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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCriminal Appeal (not fully stated in judgment)· [2023] KECA 479 (KLR)

JMM v Republic (Criminal Appeal 28 of 2014) [2023] KECA 479 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
12 May 2023
3,042 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that life imprisonment for incest is not automatic, replacing it with a 30-year sentence.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant, JMM, was convicted of incest contrary to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act and sentenced to life imprisonment. His first appeal to the High Court was dismissed, and he appealed to the Court of Appeal at Nakuru on four grounds, including that penetration was not proved, that the evidence was contradictory and uncorroborated, that his defence was ignored, and that the life sentence was harsh and excessive. At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against conviction and pursued only the appeal against sentence. Sitting as a second appellate court, the Court held that under section 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code its jurisdiction is confined to matters of law, and although severity of sentence is ordinarily a factual matter outside its remit, the appellant's contention that life imprisonment is not mandatory under section 20(1) raised a question of law. Associating itself with its earlier decision in Caroline Auma Majabu v Republic, the court held that the word 'liable' in the proviso to section 20(1) preserves judicial discretion, permitting any sentence between ten years and life imprisonment, and contrasted the expressly mandatory language of section 8(2) of the same Act. The court further found that the trial magistrate, though passing a lawful sentence, had overlooked sections 137I(2)(a) and 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Sentencing Policy Guidelines, 2016, including the requirement to account for pre-sentence custody. Balancing deterrence, protection of the family structure, and the offender's prospects of reform, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, set aside the life sentence, and substituted a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment running from April 22, 2013.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether life imprisonment under the proviso to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act is mandatory

Holding

It is not mandatory; the word 'liable' preserves judicial discretion between ten years and life imprisonment.

Reasoning

The court adopted its earlier interpretation in Caroline Auma Majabu that 'liable' indicates a likely maximum, not a mandatory sentence, allowing discretion to the sentencing court. It contrasted section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act, where the legislature used express mandatory language ('shall upon conviction be sentenced to imprisonment for life'), and concluded that the deliberate use of 'liable' in section 20(1) leaves room for judicial discretion.

p. 5
02

Jurisdiction to interfere with sentence on a second appeal

Holding

Severity of sentence is a factual matter outside a second appeal under section 361, but a contention that the sentence is not mandatory under the statute raises a question of law properly invoking jurisdiction.

Reasoning

The court noted that section 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code excludes severity of sentence from second appeals. However, where the appellant demonstrates that the sentence was enhanced on first appeal, or that the trial court lacked power to pass it, or - as here - that procedural tenets of sentencing such as sections 137I(2)(a) and 333(2) and the Sentencing Policy Guidelines were overlooked, jurisdiction is properly invoked.

p. 3
03

Compliance with sentencing procedure and guidelines

Holding

Although the life sentence was within the law, the trial magistrate overlooked procedural tenets: pre-sentence custody under sections 137I(2)(a) and 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Sentencing Policy Guidelines, 2016.

Reasoning

The court recalled the rules of sentencing, including the mandatory consideration of pre-sentence custody and the guidelines' call for consistency, certainty and a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors even where life imprisonment is called for. It found the sentence passed did not conform to these provisions, justifying intervention.

p. 6
04

The appropriate sentence

Holding

A determinate prison term of 30 years, running from the date of first appearance on April 22, 2013.

Reasoning

The court weighed deterrence, protection of the community and the family as the basic societal structure, and society's denunciation of incest against the offender's prospects of reform and the single mitigating factor of being a first offender. It concluded that a 30-year term met the objectives and principles of the Sentencing Policy Guidelines.

p. 6

Legal principles established

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  • The proviso to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act prescribing life imprisonment for incest with a minor is not mandatory; it preserves judicial discretion to impose any sentence between ten years and life imprisonment.
  • A second appellate court may interfere with sentence only where the sentence was enhanced by the first appellate court or the subordinate court had no power to pass it, but a challenge asserting that a sentence is not mandatory raises a matter of law within section 361(1)(b).
  • Courts must take into account the period spent in pre-sentence custody and comply with the Sentencing Policy Guidelines when passing sentence, including for life sentences.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal against conviction is dismissed
  2. 2.The appeal against sentence is allowed
  3. 3.The sentence of imprisonment for life is set aside
  4. 4.The appellant is sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment
  5. 5.The sentence shall run from the date of the appellant's first appearance in court being April 22, 2013

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Sexual Offences Actsection 20(1)
  • Sexual Offences Actsection 11(1)
  • Sexual Offences Actsection 3(3)
  • Sexual Offences Actsection 8(2)
  • Criminal Procedure Codesection 361
  • Criminal Procedure Codesection 361(1)(b)
  • Criminal Procedure Codesection 7
  • Criminal Procedure Codesection 137I(2)(a)
  • Criminal Procedure Codesection 333(2)
  • Penal Codesection 204
  • Penal Codesection 296(2)
  • Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (Control) Actsection 4(a)
  • Sentencing Policy Guidelines, 2016paragraphs 23.9 and 23.10; Part 1

Cases cited (7)

  • Michael Odhiambo v Republic
    Criminal Appeal No 280 of 2004
  • M.K v Republic
    [2015] eKLR
  • Simon Karanja Kiarie v Republic
    [2014] eKLR
  • Raphael Kavoi Kiilu v Republic
    [2010] Eklr
  • Zacharia Waithaka Mwaura v Republic
    [2010] eKLR
  • Caroline Auma Majabu v Republic
    [2014] eKLR
  • Kingsley Chukwu v R
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Jurisdiction invoked
Section 361(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code - second appeal confined to matters of law

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "JMM v Republic (Criminal Appeal 28 of 2014) [2023] KECA 479 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2023). Criminal Appeal (not fully stated in judgment). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2023/479/eng@2023-05-12

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.