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ELCDismissedNot stated in judgment· [2018] KEELC 4683 (KLR)

Flora Makokha Wanjala v Timothy Isaya Wakukha & Yohana Muchisi Isaya [2018] KEELC 4683 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court
23 January 2018
1,210 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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The Environment and Land Court in Kakamega refused to stop land occupation because the owner couldn't show harm that money couldn't fix.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The plaintiff/applicant, claiming to be the registered owner of L.R. SOUTH KABRAS/BUSHU/3611 (0.81 Ha), moved the court by notice of motion dated 12th May 2017 under sections 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking temporary injunctions restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and relatives from trespassing on, encroaching on, occupying, selling, alienating or dealing with the parcel, pending the hearing of the application inter partes and the finalization of the suit. She relied on a copy of her title deed, a District Surveyor's report showing beacons planted and uprooted, and letters from the Assistant Chief; she asserted a prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience in her favour. The 2nd defendant/respondent opposed the application, deponing that he resides on the parcel with his family and ageing father, that it was subdivided from S. KABRAS/BUSHU/1430 of which he was the sole registered owner, and that the transfer and division into parcels 3610 and 3611 was effected without his consent or knowledge. He contended the application was brought in bad faith and that the applicant, a non-resident non-user of the land, would suffer no irreparable harm. Applying the Giella v Cassman Brown principles as elaborated in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank, the court held that the fraud raised by the respondents could only be determined at full hearing, that the applicant had not shown irreparable injury not compensable by damages, and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants in occupation. The application was dismissed with costs in the cause.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the applicant established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

Although the applicant claimed to be the registered proprietor, the 2nd respondent raised fraud regarding the subdivision of S. KABRAS/BUSHU/1430, an issue reserved for trial; the court did not find a prima facie case sufficient to grant the injunction

Reasoning

The court applied the Giella v Cassman Brown principles and Mrao's definition of a prima facie case. The applicant asserted registered ownership and trespass, but the 2nd respondent contended he owned the parent parcel and that the subdivision occurred without his consent, raising fraud which the court held could only be determined at full hearing.

p. 2
02

Whether the applicant would suffer irreparable injury not adequately compensable by damages

Holding

No - the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable injury

Reasoning

The court found the applicant had not shown that she might suffer irreparable injury which damages could not adequately compensate. The 2nd respondent had argued the applicant neither resides on nor utilizes the land and thus stands to suffer no irreparable harm; the court accepted that the balance favoured the respondents.

p. 3
03

Where the balance of convenience lies

Holding

The balance of convenience lies in favour of the defendants, who currently reside on the land with their families

Reasoning

The 2nd respondent deponed that he resides on the parcel with his family and ageing father, that it is his source of livelihood, and that the parcel was carved out of land he solely owned. On this material the court concluded the balance of convenience favoured the defendants rather than the non-resident applicant.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • The conditions for granting an interlocutory injunction are a prima facie case with probability of success, irreparable injury not adequately compensable by damages, and, if in doubt, the balance of convenience (Giella v Cassman Brown)
  • A prima facie case is more than an arguable case; the evidence must show infringement of a right and the probability of the applicant's case upon trial (Mrao Ltd)
  • Allegations of fraud cannot be determined on an interlocutory application but must await the full hearing

Court orders

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  1. 1.The application dated 12th May 2017 is dismissed
  2. 2.Costs to be in the cause

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Actsection 3
  • Civil Procedure Actsection 3A
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 40 rules 1, 2, 3 and 4
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 51 rule 1

Cases cited (2)

  • Giella vs. Cassman Brown
    (1973) EA 358
  • Mrao Ltd vs. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others
    {2003}
Jurisdiction invoked
Sections 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Flora Makokha Wanjala v Timothy Isaya Wakukha & Yohana Muchisi Isaya [2018] KEELC 4683 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Not stated in judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2018/4683/eng@2018-01-23

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.