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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal Number 150 of 2018· [2020] KECA 395 (KLR)

Kenya Revenue Authority v Universal Corporation Ltd

Court of Appeal of Kenya
7 August 2020
13,550 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~54 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal stopped KRA from collecting Kshs 427 million in VAT thirteen years late, ruling the delay was unfair and unlawful.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a single judgment of the Court of Appeal (Nambuye, Karanja and Mohammed, JJJA) delivered on 7th August 2020 in Civil Appeal Number 150 of 2018, in which the Kenya Revenue Authority challenged the High Court's judicial review orders quashing its demand of approximately Kshs 427,918,033 as short-levied VAT on raw materials for the manufacture of medicaments for the period January 2008 to October 2013. Three related appeals were consolidated, but appeals 382 of 2017 and 383 of 2017 were struck out by a ruling of 20th December 2019, leaving this appeal as the only one for determination. The Court framed three issues: whether the High Court was properly seized of the matter notwithstanding sections 229 and 230 of the EACCMA and section 9 of the Fair Administrative Action Act; and whether the doctrines of legitimate expectation and proportionality were properly applied. On jurisdiction, the Court held that the word "may" in section 230(1) EACCMA does not oust the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction, that the tribunal had no mandate to entertain judicial review claims, and that the Fair Administrative Action Act 2015 had no retrospective application to events predating its 2015 commencement. On the merits, the Court endorsed the trial Judge's finding that the Revenue's thirteen-year inaction, including the Simba System that automatically exempted the raw materials, lulled the taxpayer into a false sense of security and deprived it of refund rights, rendering the belated demand unfair, irrational and disproportionate. The Court found no error in the exercise of the trial Judge's discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs to the respondent both on appeal and at trial.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction was barred by the alternative remedy before the Customs and Excise Tribunal under sections 229 and 230 of the EACCMA

Holding

The High Court was properly seized of the matter; the tribunal had no mandate to entertain judicial review proceedings, and the alternative remedy was not suitable in the circumstances

Reasoning

The Court construed the words "shall" and "may" in sections 229 and 230 EACCMA contextually, finding the mandatory element only governed timelines for review applications and the tribunal forum provision did not oust the High Court's jurisdiction. Applying the exhaustion principles, the Court held that judicial review of the process of the demand was the only suitable avenue since what was in issue was the process and the effect of the authority's own inaction, not the merits of the tax liability, which the tribunal process could not appropriately address.

p. 15
02

Whether the Fair Administrative Action Act 2015 applied to the impugned administrative action

Holding

The Act did not apply because it had no retrospective effect on events that triggered the litigation in 2013-2014

Reasoning

The Court noted the Act was assented to on 27th May 2015 and commenced on 17th June 2015, whereas the respondent's judicial review claim was filed in January 2014. Since the statute had no retrospective application, section 9 thereof on exhaustion of remedies was inapplicable, and the appellant could not rely on it to found a jurisdictional objection.

p. 15
03

Whether legitimate expectation arose from the tax authority's prolonged inaction and administrative practice exempting the raw materials from VAT

Holding

Legitimate expectation was properly invoked; the appellant's failure to act timeously lulled the respondent into a false sense of security and deprived it of the right to claim refunds

Reasoning

The Court adopted the trial Judge's reasoning that it is the effect of the delay coupled with the conduct of the parties, not merely its length, that engages legitimate expectation. The demand made after thirteen years, when the respondent could no longer claim refunds lawfully available had the demand been prompt, was unfair and unjust. The default was attributable to the appellant's own conduct, including the Simba System that automatically exempted the materials, not to any fraud by the taxpayer.

p. 19
04

Whether the doctrine of proportionality was properly applied to the appellant's demand

Holding

The doctrine was properly applied; the appellant's decision to recover the short-levied taxes when the respondent could not recover refunds was disproportionate, irrational and unreasonable

Reasoning

Applying the threshold from Ex parte Daly as approved in Suchan Investments and Bato Star Fishing, the Court found that no reasonable public authority would have made the belated demand; the appellant's gain was not proportional to the respondent's loss of refund rights; no justification was given for the late demand; and the circumstances of other companies were irrelevant considerations not before the trial court.

p. 21

Legal principles established

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  • Where the taxing authority's own inaction lulls the taxpayer into a false sense of security and the taxpayer loses recourse that would have been legally available had the tax been demanded promptly, a belated demand may be unfair and unjust and will not be sustained
  • The mandatory requirement in section 229(1) of the EACCMA is limited to the timeline for lodging a review application, and the word "may" in section 230(1) EACCMA conferring the tribunal forum does not oust the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction
  • Judicial review is available in appropriate cases even where alternative legal or equitable remedies exist, and the statutory tribunal appellate process may be declined where it is less convenient, effective or beneficial in the circumstances
  • An appellate court may only interfere with the exercise of judicial review discretion where the Judge misdirected himself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant considerations, or where the decision is plainly wrong
  • The Fair Administrative Action Act 2015, having been assented to on 27th May 2015 and commenced on 17th June 2015, has no retrospective application to events preceding its commencement

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is dismissed
  2. 2.Costs of the appeal and the trial awarded to the respondent
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Judicial Review Misc. Application Number 460 of 2013, Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority, Ex parte Universal Corporation Limited
Jurisdiction invoked
Section 8(2) of the Law Reform Act (Cap 26) and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules; appellate jurisdiction under the Court of Appeal Act in respect of a judicial review decision of the High Court

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Kenya Revenue Authority v Universal Corporation Ltd", Case Analysis (2020). Civil Appeal Number 150 of 2018. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2020/395/eng@2020-08-07

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.