John Waruinge Kamau v Phoenix Aviation Limited [2015] KEELRC 788 (KLR)
The bottom line
#The Employment and Labour Relations Court refused to undo a settlement a worker regretted, confirming consent judgments are binding unless fraud, coercion, mistake or misrepresentation is proved.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Threshold for setting aside a consent judgment
The claimant failed to meet the threshold; no misrepresentation, mistake, coercion or breach of express instructions was proved
The court held that consent orders are contractual in nature and can only be set aside on grounds justifying rescission of a contract. The claimant admitted meeting his advocate on 1st October 2014 and emailing on 4th October 2014 authorising settlement. No withdrawal of instructions was produced before adoption of the consent on 4th November 2014. An improvident bargain alone is not a ground for interference.
Ostensible authority of an advocate to compromise
The advocate had ostensible authority based on the claimant's email entrusting the matter to his professional judgment
The email of 4th October 2014 stated the claimant would go by the advocate's advice as settlement was his area of speciality. The court held the respondent properly acted on the consent and had already deposited the agreed sum with its advocates for transmission. The alleged misrepresentations were not material misrepresentations in law.
Functus officio and abuse of process
The court was not functus officio and the application, though unsuccessful, was not an abuse of process
The respondent argued the court could not interrogate its own decision. The court rejected this, holding the Industrial Court Act and Rules confer power to set aside and review its decisions. However, the claimant's application failed on merit as it did not meet the threshold for setting aside consent judgments.
Legal principles established
#- A consent judgment, once adopted by the court, acquires the force and effect of a judgment and may only be set aside on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract, such as fraud, coercion, mistake or misrepresentation
- An advocate has ostensible authority to compromise a client's case where the client has entrusted the matter to the advocate's discretion
- The Industrial Court is not functus officio after adopting a consent judgment, as it has jurisdiction to set aside and review its decisions, and seeking such review is not per se an abuse of process
- A consent agreement compromising a discrimination claim is a compromise of the right, not a breach of it, and cannot be declared a nullity where no constitutional rights were pleaded in the claim
Court orders
#- 1.The claimant's application dated 7th November 2014 is dismissed
- 2.The sum of Kshs 50,000/= held by the respondent's advocates to be released to Koceyo & Company Advocates
- 3.Each party shall bear its own costs of the application
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Sections 12 and 16 of the Industrial Court Act; Articles 159(2)(d) and 162(2) of the Constitution
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "John Waruinge Kamau v Phoenix Aviation Limited [2015] KEELRC 788 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2015). Not stated in judgment (Industrial Court claim filed 30th July 2013). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2015/788/eng@2015-07-07
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.