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ELCDismissedNot stated in the judgment· [2026] KEELC 1760 (KLR)

Farah & another v Adan & another (Environment and Land Case E229 of 2022) [2026] KEELC 1760 (KLR)

High Court of Kenya (trial court not expressly named in the excerpt)
24 March 2026
3,422 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~14 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A Kenyan High Court dismissed a bid to have a judge step aside for bias, ruling that disagreeing with court directions is not bias.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The 1st Defendant, Yusuf Abdi Adan, moved the Court by Notice of Motion dated 16th February 2026 seeking the recusal of the trial Judge, alleging bias arising from two case management events. First, on 27th January 2026, after he sought an adjournment pending an application for stay of proceedings, the Court directed him to reimburse the Plaintiffs' travel and accommodation expenses from Dubai and Zambia without first verifying the supporting documents, which the Plaintiffs supported with handwritten receipts and an unsigned pro forma invoice allegedly exceeding USD 10,000. Second, on 5th February 2026, the Court declined to hear his application of 30th January 2026 seeking summons to the Director of Immigration to verify the alleged travel, holding it premature. The 1st Plaintiff opposed, characterising the application as part of a pattern of obstruction, including a prior recusal application against Hon. Lady Justice Lucy Mbugua; the 2nd Defendant filed grounds of opposition and submissions, relying on Ashok Labshanker Doshi v Central Bank of Kenya. The Court framed a single issue: whether sufficient grounds for recusal were established. Applying the objective fair-minded and informed observer test from Jasbir Singh Rai and Kibisu v Republic, and Rule 21(1) of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations 2020, the Court held that the impugned orders were lawful case management directions; the reimbursement order followed the 1st Defendant's own adjournment, and the burden of proof lay on the parties, the Court not being an investigator. Dissatisfaction with directions is not bias; review and appeal are the proper remedies. The application was dismissed with costs. However, the Judge nonetheless recused herself from further handling the matter for personal reasons, expressly not on the merits.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the orders of 27th January 2026 and 5th February 2026 established a reasonable apprehension of bias warranting recusal

Holding

No. The impugned directions were ordinary case management: the reimbursement order followed the 1st Defendant's own adjournment and left quantification to the parties, and the ruling that the verification application was premature was a lawful allocation of the burden of proof.

Reasoning

The Court applied the objective test from Jasbir Singh Rai and Kibisu v Republic. The reimbursement order arose from an adjournment sought by the 1st Defendant himself and did not fix any amount. The refusal to assist in verifying the plaintiffs' travel documents reflected the rule that the burden of proof lies on the parties and the Court cannot become an investigator. A fair-minded observer would not perceive a real possibility of bias.

p. 6
02

Whether recusal may substitute for appellate or review remedies

Holding

No. A litigant aggrieved by procedural directions must pursue review or appeal; recusal cannot be used as a substitute remedy.

Reasoning

The Court held that even if the Applicant was aggrieved by the directions regarding his application, the law provides remedies of review and appeal. The totality of the complaints revealed a pattern of dissatisfaction with rulings rather than objective demonstration of bias, and recusal is not a mechanism for challenging judicial decisions one dislikes.

p. 7
03

Whether the Judge nonetheless recused herself despite dismissing the application

Holding

Yes, for personal reasons only, expressly not on the merits.

Reasoning

Notwithstanding finding the application unsubstantiated and dismissing it with costs, the Judge stated she would recuse herself from further handling the matter due to personal reasons, clarifying that this decision was not based on the merits of the recusal application.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • The test for recusal is objective: whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered all the relevant facts, would conclude there is a real possibility of bias; unsubstantiated suspicion will not suffice.
  • Dissatisfaction with case management directions or judicial decisions does not constitute evidence of bias; review and appeal are the proper remedies, recusal is not a substitute.
  • Allegations of bias must be reasonable, objective and based on cogent evidence, not mere suspicion.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The 1st Defendant's Notice of Motion dated 16th February 2026 seeking recusal of the trial Judge is dismissed
  2. 2.The application is dismissed with costs
  3. 3.Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Judge will recuse herself from further handling the matter due to personal reasons, not on the merits
Jurisdiction invoked
Articles 47(1), 50(1), 159(2) and 160(1) of the Constitution; Sections 1 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Act; Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules; Sections 3 and 12 of the Fair Administrative Action Act 2015; Section 3 of the Judicature Act

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Farah & another v Adan & another (Environment and Land Case E229 of 2022) [2026] KEELC 1760 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/1760/eng@2026-03-24

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.