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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No 224 of 2018· [2020] KECA 622 (KLR)

Clifford Okello Rachuonyo t/a Rachuonyo and Rachuonyo Advocates v Mohamed Yusuf Soroya & 3 others [2020] KECA 622 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
22 May 2020
6,435 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~26 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal dismissed a lawyer's defamation claim because he couldn't prove anyone other than the letter's recipient actually saw it.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant advocate sued the 1st respondent for defamation over a letter accusing him of negligence, collusion with fraudsters and embezzlement of Kshs 200,000.00 in a conveyancing transaction, copied to the Law Society of Kenya, the CID, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General. The High Court (Njuguna, J.) dismissed the defamation claim for want of proof of publication to a third party and proof of reputational injury, dismissed the 1st respondent's counterclaim for professional negligence and fraud against the appellant and the vendor parties, and hypothetically assessed general damages at Kshs 5,000,000.00, with each party bearing its own costs. The appellant appealed on liability and quantum, seeking Kshs 7.5 million general and Kshs 1 million exemplary damages; the 1st respondent cross-appealed against the dismissal of his counterclaim, alleging collusion and fraud and non-enforcement of a deed of indemnity. The Court of Appeal, re-evaluating the evidence as a first appellate court, held that publication is an essential ingredient of defamation and that the burden of proving it lies on the claimant; the appellant admitted having no witness or documentary proof that the letter reached the persons copied, and the 1st respondent denied circulating it. It further found no third-party evidence of reputational injury, and declined to interfere with the damages assessment under the Kemfro Africa principles. On the cross-appeal, it applied R. G. Patel v Lalji Makanji, holding that fraud must be strictly proved and was not. Both appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed with no orders as to costs, affirming the judgment below.

Key legal issues

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01

Essential elements of the tort of defamation, particularly publication

Holding

Publication of the defamatory matter to a third party is an essential ingredient; words sent only to the person defamed are not actionable, and the claimant bears the burden of proving publication

Reasoning

The court traced the law from common law definitions through Kenyan authority, holding that a libel only becomes actionable upon relay to a person other than the one defamed. The presumption of publication from a document passing through ordinary channels can be rebutted by the defendant, but absent such presumption, the claimant must prove third-party receipt.

p. 6
02

Allocation of the burden of proving publication

Holding

The burden lies on the claimant-plaintiff, not on the defendant to disprove circulation; the trial judge correctly placed it on the appellant

Reasoning

Relying on section 108 of the Evidence Act and Selina Patani, the court held that a claimant cannot sustain a defamation claim unless publication is proved. The appellant admitted he had no witness or copy evidencing receipt by the persons copied on the letter, so the trial judge rightly found ingredient (b) of the Muchai test unsatisfied.

p. 6
03

Proof of damage to reputation from a third party

Holding

Absent evidence from any third party that reputation was injured, the claim fails

Reasoning

Even where the words are defamatory and malice may be inferred, the plaintiff must demonstrate that reputation was actually lowered in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. No third party testified to reading the letter, so the finding that the claim was not proved could not be disturbed.

p. 6
04

Interference with quantum of damages

Holding

The trial court's hypothetical assessment of Ksh 5,000,000.00 general damages and refusal of exemplary damages involved no error of principle

Reasoning

Applying Kemfro Africa and Butt v Khan, the court held that assessment of damages is discretionary and appellate interference requires wrong principles or an erroneous estimate. Since the defamation claim failed, no award could lie, and exemplary damages were unsupported by evidence.

p. 7
05

Standard of proof for fraud in the counterclaim

Holding

The counterclaim founded on fraud failed because fraud must be specially pleaded and strictly proved beyond a mere balance of probabilities

Reasoning

Applying R. G. Patel v Lalji Makanji, the court found no evidence of collusion between the appellant and the vendor parties. The trial court's finding that the appellant acted on instructions and in the 1st respondent's best interests, procuring indemnities to protect him, was sound and could not be faulted.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • Publication to a person other than the person defamed is an essential element of defamation, and the burden of proving publication rests on the claimant
  • An appellate court will not interfere with an award of damages unless the trial court applied wrong principles or arrived at an inordinately high or low figure
  • Allegations of fraud must be strictly proved; something more than a mere balance of probabilities is required
  • A first appellate court must re-evaluate the evidence on both law and facts and reach its own conclusions

Court orders

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  1. 1.Dismissal of the appellant's appeal against the dismissal of his defamation claim
  2. 2.Dismissal of the 1st respondent's cross-appeal against the dismissal of his counterclaim
  3. 3.No orders as to costs

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Evidence ActSection 108
  • Defamation Actapology/mitigation provisions (referenced generally)
  • Civil Procedure Rulesreferenced re claims founded in crime

Cases cited (20)

  • Selle v Associated Motor Boat Company
    (1968) EA 123
  • Murphy v LaMarsh
    (1970) 73 W.W.R 114
  • Selina Patani & another v Dhiranji V. Patani
    [2019] eKLR
  • Miguna Miguna v Standard Group Ltd & 4 Others
    [2017] eKLR
  • Phineas Nyaga v Gitobu Imanyara
    [2013] eKLR
  • Raphael Lukale v Elizabeth Mayabi & another
    [2018] eKLR
  • Huth v Huth
  • George Mukuru Muchai v The Standard Limited
    [2001] eKLR
  • Swanya v Toyota East Africa Ltd & Another
    [2009] eKLR
  • Pullman v Walter Hill & Co
    (1891) 1 QB 524
  • Ombura T/A Okoth Ombura & Company Advocates
    [2013] eKLR
  • Butt v Khan
    [1981] KLR 349
  • Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Services & Another v A.M. Lubia and Another (No.2)
    (1982-88) KAR 727
  • Mbogo v Shah
    [1968] EA 93
  • Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & Another
    [2005] eKLR
  • Jones v Pollard
    [1997] EMLR 233
  • John v MG Ltd
    [1996] 1 ALL E.R. 35
  • R. G. Patel v. Lalji Makanji
    [1957] EA 314
  • Gudka v. Dodhia
    CA. No. 21 of 1980
  • Richard Akwesera Onditi v. Kenya Commercial Finance Co Ltd
    CA. No. 329 of 2009
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C No 118 of 2010
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction under the Court of Appeal Act over an appeal from the High Court (appeal on facts and law)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Clifford Okello Rachuonyo t/a Rachuonyo and Rachuonyo Advocates v Mohamed Yusuf Soroya & 3 others [2020] KECA 622 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2020). Civil Appeal No 224 of 2018. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2020/622/eng@2020-05-22

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.