Edelvale Trust Jamaa Home & Mission Hospital v Sarah Nduta Thenya & 2 others
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal set aside injunctions protecting suspended hospital employees, ruling they should have used the employer's internal grievance process first.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Exhaustion of internal Dispute-Grievance Procedures under clause 15 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment
The trial court erred by failing to consider whether the genuine, available grievance procedure should have been invoked before court intervention; the injunction ought not to have been granted.
Clause 15 provided a graduated grievance process, and even where termination was in issue, an appeal to the Edelvale Trust was available before implementation of termination. Although the clause used permissive language ('should' and 'may'), it constituted genuine contractual machinery. Unless invocation was impossible or would occasion manifest injustice, the trial court was bound to consider whether exhaustion was required. The trial court noted the objection but did not consider it at all in arriving at its decision, an error justifying appellate interference.
Pleading requirement under Rule 17(5) of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules, 2016
The respondents failed to plead a prayer for injunction in the memorandum of claim; the rule's mandatory safeguard was not satisfied and the temporary injunctions should not have been granted.
Rule 17(5) required that an applicant for an interlocutory restraining injunction have sought a permanent injunction in the main suit. Prayer (i) of the memorandum of claim ('Lifting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents' Suspension') did not amount to a prohibitory or mandatory injunction. There must be practical consistency between the application and the main suit: the interim prayer must mirror the final injunctive relief sought. The trial court failed to consider this mandatory safeguard.
Satisfaction of the Giella v Cassman Brown principles for interlocutory injunctions
The respondents failed to establish a prima facie case and irreparable injury incapable of compensation in damages; the balance of convenience did not fall to be considered.
The contract of employment was a purely commercial relationship; any breach of the extended suspension or ensuing termination would be adequately remedied by pecuniary compensation. Further, termination letters were on record, the respondents had admitted attending a disciplinary hearing, and the respondents had not exhausted internal machinery, so no prima facie case with probability of success was established. A mandatory interlocutory injunction (reinstatement or lifting of suspension) required special circumstances and a high sense of assurance at trial, which was absent.
Legal principles established
#- An appellate court reviewing a discretionary interlocutory decision should not interfere unless the trial judge misdirected herself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account matters she should not have, failed to take into account matters she should have, or the decision is plainly wrong.
- Under Rule 17(5) of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules, 2016, an interlocutory injunction may only be granted where the applicant specifically prayed for a permanent injunction in the main suit; the temporary injunction must mirror or directly correspond to the final injunctive order sought in the statement of claim.
- A mandatory interlocutory injunction should not be granted in the absence of special circumstances and a high sense of assurance that it would be vindicated at trial.
- Injuries arising from a purely commercial employment relationship are ordinarily compensable by damages, so absent unique circumstances an interlocutory injunction will fail the irreparable-harm limb of the Giella test.
- Where genuine contractual or internal dispute-resolution machinery exists and is available, a party must ordinarily exhaust it, absent impossibility of invocation or manifest injustice, before a court will intervene.
- An appellate court on an interlocutory appeal must not make definitive findings of fact or law that may prejudice or embarrass the main trial.
Court orders
#- 1.Appeal allowed
- 2.The impugned ruling of the Superior Court delivered on 5th February, 2018, together with the orders and processes flowing therefrom, set aside
- 3.The respondent's application dated 7th September, 2017 dismissed with costs in the cause
- 4.Parties to bear own costs of the appeal
- On appeal from
- Employment and Labour Relations Court
- ELRC Nairobi Cause No. 1807 of 2020 (as printed in the judgment)
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over decisions of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (basis not expressly cited in the judgment; the appeal was lodged by memorandum of appeal dated 19th March, 2020)
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Edelvale Trust Jamaa Home & Mission Hospital v Sarah Nduta Thenya & 2 others", Case Analysis (2026). Memorandum of appeal dated 19th March, 2020 (not otherwise numbered in the judgment). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1110/eng@2026-06-12
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.