Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No 261 of 2018· [2020] KECA 566 (KLR)

Haki Na Sheria Initiative v Inspector of Police & 3 others (Civil Appeal 261 of 2018) [2020] KECA 566 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
19 June 2020
9,061 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~36 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal upheld police curfew powers under the Public Order Act, ruling they are a constitutional limit on rights when public safety demands it.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
This was a first appeal to the Court of Appeal by Haki Sheria Initiative, a Garissa-based civil society organization, challenging the constitutionality of Sections 8 and 9 of the Public Order Act and the curfew imposed on Garissa, Mandera, Tana River and Wajir Counties following the 2nd April 2015 Garissa University terrorist attack that killed at least 148 people. The curfew ran from 3rd April 2015 and was lifted on 18th June 2015 after a Presidential directive. The High Court (Dulu, J.) had on 14th March 2017 dismissed the petition, upholding the impugned provisions and ordering each party to bear its own costs. The Court of Appeal (W. Karanja, F. Sichale and J. Mohammed, JJ.A) distilled four issues: precision of pleading, whether the Judge considered the appellant's submissions, whether Sections 8 and 9 infringe constitutional rights, and whether they constitute acceptable limitations under Article 24. The Court held the petition met the required pleading standard, the Judge considered the submissions, and the provisions are constitutional. Applying the presumption of constitutionality and the purpose-and-effect test, the Court found the Act's objective of maintaining public order legitimate, the curfew powers checked by time limits and oversight, the curfew a proportionate and justifiable limitation under Article 24, and no prohibited discrimination under Article 27 since the curfew applied to all residents. The appeal was dismissed with each party bearing its own costs, the public interest nature of the matter having been taken into account.

Key legal issues

#
01

Pleading standard in constitutional petitions

Holding

The appellant set out its case to the required standard; the Anarita Karimi Njeru precision principle must not be applied in a creeping formalistic way.

Reasoning

The amended petition identified the specific constitutional provisions allegedly violated. Relying on Mumo Matemu and Mohammed Fugicha, the Court held that precision is not exactitude and that the 2010 Constitution does not lionize form over substance. Considered as a whole, the petition left no doubt as to the complaints and the provisions said to be contravened.

p. 10
02

Whether the learned Judge considered the appellant's submissions

Holding

This ground failed; the record showed the Judge laid down and considered the appellant's submissions.

Reasoning

From the record, the learned Judge succinctly set out the appellant's submissions and considered them in the impugned judgment. A court exercising judicial discretion is guided by established principles and precedent, not whim and caprice, and the ground of appeal alleging failure to consider submissions could not be sustained on the material before the Court.

p. 11
03

Constitutionality of Sections 8 & 9 of the Public Order Act

Holding

The sections are constitutional; their purpose and effect were justifiable in the circumstances.

Reasoning

Applying the presumption of constitutionality and the purpose-and-effect test, the Court found the Act's objective is maintenance of public order, a legitimate purpose. The powers are not unchecked: curfews are limited by hours and duration, subject to variation or rescission, and subject to judicial oversight like a state of emergency. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits curfew orders.

p. 15
04

Whether the limitation was acceptable under Article 24

Holding

The limitation was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society; the curfew was a proportionate means of achieving public order.

Reasoning

Applying the Article 24 reasonable-and-justifiable test and proportionality factors, the Court found the curfew restricted movement and affected worship, but the limitation served the legitimate purpose of safety, peace and national security following the Garissa University attack, and applied to all residents rather than a prohibited class. Rights under Articles 26 and 29 were not demonstrated to be infringed.

p. 22
05

Whether Sections 8 & 9 discriminate contrary to Article 27

Holding

No prohibited discrimination was established; the impugned provisions were not based on grounds prohibited by Article 27(4).

Reasoning

Adopting the three-stage enquiry from Mohammed Abduba Dida, the Court found differentiation arising from curfews on a class of persons has a rational connection to the legitimate purpose of public order. The appellant neither established that the differentiation was on a prohibited ground nor that it was unfair, so no violation of Article 27 arose.

Legal principles established

#
  • A person alleging contravention of a constitutional right must set out the right infringed and particulars of the infringement with reasonable precision, though precision is not exactitude and the Constitution does not lionize form over substance.
  • There is a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality of legislation, and the burden of rebutting it rests on the party challenging the legislation.
  • In determining constitutionality, a court must consider both the purpose and the effect of the impugned provision; if either infringes a guaranteed right, the provision must be declared unconstitutional.
  • Mere differentiation or unequal treatment does not per se amount to prohibited discrimination under Article 27; differentiation must be shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or on a prohibited ground.
  • Limitation of rights under Sections 8 & 9 of the Public Order Act in circumstances of threatened public order due to terror attacks or criminal insecurity is a justifiable, reasonable and necessary limitation under Article 24.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.Appeal dismissed
  2. 2.High Court's finding that Sections 8 & 9 of the Public Order Act are constitutional upheld
  3. 3.Each party to bear their own costs

Authorities

#

Legislation

  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 2(4)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 24
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 25
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 26
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 27
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 29
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 32
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 39
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 58
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 238(1)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 238(2)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 259
  • Public Order ActSections 8 and 9
  • Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014No. 19 of 2014
  • Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)Article 3
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)Articles 6(1), 18, 4
  • Siracusa Principles on The Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR

Cases cited (18)

  • Anarita Karimi Njeru v R
    [1976-1980] KLR 1272
  • Attorney General v Law Society of Kenya & Another
    [2017] eKLR (Civil Appeal No. 133 of 2011)
  • Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Limited
    [2009] 2 EA 212
  • Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others
    [2013] eKLR
  • Mohammed Fugicha v Methodist Church in Kenya (suing through its registered trustees) & 3 others
    [2016] eKLR
  • City Chemist (NRB) & Others v Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd
    Civil Application No. Nai 302 of 2008 (UR199/2008)
  • Attorney General vs v Kituo Cha Sheria & 7 others
    [2017] eKLR (Civil Appeal No. 108 of 2014)
  • Ndyanabo vs Attorney General
    [2001] 2 EA 495
  • Mohammed Abduba Dida v Debate Media Limited & Another
    [2018] eKLR
  • Reserve Bank of India v Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others
    [1987] 1 SCC 424
  • Law Society of Kenya v Inspector General Kenya National Police Service & 3 others
  • Karen Njeri Kandie v Alassane Ba & another
    [2017] eKLR
  • Attorney-General & another v. Randu Nzai Ruwa & 2 others
    Civil Appeal No. 275 of 2012; [2016] eKLR
  • Seventh Day Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v Minister for Education & 3 others
    [2017] eKLR (Civil Appeal 172 of 2014)
  • Mtana Lewa v Kahindi Ngala Mwagandi
    [2015] eKLR (Civil Appeal No 56 of 2014)
  • R v Big M. Drug Mart Ltd.
  • National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister for Justice
    [1998] ZAAC 15
  • Kenya Medical Research Institute v Samson Gwer & 8 others
    [2019] eKLR
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court exercising constitutional (petition) jurisdiction

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Haki Na Sheria Initiative v Inspector of Police & 3 others (Civil Appeal 261 of 2018) [2020] KECA 566 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2020). Civil Appeal No 261 of 2018. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2020/566/eng@2020-06-19

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.