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ELCDismissedNot stated in the judgment (application dated 7th March 2017 in the main suit)· [2018] KEELC 2976 (KLR)

Benjamin Kipwambok Samoei (suing for and on behalf of AIC Kenya Registered Trustees) v Attorney General & 2 others [2018] KEELC 2976 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court
19 March 2018
2,170 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~9 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A landowner's title certificate alone wasn't enough to evict long-standing tea farmers at the interim stage — occupation counts.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a ruling of the Environment and Land Court at Eldoret by M.A. Odeny, J, on the plaintiff's notice of motion dated 7th March 2017 seeking a temporary injunction against the 3rd and 4th defendants to restrain them from trespassing on, ploughing, planting on, encroaching on, plucking tea from, or leasing land parcel Kapsabet/Municipality/363 pending the hearing of the application and the main suit. The 1st and 2nd defendants declined to participate in the application. The plaintiff claimed to have been allocated the land in 1992 and issued with a certificate of lease in 1998, and asserted the defendants had illegally encroached on a portion planted with tea. The 3rd and 4th defendants countered that the 3rd defendant had occupied the land since 1959, been allocated it by the colonial government for tea planting, had a contract to deliver tea to Kaimosi tea factory, and held the land in trust for the people of Nandi County; they also alleged the plaintiff's title was fraudulently acquired. Applying the Giella v Casman Brown principles, the court found the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case with a probability of success: occupation by the 3rd defendant and tea plucking were admitted or evident from documents predating the plaintiff's lease, and the disputed process of acquisition of the certificate of lease meant production of title documents was not conclusive. The court further held the defendants would suffer the irreparable loss as their tea was going to waste, and declined to issue an injunction that would amount to an unenforceable eviction of a party in occupation. The application was dismissed with no orders as to costs, the status quo before the suit was to be maintained, and the parties were directed to comply with Order 11 and fast-track the case for hearing.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

The plaintiff did not; although the plaintiff held a certificate of lease, the 3rd defendant's occupation and tea-plucking since before the lease was not in dispute, and the defendants disputed the acquisition of the title

Reasoning

The court applied the Giella v Casman Brown principles. While the plaintiff exhibited a certificate of lease granted in 1998 following allotment in 1992, the defendants claimed occupation since 1959 and exhibited a Tea Board letter dating to 1997 and a contract with Kaimosi tea factory. The court found the documentary evidence showed the defendant in occupation, that the plaintiff had delayed asserting rights, and that where the validity of the title process is disputed by defence and counterclaim, production of ownership documents alone does not establish a prima facie case.

p. 3
02

Irreparable harm and balance of convenience

Holding

It is the defendants, not the plaintiff, who would suffer irreparable loss since the tea bushes were going to waste under interim orders

Reasoning

Although the court would ordinarily stop at the first limb once no prima facie case is found, it addressed the second limb and found it pointed the opposite way: the tea planted by the 3rd defendant was going to waste because of the interim orders, so the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo ante rather than restraining the defendants.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • The purpose of interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the substratum of the case, and courts should not issue orders in vain or that cannot be enforced
  • Where a party has proved occupation of land, an injunction restraining entry or possession amounts effectively to an eviction and should not issue
  • Production of a certificate of lease is not automatically a prima facie case where the process of acquisition of title is disputed

Court orders

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  1. 1.The application dated 7th March 2017 is dismissed with no orders as to costs
  2. 2.The status quo before the matter was brought to court be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the case
  3. 3.The parties to comply with Order 11 and fast track the case for hearing

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 11

Cases cited (3)

  • Giella Casman Brown
  • American Cynamid vs Ethicon Limited
    (1975) AC 396
  • Daniel Leura Kalasinga vs James Kayioni Kaikai
    (2016) eKLR E & L Court Kisii Case No. 367 of 2015
Jurisdiction invoked
Inherent powers of the court to grant interlocutory injunctive relief pending hearing and determination of the main suit concerning land parcel Kapsabet/Municipality/363

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Benjamin Kipwambok Samoei (suing for and on behalf of AIC Kenya Registered Trustees) v Attorney General & 2 others [2018] KEELC 2976 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Not stated in the judgment (application dated 7th March 2017 in the main suit). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2018/2976/eng@2018-03-19

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.