Njurai v Mwangi (Environment and Land Appeal E006 of 2024) [2026] KEELC 1241 (KLR)

The sale agreement was executed in 2003 when the vendor, a beneficiary under a confirmed grant, was not yet registered proprietor and lacked capacity to transfer. The obligation to transfer was contingent on registration, which occurred on 23rd February 2022. The legal effect of the 2014 MOU and what constituted a reasonable time for completion required evidential interrogation at trial. The exact date of accrual was not self-evident from the pleadings.

The court adopted the principle from Halsbury's Laws of England and Attorney General v Andrew Maina Githinji that time begins to run when there is a breach. Where no time is fixed for performance, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and determining what is reasonable is a factual inquiry. A claimant cannot indefinitely postpone accrual by failing to demand performance.

Following Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd, the court restated that an appeal is by way of retrial and the appellate court is not bound by the findings of fact below, though due allowance must be made for the fact that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses.

Relying on Divecon v Samani, the court noted that Section 4(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act is mandatory and admits no discretion for contract actions, and no court may entertain an action founded on contract brought six years after the cause of action accrued. The central inquiry is therefore when the cause of action accrued.

The respondent's submissions raised adverse possession, but the court declined to consider it because a new cause of action cannot be introduced at the appellate stage and parties are bound by their pleadings.