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ELCAllowedNot stated in the judgment· [2018] KEELC 3900 (KLR)

Samuel Kiptanui Kipkor v Baringo County Government [2018] KEELC 3900 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court
2 March 2018
1,004 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The applicant, Samuel Kiptanui Kipkor, moved the Environment and Land Court at Eldoret by notice of motion dated 16th December, 2017 seeking a temporary injunction against the Baringo County Government to restrain it from entering, taking possession, allocating, leasing, charging, demolishing or dealing in any manner with Plot No. 29 at Kiptuno Trading Centre pending the hearing and determination of the suit. He swore he was allocated the plot by the County Council of Baringo in 1995, paid allocation and rent fees, took possession, and built a permanent structure after his building plan was approved in 2017, only to be served with notice that the plot stood on a public utility, with the County threatening demolition and already removing his fence. The respondent opposed through grounds of opposition and a replying affidavit of the Sub-County Administrator, contending the applicant was a trespasser ab initio without title or locus standi, that the plot did not exist and the allocation was only a provisional promise, and that the applicant lacked clean hands under the Giella v Cassman Brown principles. The court found the applicant's 1995 application was allowed, he was shown the suit plot, and he paid demarcation fees and plot rent from 1996 to 2005. It held the respondent's affidavit was self-contradictory - denying Plot No. 29's existence while admitting receipt of rent for it - confirming the plot existed. The applicant therefore established a prima facie case with probability of success, likely irreparable loss, and the balance of convenience favoured him. The court granted the temporary injunction as prayed pending hearing and determination of the suit.

Key legal issues

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01

Prima facie case for temporary injunction

Holding

The applicant established a prima facie case with probability of success: his 1995 plot application was allowed, he was shown the suit plot, paid demarcation fees and plot rent from 1996 to 2005, and developed the plot.

Reasoning

The court found the respondent's replying affidavit internally contradictory: it asserted the allocation was successful yet Plot No. 29 did not exist, while admitting receipt of rent for Plot No. 29 and that Plots 28-31 had been collapsed into Plot No. 32 for a public utility. That contradiction confirmed Plot No. 29 existed and had been allocated to the applicant, who had invested heavily on it.

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02

Irreparable loss and balance of convenience

Holding

Demolition of the permanent structures on the plot would cause irreparable loss; in any event the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the applicant.

Reasoning

The applicant had built a permanent structure and heavily invested on the parcel, which was not disputed. Demolition would be an irreversible act. The court stated it was not in doubt, but held that even if it were, the balance of convenience would tilt towards granting the injunction since the applicant would be inconvenienced if the structures were demolished.

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03

Respondent's locus standi and clean hands objections

Holding

The court did not uphold the respondent's objections that the applicant was a trespasser ab initio without locus standi; instead it found the applicant was allocated and possessed the plot.

Reasoning

The respondent (through the Sub-County Administrator) contended the applicant had no title, was a trespasser ab initio, and came with unclean hands, invoking Giella v Cassman Brown. The court, weighing the affidavit evidence, found the applicant's 1995 application was allowed, he was shown the ground he is developing, and he paid demarcation fees and rent, rejecting the respondent's denial of the plot's existence as self-contradictory.

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Legal principles established

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  • A party who, in a replying affidavit, states an allocation was successful while denying the plot's existence, and who admits receiving rent for that plot, contradicts itself; such conduct ('blowing cold and hot') supports a finding that the plot existed and was allocated to the applicant.
  • Payment of demarcation fees and plot rent over many years, plus substantial development of the plot, demonstrates a prima facie case and likely irreparable loss justifying a temporary injunction.

Court orders

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  1. 1.A temporary injunction to restrain the defendant by itself, its agents, servants, employees or others whosoever from entering into, taking possession of, acquiring, allocating, leasing out, charging, demolishing or dealing in any other manner on Plot No. 29 at Kiptuno Trading Centre pending the hearing and determination of this suit

Authorities

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Cases cited (1)

  • Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd
    (1973) 1 EA 358
Jurisdiction invoked
Original jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court over land disputes (Notice of Motion dated 16th December, 2017 seeking a temporary injunction)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Samuel Kiptanui Kipkor v Baringo County Government [2018] KEELC 3900 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2018/3900/eng@2018-03-02

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.