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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal (Mombasa)· [2022] KECA 79 (KLR)

National Oil Corporation v Suleiman Mohamed Said Suleiman Al-busaidy & 3 others

Court of Appeal of Kenya
4 February 2022
5,262 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~21 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a lease transferred without the landlord's written consent is void, but cut damages to start from 2008.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a first appeal from the Environment and Land Court at Mombasa, which on 22nd March 2018 allowed the respondents' claim arising from a 99-year lease of L.R No. Mombasa/Block XVIII/244 granted in 1937 to Shell Company (of East Africa) Ltd. The trial court declared the lease forfeited, held the waiver of the head lessor's consent and the transfer of the lease to the appellant null and void, awarded mesne profits from 1985, and ordered eviction. The Court of Appeal, composed of Nambuye, Karanja and Murgor JJA in a single unanimous judgment, identified four issues: whether the lease had been terminated; whether the assignment to the appellant without the head lessor's consent was lawful; whether the Registrar's waiver was unlawfully obtained; and from what date mesne profits should run. The Court held that the lease had already terminated before the 2013 waiver application because the requisite six months' notice of re-entry was given, as the appellant's own letter of 8th July 2010 acknowledged. The purported assignment without the head lessor's written consent was null and void. However, the Court found no evidence of unpaid rent, and a receipt of December 2007 showed rates for 1985-2007 had been cleared; mesne damages were therefore varied to run only from 2008, when the appellant entered the premises, until payment in full with interest at court rates. The remainder of the appeal was dismissed with costs to the 1st and 2nd respondents, and the appellant was given 60 days to vacate or face eviction.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the 1937 lease had been terminated before the 2013 application for waiver of consent

Holding

The lease had already terminated by the time the waiver was applied for in 2013, because the requisite six months' notice of the landlord's intention to re-enter was given, as evidenced by the appellant's own letter of 8th July, 2010 acknowledging receipt.

Reasoning

The lease required six months' notice before re-entry for breach. The letters of 20th May 2010 and 12th July 2010 conveyed the landlord's intention to re-enter for non-payment of rent. The appellant's reply of 8th July 2010, indicating it had paid rent for 2005-2007 to Pandya & Talati, satisfied the Court that the appellant received the requisite notice. Accordingly the lease had terminated before the 2013 waiver application, disposing of issues (i) to (iv).

p. 8
02

Whether the assignment of the lease to the appellant without the head lessor's consent was valid

Holding

The assignment was null and void because the lease expressly required the landlord's written consent before assignment, which was not obtained.

Reasoning

The 1937 lease forbade assignment without the landlord's written consent, which was not to be unreasonably withheld. The 3rd and 4th respondents knew of this clause yet assigned the lease to the appellant without consent. The Court, citing Lalji Karsan Rabadia, held that courts must maintain performance of contracts according to the parties' intention, rendering the purported assignment void.

p. 8
03

Whether mesne profits should run from 1985

Holding

The award of mesne profits was varied to commence from 2008, when the appellant entered the suit premises, because the rates invoice showed arrears for 1985-2007 had been cleared in December 2007.

Reasoning

The trial judge based the award from 1985 on a municipal council rates invoice, but a receipt dated 20th December 2007 for Ksh. 714,539.15 showed rates for 1985-2007 were cleared. There was no evidence of unpaid rent. Mesne profits, being profits a person in wrongful possession received, could only run from 2008 when the appellant took possession.

p. 9

Legal principles established

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  • On a first appeal, the Court of Appeal must reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify.
  • A lease that is to be assigned only with the head lessor's written consent cannot validly be assigned without that consent; a purported assignment without the required consent of the head lessor is null and void.
  • Mesne profits are recoverable only in respect of the period during which the defendant was actually in wrongful possession of the property, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Mesne damages payable by the appellant for the period starting from 2008 until payment in full plus interest thereon at court rates
  2. 2.The rest of the appeal dismissed with costs to the 1st and 2nd respondents
  3. 3.The appellant given 60 days from the date of the judgment to vacate the suit premises or be evicted therefrom
On appeal from
Environment and Land Court, Mombasa
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal under its appellate jurisdiction (Rule 29(1)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules invoked for re-evaluation of evidence)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "National Oil Corporation v Suleiman Mohamed Said Suleiman Al-busaidy & 3 others", Case Analysis (2022). Civil Appeal (Mombasa). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2022/79/eng@2022-02-04

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.