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ELCDismissedNotice of Motion dated 27th June 2017 (suit at Mombasa)· [2017] KEELC 182 (KLR)

Khadija Kibwana Swaleh v Amina Suleiman Abdalla & another [2017] KEELC 182 (KLR)

Environment and Land Court
31 October 2017
1,208 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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A Mombasa court refused to stop the sale of two disputed plots because the person claiming them couldn't show the land was registered to the deceased.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This ruling by the Environment and Land Court at Mombasa (L. Komingoi, J) disposed of a Notice of Motion dated 27th June 2017 in which the Plaintiff, Khadija Swaleh Kibwana, sought a temporary injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants from selling, disposing of, alienating or transferring Plot Number Mombasa/Block XVII/1328 and Plot Number 46/Section I Mainland North pending trial. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants forged or fraudulently obtained the ownership documents of the suit properties, which she claimed belonged to the deceased Zena Swaleh, including by taking advantage of the deceased's old age and sickness. The Defendants opposed, contending that the Plaintiff was not an heir of the deceased, that one property was jointly purchased by the deceased and the 2nd Defendant's father, that the 2nd Defendant had since sold it to a third party, and that neither property was registered in the deceased's name. Applying the Giella v Cassman Brown principles and the Mrao Ltd v First American Bank definition of a prima facie case, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case with probability of success since neither property was registered in the deceased's name; her heirship and the alleged fraud were matters for trial. She also failed to demonstrate irreparable loss, being out of possession, and the balance of convenience favoured the Defendants. The court declined to strike out the late-filed replying affidavit, invoking Article 159(2)(d). The application was dismissed with costs abiding the outcome of the main suit, and leave was granted to the Defendants to file their defence within 14 days.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the Plaintiff established a prima facie case with a probability of success

Holding

She did not; neither suit property is registered in the name of the deceased Zena Swaleh, and the alleged fraud and her status as heir are matters for trial

Reasoning

Applying the Mrao Ltd v First American Bank test, the court found no apparent right infringed. Both properties are registered in the name of the 1st Defendant and a third party respectively, not the deceased. Whether the Plaintiff is an heir and whether fraud was committed are evidentiary matters to be determined at the trial, so no prima facie case was made out.

p. 2
02

Whether the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss not compensable by damages

Holding

She would not; she is not in possession or occupation of the properties and can be compensated by damages if she succeeds

Reasoning

The Plaintiff is not in possession or occupation of either property, which are registered in the 1st Defendant's name and a third party's name respectively. The court found she failed to show what loss she would suffer, and any success at trial could be compensated by an award of damages. The balance of convenience tilts towards the Defendants, who are in possession.

p. 2
03

Whether the late replying affidavit should be struck out

Holding

No; the court declined to strike it out, guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and the overriding objective of substantial justice

Reasoning

Counsel for the Defendants admitted late service, explaining that parties were negotiating an out-of-court settlement. Applying Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, the court prioritised substantial justice over procedural technicality, holding that since the replying affidavit had been filed and served, it would not be struck out.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • A prima facie case in civil proceedings is one in which, on the material presented, a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude there exists a right apparently infringed by the opposite party so as to call for an explanation or rebuttal
  • The three Giella v Cassman Brown principles govern the grant of temporary injunctions: prima facie case with probability of success, irreparable injury not compensable by damages, and balance of convenience if in doubt

Court orders

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  1. 1.The Notice of Motion dated 27th June 2017 is dismissed
  2. 2.Costs to abide the outcome of the main suit
  3. 3.Leave granted to the Defendants to file and serve their defence within 14 days

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 1, 2 and 3; Order 51 Rule 14
  • Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 Laws of KenyaSections 1A, 1B, 3A
  • Constitution of KenyaArticle 159(2)(d)
  • Land Registration Act, 2012Section 26

Cases cited (2)

  • Giella –versus- Cassman Brown And Company Limited
    (1973) EA 385
  • Mrao Limited –versus- First American Bank Limited And 2 Others
    (2003) KLR 125
Jurisdiction invoked
Order 1, 2 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules; Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 Laws of Kenya

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Khadija Kibwana Swaleh v Amina Suleiman Abdalla & another [2017] KEELC 182 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2017). Notice of Motion dated 27th June 2017 (suit at Mombasa). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2017/182/eng@2017-10-31

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.