Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
ELCDismissedNot stated in the judgment (application dated 28th June 2019; judicial review proceedings filed 19th July 2019)· [2019] KEELC 970 (KLR)

Christopher Aluda Keya v Moses Kitagwa Alloo [2019] KEELC 970 (KLR)

High Court of Kenya at Kakamega
5 November 2019
870 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~3 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

The High Court refused to revive a challenge to a 2001 land tribunal decision, ruling a 20-year delay was inexcusable.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
The applicant, Christopher Aluda Keya, moved the High Court by an application dated 28th June 2019 under Order 50 Rules 1 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Articles 21(1), 23(3)(f), 25(c), 27(1), 47(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution. He sought leave to commence judicial review proceedings out of time to quash the decision of the Vihiga Land Disputes Tribunal and its adoption as judgment in Vihiga Miscellaneous Application No. 64 of 2001, together with a restriction over land parcels South Maragoli/Bunyonga/2035 and 2036. He asserted that he was neither a party to the Tribunal proceedings nor served, that the land was registered in his name, and that the plot referred to in a sale agreement between Ephainitus Fundi Kilasi and Moses Kitagwa Aloo (deceased) was not the same as South Maragoli/Bunyonga/1589. He attributed the delay to late knowledge of the decision. The court applied Republic v Mwangi Nguyai ex-parte Haru Nguyai, Republic v The Minister for Lands & Settlement, and Rosaline Tubei v Patrick K. Cheruiyot, emphasising that judicial review is a special, exceptional jurisdiction subject to stringent limitation because public policy demands finality in administrative decisions. Applying the Ivita v Kyumbu test, Matheka J held that a delay of almost twenty years (the application having been filed on 19th July 2019) was prolonged and inexcusable. The application was found to have no merit and to constitute an abuse of the court process, and was dismissed entirely.

Key legal issues

#
01

Whether leave to commence judicial review out of time should be granted where the applicant alleges he was not a party to the Tribunal proceedings

Holding

The application was dismissed; the delay of almost 20 years was inexcusable notwithstanding the applicant's claim of late knowledge of the decision.

Reasoning

The court adopted the authorities holding that judicial review is a special jurisdiction subject to stringent limitation, driven by public policy favouring finality of public and administrative decisions. Following Ivita v Kyumbu, the test is whether the delay is prolonged and inexcusable and whether justice can still be done. The delay of nearly twenty years from the 2001 decision and adoption as judgment was held inexcusable, and the application was characterised as an abuse of the court process.

p. 2
02

Whether the applicant's claim that he was denied a hearing and that the plot in the sale agreement differed from the suit parcel justified the extension

Holding

These grievances did not justify an extension of time; the applicant was directed, in effect, to the finality of the limitation regime for judicial review.

Reasoning

The applicant argued he was never a party to the Tribunal proceedings, was never served, and that Plot No. 340 Buyonga was not the same as South Maragoli/Bunyonga/1589. The court did not engage with the merits of these allegations, holding instead that the door to judicial review was shut by effluxion of time and that the applicant must find other avenues for his grievances.

p. 2

Legal principles established

#
  • Judicial review proceedings must be instituted promptly; the stringent limitation period reflects public policy that the validity of public decisions should not remain in suspense indefinitely, and judicial review remedies should not be made available to indolent parties who sleep on their rights.
  • A court cannot grant leave to a party seeking to file a judicial review application out of time where the limitation period has lapsed; the applicant must pursue other avenues.
  • The test for extension of time is whether the delay is prolonged and inexcusable and whether justice will nonetheless be done despite the delay, justice being for both parties.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.The application dated 28th June 2019 is dismissed with the finding that it has no merit and is an abuse of the court process
Jurisdiction invoked
Sections 1A and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act; Order 50 Rules 1 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules; Articles 21(1), 23(3)(f), 25(c), 27(1), 47(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution (application for extension of time to commence judicial review proceedings)

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Christopher Aluda Keya v Moses Kitagwa Alloo [2019] KEELC 970 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2019). Not stated in the judgment (application dated 28th June 2019; judicial review proceedings filed 19th July 2019). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2019/970/eng@2019-11-05

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.