been established at the time of appointment, that he failed to produce his appointment letter, and that he refused to submit to vetting. The court framed five issues. It accepted that the pleasure doctrine no longer applies under the 2010 Constitution, citing Ongaya J's decisions, and that the petitioner was not a political appointee. However, it held the appointment was made to a non-existent position since the 2014 Act postdated the appointment, and the petitioner failed to annex the critical letter of appointment dated 7th October 2013, reducing his case to a shell. His refusal to attend vetting was treated as a waiver of his right to a hearing, on the authority of Amiga and Aimba. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs. The case against the 4th respondent was withdrawn by consent.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the pleasure doctrine applies to the petitioner's removal as County Attorney

Holding

No. The pleasure doctrine and servants-of-the-crown doctrine were rendered inoperative by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; all public and state officers are servants of the people and are removable only through due process.

Reasoning

The court adopted the reasoning of Byram Ongaya, J in Margaret Lorna Kariuki v Embu County Government (2015) eKLR, which relied on Richard Bwogo Birir v Narok County Government and Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu v County Government of Nyeri. It held that under Articles 1, 10, 73 and 129, executive authority derives from the people and no public officer serves another but the people. Accordingly the petitioner was not a political appointee and the respondent could not invoke the pleasure doctrine to justify removal.

p. 5
02

Whether the petitioner was validly appointed as Bomet County Attorney

Holding

No. The Bomet County Office of the County Attorney Act, 2014 was not in place at the time of the alleged appointment in October 2013, so the appointment was to a non-existent position.

Reasoning

The petitioner relied on the 2014 Act as authority for his office, but the appointment allegedly occurred in October 2013 when no statute established the office. The petitioner also failed to annex the letter of appointment dated 7th October 2013 said to have been backdated to 1st July 2013, weakening proof of the contractual relationship. The respondents argued the office had not been established by the County Public Service Board under Section 5 of the Act, making any appointment illegal ab initio.

p. 8
03

Whether the petitioner's failure to attend vetting affected the lawfulness of his removal

Holding

Yes, adversely to the petitioner. His refusal to attend the vetting process was belligerent conduct that waived his right to a hearing and made his termination defensible.

Reasoning

The court relied on John Mose Amiga v Dominion Vegefruits Ltd and Jared Aimba v Fina Bank Ltd, where employees who refused to attend disciplinary hearings were held to have made civil disciplinary hearings impossible and waived their right to be heard. The petitioner, an advocate, declined the invitation to vetting. The court agreed with the respondents that this refusal to attend the lawfully notified vetting process rendered the employment vulnerable and supported lawful termination.

p. 9
04

Whether a constitutional petition was the proper vehicle given the ordinary employer/employee relationship

Holding

Yes, the choice of procedure lies with the party; the thin line between employment and constitutional rights means the petition was not defective for that reason.

Reasoning

The respondents argued the dispute was an ordinary employer/employee matter and that constitutional violations did not arise. The court disagreed, holding that employment and constitutional rights are intertwined and that parties have a choice of procedure and methodology in approaching a court, which does not render a cause defective. Nevertheless the petition failed on proof and conduct.

p. 8

Legal principles established

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  • The pleasure doctrine does not apply in Kenya's public and state service under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; public servants are servants of the people governed by due process
  • The letter of appointment is a critical document in establishing an employment contract and relationship, and its non-production is fatal to a claim
  • An employee who refuses to attend a disciplinary or vetting process waives the right to be heard and cannot later complain of unfair termination
  • The border between employment rights and constitutional rights is thin, and parties may choose the procedure for approaching the court

Court orders

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  1. 1.The petition is dismissed
  2. 2.Each party bears their own costs of the petition

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Articles 1, 6, 10, 27, 28, 41, 47, 50, 73, 75, 76, 129, 251 and Preamble
  • Bomet County Office of the County Attorney Act, 2014Sections 5 and 12
  • County Governments Act, 2012Sections 58, 75 and 77
  • Employment Act, 2007Sections 41, 45, 46 and 51

Cases cited (7)

  • Margaret Lorna Kariuki v Embu County Government (2015) eKLR
    (2015) eKLR
  • Richard Bwogo Birir v Narok County Government and 2 Others (2014) eKLR
    (2014) eKLR
  • Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu v The County Government of Nyeri and Another (2014) eKLR
    (2014) eKLR
  • Mundia Njeru Geteria v Embu County Government & 3 Others (2013) eKLR
    (2013) eKLR
  • Abbot vs. Sullivan (1952) 1 KB 189
    (1952) 1 KB 189
  • John Mose Amiga v Dominion Vegefruits Ltd Industrial Cause No. 77 of 2012
    Industrial Cause No. 77 of 2012
  • Jared Aimba v Fina Bank Ltd Industrial Cause No. 525 (N) of 2009
    Industrial Cause No. 525 (N) of 2009
Jurisdiction invoked
Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Articles 27, 28, 41, 47, 50, 76 and 251 invoked in the petition); Employment Act, 2007; County Governments Act, 2012

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Samuel Kipkoech Keter v County Government of Bomet & 3 others [2016] KEELRC 1530 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2016). Petition dated 26th June, 2015. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2016/1530/eng@2016-03-16

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.