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ELCDismissedNot stated in the judgment (Notice of Motion dated 11th May 2018)· [2018] KEELC 2783 (KLR)

Benjamin Kariamburi Mwangi & 2 others v Kenya Elecricity Transmission Company & another [2018] KEELC 2783 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court
4 July 2018
5,360 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~21 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A Nyahururu court refused to stop power transmission lines on private farmland because the landowners had already signed an easement agreement and been paid compensation.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Applicants, registered proprietors of land parcel No. Nyandarua/Olaragwai/3432 and the flower-farming company operating on it, moved the Environment and Land Court at Nyahururu by Notice of Motion dated 11th May 2018 seeking a temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with the suit property by stringing high voltage power lines across it, pending the hearing of the main suit. They asserted that although an easement agreement had been signed on 23rd February 2015 subject to prompt compensation, the 1st Respondent forcefully entered the land in February 2017 to erect a 400 KV transmission line from Loiyangalani to Suswa without paying compensation for damaged crops and irrigation systems, in violation of Article 40(3)(b)(ii) of the Constitution, exposing them to contractual breaches and losses. The Respondents opposed, contending that the way leave process under the Land Act was duly followed, that the Applicants signed the easement agreement and an indemnity willingly and were paid a total of Kshs 24,688,778/=, that remaining compensation was only for anticipated damage during the pending stringing exercise, that the dispute was subject to arbitration under clause 11 of the agreement, and that an injunction would derail a project of great national importance at a cost of millions per day. Applying the Giella v Cassman Brown principles, the court found no prima facie case: the Respondents lawfully acquired the way leave and the parties were bound by their agreements and indemnity. Damages were an adequate remedy, and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest. The application was dismissed with costs to the Respondents, the interim status quo orders of 14th May 2018 were set aside, and parties were directed to comply with Order 11 within 21 days for the hearing of the main suit.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the Applicants established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

No. The Applicants consented to the easement/way leave, signed the easement agreement of 23rd February 2015 and an indemnity, were compensated, and the Respondents followed the statutory way leave process under the Land Act; their entry and construction were lawful

Reasoning

The court found the 1st Respondent followed the procedure laid down in the Land Act in acquiring the way leave, and that the 1st and 2nd Applicants had voluntarily signed the easement agreement and indemnity and had been paid Kshs 24,688,778.00 in compensation. A party cannot run away from the terms of its agreement, and no duress was suggested. Accordingly no apparently infringed right calling for rebuttal was established.

p. 6
02

Whether the Applicants would suffer irreparable harm not compensable in damages

Holding

No. The dispute is over compensation; damages already paid, and remaining compensation is ascertainable after the stringing exercise, so compensation is an adequate remedy

Reasoning

The Respondents had already paid a total of Kshs 24,688,778/= for damage caused, and what remained was compensation for anticipated damage from the stringing exercise, which the Respondents did not deny. Compensation for damages was therefore an available remedy, defeating irreparable-harm relief.

p. 7
03

Where the balance of convenience lies

Holding

In favour of the Respondents and the public: the transmission towers serve great national and public interest, and an injunction would cause heavy losses to the Respondents and the tax payer

Reasoning

The court found the electricity transmission towers are intended for the common good of the public and are of great national and public interest. Stoppage would cost the 1st Respondent about Kshs 500,000 per day under the EPC contract, and non-completion by 31st July 2018 would attract Kshs 33,000,000 per day payable to Lake Turkana Wind Power. Public interest prevailed over private interest.

p. 7
04

Whether the dispute should be referred to arbitration under the easement agreement

Holding

Raised by the Respondents under clause 11 of the agreement and section 7 of the Arbitration Act; the court disposed of the application on the Giella principles without ordering reference to arbitration

Reasoning

The Respondents submitted that clause 11 of the easement agreement required disputes to be settled by arbitration and that the court's jurisdiction was limited under section 7 of the Arbitration Act. The Applicants did not seek section 7 intervention. The court's determination rests on the injunction principles rather than on an arbitration ruling, so this is obiter.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • The sequence of the Giella v Cassman Brown principles is sequential; the second condition is only addressed if the first (prima facie case) is satisfied
  • A court has a duty to uphold and enforce contracts entered into by parties and cannot rewrite their agreements
  • A prima facie case is a genuine and arguable case showing an apparently infringed right calling for rebuttal

Court orders

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  1. 1.Dismissal of the Applicants' Notice of Motion dated 11th May 2018
  2. 2.Costs of the application awarded to the Respondents
  3. 3.Interim orders (status quo) issued ex parte on 14th May 2018 set aside
  4. 4.Parties to comply with Order 11 within 21 days for the hearing of the main suit

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Constitution of KenyaArticles 40, 40(3)(b)(ii), 64, 159(d)
  • Land Registration ActSection 24
  • Civil Procedure ActSections 1A, 1B and 3A
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 40 Rules 1 and 2; Order 51 Rule 1; Order 11
  • Arbitration ActSection 7; Chapter 49 of the Laws of Kenya
  • Land ActSection 144; Section 157
  • Energy ActSection 65

Cases cited (11)

  • Paul Gitonga Wanjao vs. Tea Factory Co Ltd & 2 others
    (2016) eKLR
  • Hussein Budeid vs Patrick
    (2014) eKLR
  • Waithaka vs Industrial and Commercial Development
    (2001) eKLR
  • Giella vs Cassman Brown
    [1973] EA 358
  • MRAO versus FIRST AMERICAN BANK OF KENYA LIMITED & 2 OTHERS
    (2003) KLR 125
  • Shah -vs- Guilders International Bank Ltd
    [2003] KLR
  • Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd –vs- Afraha Education Society
    (2001) IEA 86
  • Joseph Wambua Mulusya –vs- David Kitu & Another
    (2014) eKLR
  • Director of Public Prosecutions v Justus Mwendwa Kathenge & 2 others
    [2016] eKLR
  • East African development Bank vs. Hundai Motor Ltd
    (2006) eKLR
  • E.A. Industries v. Trufoods
    [1972] E.A. 420
Jurisdiction invoked
Articles 40, 64 and 159(d) of the Constitution; sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act; Order 40 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Benjamin Kariamburi Mwangi & 2 others v Kenya Elecricity Transmission Company & another [2018] KEELC 2783 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Not stated in the judgment (Notice of Motion dated 11th May 2018). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2018/2783/eng@2018-07-04

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.