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ELCAllowedNot stated in the judgment· [2026] KEELC 312 (KLR)

Karuri & another v Kenya Defence Forces & 3 others (Environment and Land Case E220 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 312 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court of Kenya
27 January 2026
MKMohammed N. Kullow
1,737 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a first-instance ruling by the Environment and Land Court at Nairobi (Mohammed N. Kullow, J) on a Notice of Motion dated 5th March 2025 in which the applicants, registered owners of property IR No 52592 LR No 209/11396 at Eastleigh next to Moi Airbase, sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from entering, constructing on, subdividing or dealing with the suit property pending hearing of the suit. The applicants deposed, through Nancy Wangechi Karuri, that they were beneficial owners; that the 1st defendant had objected to their constructing a perimeter wall on part of their land citing security concerns; and that the 2nd defendant had thereafter constructed toilets on that section, allegedly with approval of the 4th defendant, making them apprehend an unlawful takeover. The 1st and 3rd defendants denied interfering with the property, claiming title through the National Treasury as trustee and citing airbase safety distances; the 2nd defendant disclaimed the toilets, attributing them to a third party, Madhiwa Highway CBO; the 4th defendant denied issuing any approvals. Framing the sole issue as whether the applicants had met the threshold for temporary injunctions, the court applied Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the Giella v Cassman Brown principles. It found a prima facie case (registration in the applicants' names and uncontested construction of public toilets on the land), irreparable harm (tenant desertion and depreciation of the land), and balance of convenience in the applicants' favour. The application was allowed with temporary injunction issuing as prayed, and costs were ordered to be in the cause notwithstanding section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. The ruling was delivered virtually at Nairobi on 27th January 2026, with Mr. Aria for the plaintiff, Mr. Kirga for the 1st and 3rd defendants, and Mr. Orimbha for the 2nd defendant.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the applicants established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

Yes. It was not in dispute that the property was registered in the applicants' names and that public toilets had been constructed on the suit property, an apparently infringed right calling for rebuttal.

Reasoning

The court found the property undisputedly registered in the applicants' names and that construction of public toilets on it had occurred and was not controverted. Applying the Mrao definition, an apparently infringed right to quiet possession existed which called for an explanation from the respondents, whose only answer—that ownership was unproved—did not displace the register.

p. 4
02

Whether the applicants would suffer irreparable harm not compensable by damages

Holding

Yes. The toilets adjacent to residential rental premises would cause tenants to desert and depreciate the land's value, making restoration impossible.

Reasoning

The applicants showed the toilets were next to rental space let for residential purposes; tenants might desert the premises and the land would depreciate such that it could not be restored to its original state. Applying Nguruman, this was harm of a nature monetary compensation could never adequately remedy.

p. 4
03

Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction

Holding

Yes. The applicants demonstrated prejudice they would suffer, while the respondents did not show any loss they would suffer if the injunction issued.

Reasoning

On the third Giella limb, the court weighed prejudice. The applicants had demonstrated how they would be prejudiced by continued construction, whereas the respondents adduced nothing showing loss to them if restrained. The balance therefore tilted in favour of granting the injunction pending the hearing of the suit.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • The principles for granting an interlocutory injunction are those in Giella v Cassman Brown: prima facie case with probability of success, irreparable injury not compensable by damages, and balance of convenience in case of doubt.
  • A prima facie case in a civil application is a genuine and arguable case showing an apparently infringed right calling for an explanation or rebuttal from the opposite party.
  • An injury is irreparable where its amount cannot be measured with reasonable accuracy or where monetary compensation will never be an adequate remedy.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents or any person claiming through them from entering, undertaking construction on, subdividing or dealing with the suit property IR No 52592 LR No 209/11396 at Eastleigh, pending hearing and determination of the suit
  2. 2.Costs of the application to be in the cause
Jurisdiction invoked
Inherent jurisdiction under Order 40 Rule 1(a) and (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules (interlocutory injunction in an pending suit)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Karuri & another v Kenya Defence Forces & 3 others (Environment and Land Case E220 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 312 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/312/eng@2026-01-27

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.