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ELCPartially AllowedNot stated in the judgment (ruling on Plaintiff's application dated 22/11/2017 and 2nd Defendant's application dated 04/07/2018)· [2019] KEELC 74 (KLR)

Benjamin Mutuku Mutwa v Benard Maithya Nthenge & another [2019] KEELC 74 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court (Makueni)
28 November 2019
2,940 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~12 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A Makueni court let a 1977 land sale claim go to trial because fraud was alleged, and stopped the new title holder from interfering with the land.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This ruling of the Environment and Land Court at Makueni (Mbogo CG, J) determined two interlocutory applications in a land dispute over parcel Makueni/Unoa/1901. The Plaintiff sought a temporary injunction restraining the 2nd Defendant from trespassing on and constructing a toilet on the suit land pending trial, alleging he purchased the property from the 1st Defendant in 1977, paid the full price, took possession in May 1977, and remained in possession until 2015 when the 2nd Defendant, allegedly holding a fraudulently acquired title, entered and began construction. The 2nd Defendant applied to strike out the amended plaint under Order 2 Rule 15, contending the suit - founded on a 1977 contract - was statute barred under sections 4(1)(a) and 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act, and that the absence of Land Control Board consent rendered the contract void. He also filed a preliminary objection on the same grounds. The court first dismissed the 2nd Defendant's striking-out application, holding that although a 38-year-old contract may prima facie be time barred, the Plaintiff demonstrated possession after paying the purchase price, and the allegations of fraud in the 2nd Defendant's registration engaged the proviso to section 26 of the Limitation of Actions Act, requiring a full trial; the missing refund prayer was curable by amendment. Turning to the injunction, the court found a prima facie case with probability of success, corroborated by the 1st Defendant, found irreparable harm in the risk of disposal to bona fide purchasers, and held the balance of convenience favoured the Plaintiff. The injunction application was allowed in terms of prayers 2, 3 and 4, and the striking-out application dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff.

Key legal issues

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01

Limitation of actions - whether a 1977 contract suit is statute barred

Holding

The suit is not statute barred at the interlocutory stage because the Plaintiff took possession in 1977 after paying the purchase price, and allegations of fraud in the registration of the 2nd Defendant raise the section 26 proviso requiring trial.

Reasoning

The court accepted that a 38-year-old contract may prima facie be time barred, but the Plaintiff demonstrated possession from 1977 to about 2015, and the 1st Defendant corroborated this. Both Plaintiff and 1st Defendant questioned how the 2nd Defendant acquired title, engaging the fraud proviso to section 26 of the Limitation of Actions Act, which requires the matter to go to full hearing.

p. 4
02

Land Control Act consent - whether lack of consent is fatal

Holding

The court declined to strike out the suit on the Land Control Act ground at the interlocutory stage, since fraud was alleged and the matter required substantive hearing.

Reasoning

The 2nd Defendant argued that failure to obtain Land Control Board consent within six months rendered the contract void. The court found that the dispute over how the 2nd Defendant was registered as proprietor, and the fraud allegations, required a full trial rather than striking out the plaint on a point of law.

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Interlocutory injunction - Giella principles

Holding

The Plaintiff established a prima facie case with probability of success, potential irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience tilted in his favour; a temporary injunction was granted.

Reasoning

Affidavit evidence showed the Plaintiff took possession in May 1977 after paying the full purchase price and remained in possession until 2015. The 1st Defendant supported the Plaintiff's account. Irreparable harm was inferred from the risk that the 2nd Defendant, against whom fraud was alleged, could dispose of the property to third parties who might acquire valid titles as purchasers for value without notice.

p. 4
04

Striking out plaint for lack of refund prayer

Holding

The omission of a prayer for refund of the purchase price is curable by amendment and does not justify striking out the plaint.

Reasoning

The 2nd Defendant argued the suit should fail because the Plaintiff did not plead refund of the purchase price in the alternative. The court held, consistent with Bogani Properties Ltd v Fredrick Wairegi Karuri, that the defect could be cured by amendment and that dismissal would push the Plaintiff from the seat of justice.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • Where fraud is alleged in the acquisition or registration of land, the suit must proceed to full trial and limitation does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered.
  • Omission of a prayer for refund of the purchase price is a curable defect and not a ground for striking out a plaint at the interlocutory stage.
  • The Giella principles apply to interlocutory injunctions in land disputes: prima facie case, irreparable harm not compensable in damages, and balance of convenience; fraud allegations may establish irreparable harm.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The 2nd Defendant's notice of motion application dated 4th July, 2018 (to strike out the amended plaint) is dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff
  2. 2.The Plaintiff's notice of motion application dated 22nd November, 2017 is allowed in terms of prayers 2, 3 and 4
  3. 3.A temporary injunction is issued restraining the 2nd Defendant, his servants or agents from trespassing on land parcel No. Makueni/Unoa/1901, from continuing to build a toilet on the suit premises, or in any other manner interfering with the suit premises pending the hearing and determination of the suit
  4. 4.Costs of the Plaintiff's application to be borne by the Respondents (prayer 4 allowed)

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 40 Rules 1, 2, 3, 4; Order 51 Rule 1; Order 2 Rule 15
  • Civil Procedure ActSections 3 and 3A
  • Limitation of Actions Act, Cap 22Sections 4(1)(a), 7, 22, 26(a) and proviso
  • Land Control Act, Chapter 302Consent requirement (six months)

Cases cited (4)

  • Suleiman vs. Amboseli Resort Ltd
    [2004] 2 KLR 589
  • Purity Wanjiku Nderitu & Another vs. Humphrey Wang'ombe Kaharizi & Another
    [2013] eKLR
  • Mintina Ene Keton Koponi (suing as a legal representative of the estate of Keton Ole Koponi Parsena (deceased) vs. Francis Njakwe Gathiari & 2 others
    [2018] eKLR
  • Bogani Properties Ltd vs. Fredrick Wairegi Karuri
    [2015] eKLR
Jurisdiction invoked
Inherent jurisdiction under Sections 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules (injunction application); Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules (striking-out application)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Benjamin Mutuku Mutwa v Benard Maithya Nthenge & another [2019] KEELC 74 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2019). Not stated in the judgment (ruling on Plaintiff's application dated 22/11/2017 and 2nd Defendant's application dated 04/07/2018). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2019/74/eng@2019-11-28

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.