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Court of AppealDismissedConsolidated appeals from Nairobi High Court Petition No. E063 of 2021· [2025] KECA 1953 (KLR)

Valerina Jiwa & 289 Others v The Official Receiver & 2 others

Court of Appeal of Kenya
21 November 2025
9,324 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~37 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal dismissed Cytonn's appeals, upholding liquidation preservation and vesting orders because the companies produced no evidence that the disputed properties were bought with their own money.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a single judgment of the Court of Appeal (Kiage, Mohammed and Odunga, JJA) dismissing consolidated appeals against a ruling of the High Court (Mabeya, J.) of 30th November 2023 in Petition No. E063 of 2021 arising from the insolvency of Cytonn High Yields Solution and Cytonn Real Estate Project Notes. The High Court had terminated the administration, placed the companies under liquidation, preserved properties held by various Special Purpose Vehicles, and vested them in the Official Receiver. The appellants - SPVs, investors and Cytonn Investments Management PLC - complained that they were condemned unheard, that their separate corporate personalities were disregarded without lifting the corporate veil, that the vesting orders exceeded sections 444 and 445 of the Insolvency Act, that the consent between SBM Bank and the Official Receiver was improperly adopted, that the 'akin to fraud' finding offended the strict standard of proof for fraud, that tracing was wrongly applied, and that the guarantee and joinder rulings were inconsistent. The Court, sitting as a first appellate court, reappraised the evidence and found that the appellants produced no evidence tracing the source of the funds used to acquire the preserved properties; that a preservation order is not a lifting of the corporate veil; that section 445 squarely permits vesting orders in liquidation; that a direct appeal from a consent decree is barred under section 67(2) of the Civil Procedure Act; that no finding of fraud was made; that tracing was properly invoked for preservation purposes; that the guarantee became enforceable on default and was unaffected by the preservation orders; and that the joinder and injunction refusals were sound exercises of discretion. The appeals were dismissed with costs to the 1st respondent and the Creditor's Committee.

Key legal issues

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01

Separate legal personality of the SPVs and alleged lifting of the corporate veil

Holding

The preservation order was not the same thing as lifting the corporate veil; the SPVs remained free to prove in the liquidation proceedings or another forum that their assets were not connected to the Companies' funds, but they produced no such evidence.

Reasoning

The Court accepted that the SPVs benefited from funds collected from the investing public and were the brainchild of CIMP and Dande. Section 444 empowers the liquidator to assume control of property to which the company appears to be entitled, and section 445 permits vesting orders. Claims by third parties claiming the properties must be supported by evidence, not bare assertions. The judge's findings could not be faulted.

p. 6
02

Vesting orders in the course of liquidation under sections 444 and 445 of the Insolvency Act

Holding

A vesting order may properly be made in liquidation proceedings in respect of property that appears to belong to the company being liquidated; claimants must prove otherwise with evidence.

Reasoning

Section 444 obliges the liquidator to assume control of all property to which the company is or appears to be entitled; once such a determination is made, section 445 permits the court on the liquidator's application to vest the property in the liquidator. The 1st appellant's contention that a vesting order cannot issue in a liquidation process misconstrued the statute. No evidence established the source of the funds used to acquire the properties.

p. 9
03

Consent orders and the bar on direct appeals under section 67(2) of the Civil Procedure Act

Holding

The direct appeal against the consent adopting the SBM Bank agreement was barred; the proper course was an application to set aside the consent, which was never made.

Reasoning

The Court read section 67(2) as not a bar to any challenge to a consent order, but as expressly barring a direct appeal therefrom. The remedy is an application seeking to set aside the consent, from which an appeal may then be preferred. There was no evidence that procedure was followed, so the ground failed. The consent settled a liability the 1st appellant admittedly owed to SBM Bank as a secured creditor.

p. 9
04

Standard of proof for the finding of a scheme 'akin to fraud'

Holding

Because the judge found only a scheme 'akin to' fraud, not fraud itself, the stringent standard of proof required for findings of fraud did not apply.

Reasoning

The Court agreed with the Official Receiver that the judge chose his words carefully. Looked at holistically, given the undisclosed prior retention of the Administrator, the 'loans' to SPVs without the promised legal charges, and the guarantee issued by an entity without assets, the judge could not be faulted for concluding the conduct was akin to fraud. That is not the same as a finding of fraud.

p. 11
05

Application of the doctrine of tracing

Holding

Tracing was properly invoked for preservation purposes; funds advanced to the SPVs could be traced from the affidavits supporting the administration application, and mixing with property enhancements does not break tracing.

Reasoning

Relying on McTaggart v Bofio and Tracy v Instaloans, the Court held tracing is possible so long as the funds can be located and identified, whether mixed or unmixed, and a pre-existing fiduciary relationship need not be shown. Whether funds were mixed with enhancements was a matter for the liquidation proceedings. The tracing was for preservation, not confiscation and disposal.

p. 12
06

Enforceability of the deed of guarantee and consistency of the two rulings

Holding

The guarantee became enforceable upon default and was unaffected by the preservation orders; there was no contradiction between the rulings of 6th January 2023 and 30th November 2023.

Reasoning

A guarantee is distinct from the agreement giving rise to the guaranteed obligation (Moschi v Lep Air Services). The preservation orders applied to the SPVs, not to CIMP which was not in liquidation or administration, so the earlier arrest of proceedings did not apply to it. The guarantee liability must be delinked from the SPVs' liabilities, and enforcement should be canvassed in separate proceedings.

p. 14
07

Joinder of the 3rd appellant and interference with judicial discretion

Holding

The refusal to join the 3rd appellant was a proper exercise of discretion; the Court had no justification to interfere since the guarantee-based joinder was misconceived.

Reasoning

Citing Apungu Arthur Kibira and Kacem v Bashir, an appellate court interferes with a discretionary decision only on error of law or principle, irrelevant considerations, failure to consider relevant considerations, or where the decision is plainly wrong. The 3rd appellant was already a party to the proceedings throughout, and its guarantor interests could not be ventilated in the liquidation proceedings.

p. 15

Legal principles established

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  • A first appeal from the High Court is by way of retrial; the appellate court must re-evaluate the evidence and draw its own conclusions while making allowance for not having seen or heard the witnesses
  • An appeal lies from a discretionary decision only on established grounds such as error of law or principle, irrelevant or ignored considerations, or that the decision is plainly wrong
  • A direct appeal does not lie from a consent decree under section 67(2) of the Civil Procedure Act; the remedy is to apply to set aside the consent first
  • A finding that conduct was 'akin to fraud' is not a finding of fraud, so the stringent standard of proof for fraud is not engaged
  • Tracing remains available so long as the property can be located and identified, whether mixed or unmixed, and does not require proof of a pre-existing fiduciary relationship
  • A guarantee is distinct from the principal obligation; upon default by the principal debtor the guarantee becomes enforceable immediately and is not affected by preservation orders over the principal's assets

Court orders

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  1. 1.The consolidated appeals are dismissed
  2. 2.Costs of the appeals awarded to the 1st respondent and the Creditor's Committee
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Petition No. E063 of 2021
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction under the Court of Appeal Rules (Rule 31(1)(a)), appeals against the ruling of the High Court

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Valerina Jiwa & 289 Others v The Official Receiver & 2 others", Case Analysis (2025). Consolidated appeals from Nairobi High Court Petition No. E063 of 2021. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2025/1953/eng@2025-11-21

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.