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ELCAllowedNot stated in the extract· [2026] KEELC 666 (KLR)

Shreeji Enterprise (Kenya) Limited v Ranpura & 3 others (Environment and Land Case E088 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 666 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court of Kenya
12 February 2026
2,079 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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A Mombasa court froze two Mombasa plots, stopping their sale or development until it decides who really owns them.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The plaintiff, Sheeji Enterprises (Kenya) Limited, moved the court by notice of motion dated 05.08.2025 under Sections 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with its possession and occupation of Plot No. MN/VI/2442 (CR. 14500) and Plot No. MN/III/9192 (CR. 61811) pending trial. The plaintiff contended it bought the two parcels under sale agreements in 2009 and 2010, that the 1st defendant was nominated to oversee the transactions and registrations, but instead fraudulently transferred the properties to himself and was in the process of selling them to a third party. The 1st defendant, Naresh Jayantilal Ranpura, opposed, contending the plaintiff was a quasi-partnership of three families; that he purchased Plot MN/VI/2442 in his own name in 2010 and acquired Plot MN/III/9192 from Salim Mohamed Abdalla in 2013; and that the plaintiff's payment was on account of drawings from his share of profits. He also cited a shareholding dispute in Mombasa HCCC No. E609 of 2025. The court framed two issues: whether an interim injunction was merited, and costs. Applying Giella v Cassman Brown and Mrao v First American Bank, and without making conclusive findings on the disputed fraud allegations, the court held the plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case with probability of success given its possession and construction of a perimeter wall, and that damages would not adequately compensate it since the 1st defendant's means were unknown. A temporary injunction issued restraining the defendants from alienating, developing, selling or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff's occupation of the suit properties pending hearing and determination of the suit. Costs were ordered in the cause, and the suit was fixed for pretrial directions on 20.04.2026.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

Yes - the plaintiff's claimed purchase and possession, including a constructed perimeter wall, gave it apparent rights and interests over the suit properties.

Reasoning

The 1st defendant was registered proprietor of the two parcels, but the plaintiff alleged that as its agent he fraudulently registered them in his own name. The plaintiff produced receipts and a contract for civil works showing it built a perimeter wall on Plot MN/III/9192, and the 1st defendant did not deny the plaintiff's physical occupation, contending only that he had been locked out. The court, without making final findings on the contested fraud allegations, held the plaintiff appeared to have rights and interests from its dealings with the properties and thus demonstrated a prima facie case with probability of success.

02

Whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury not compensable by damages

Holding

Yes - potential alienation of the land could detrimentally affect the plaintiff, and no evidence showed the 1st defendant could satisfy a compensation order.

Reasoning

Although the 1st defendant argued the parcels could be valued and any loss compensated in damages, the court held that while land value can be quantified through valuation, loss from the 1st defendant dealing with the suit land may be detrimental to the plaintiff. Critically, there was nothing on record showing the 1st defendant's means to satisfy a possible compensation order. The purpose of an interlocutory injunction being preservation of the status quo and the disputed property, an injunction was warranted to prevent any judgment being rendered nugatory.

p. 4
03

Costs of the application

Holding

Costs were ordered in the cause, following Giella v Cassman Brown.

Reasoning

While costs are discretionary and ordinarily follow the event under the proviso to Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, the Court of Appeal in Giella v Cassman Brown held that where an injunction is granted, the appropriate order is costs in the cause. The court found no good reason to depart from that position and ordered costs in the cause.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • The conditions for an interlocutory injunction are a prima facie case with probability of success, irreparable injury not compensable in damages, and balance of convenience if in doubt.
  • A prima facie case in civil cases requires apparent infringement of a right and probability of success, higher than an arguable case.
  • In interlocutory applications the court makes no conclusive findings of fact or law on contradictory affidavit evidence.
  • Costs follow the event under the proviso to Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and costs in an injunction application that succeeds are in the cause.

Court orders

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  1. 1.A temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, employees and/or representatives from alienating, developing and/or undertaking construction, selling, disposing of, transferring to third parties and/or in any other way generally interfering with the plaintiff's quiet and peaceful occupation of Plot No. MN/III/9192 (CR. 61811) and Plot No. MN/VI/2442 (CR. 14500) pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
  2. 2.Costs shall be in the cause.
  3. 3.The suit to be mentioned on 20.04.2026 for pretrial directions.

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21)Section 3A
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21)Section 63(e)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21)Section 27 (proviso)
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 40 Rules 1, 2, 3 & 4

Cases cited (5)

  • Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd
    [1973] EA 358
  • EA Industries v Trufoods
    [1972] EA 420
  • Mrao Ltd. v. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others
    [2003] KLR 125
  • Salford Investment Limited v Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Co. Ltd
    [2021] KEELC 815 (KLR)
  • Airland Tours & Travel Limited v National Industrial Credit Bank
    Nairobi (Milimani) HCCC No. 1234 of 2002
Jurisdiction invoked
Sections 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 Rules 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Shreeji Enterprise (Kenya) Limited v Ranpura & 3 others (Environment and Land Case E088 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 666 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the extract. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/666/eng@2026-02-12

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.