Attorney General & 2 others v Kenya Section of International Commission of Jurists (Civil Appeal 105 of 2012 & Criminal Appeal 274 of 2011 (Consolidated)) [2018] KECA 790 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal voided the Al Bashir arrest warrant but confirmed Kenya broke its international obligations by failing to arrest him for the ICC.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Jurisdiction to issue a provisional warrant of arrest under section 32 of the International Crimes Act
The High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the provisional warrant because a request for cooperation must first emanate from the ICC to the State through prescribed channels, which had not occurred; the appeal succeeded on the provisional warrant orders.
Sections 28, 29, 32 and 33 of the International Crimes Act and Articles 59, 89 and 92 of the Rome Statute must be read together. Article 59 places the duty to arrest on a State Party which has received a request from the ICC. The provisional warrant contemplated by section 32 presupposes an ICC request transmitted through the Minister or Attorney-General. No such request was shown to have been made to the Government of Kenya as the channel for the provisional arrest; a citizen cannot substitute the ICC as the source of the request.
Locus standi of a civil-society organisation to apply for a provisional warrant of arrest
The respondent had locus standi because the statute contemplates an 'applicant' distinct from the Minister, who is required to report the issue of the warrant to the Minister; 'any person' may apply.
Section 33(1) requires the applicant to report the issuance of the warrant to the Minister, showing the applicant and the Minister are different persons. The drafters allowed any entity or person, including the ODPP, to apply to the High Court for a provisional warrant, precisely to cater for the situation where the Minister may ignore or neglect to act on an ICC request. The High Court Judge therefore did not err in finding the respondent had standing on public-interest grounds, although the warrant itself failed for want of jurisdiction and urgency.
Mootness and staleness of the provisional warrant
The provisional warrant was spent: the IGAD Summit on which it was predicated had been moved to Addis Ababa, and the ruling was delivered nearly a year after the urgency had dissipated; the appeal succeeded on this ground.
Section 32 of the International Crimes Act and Article 92 of the Rome Statute permit a provisional warrant only in urgent cases where the person is in Kenya or may come to Kenya. The application was presented on 18th November 2010 after the Summit had been moved; the Judge reserved ruling and delivered it on 28th November 2011, nearly a year later. By then the urgency which was the foundation of the application had dissipated and the warrant was stale. However, the appeal as a whole was not moot because the Court's delineation of Kenya's obligations has practical effect.
Immunity of a serving Head of State from arrest for international crimes
A serving Head of State ordinarily enjoys personal immunity under customary international law, but an exception exists for international crimes; immunity cannot shield a person from accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which violate jus cogens norms.
Article 27 of the Rome Statute renders official capacity irrelevant, and States Parties consent to waive immunity by ratification. Article 98(1) ordinarily protects third-State Head-of-State immunity unless waived, and the Court agreed with the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber and the South African Supreme Court of Appeal that sitting heads of State normally enjoy immunity. However, acts amounting to international crimes are not sovereign acts; jus cogens norms override immunity, and the Security Council referral under Chapter VII, Article 25 and Article 103 of the UN Charter invoked a special regime that removed Al Bashir's immunity in respect of the Darfur situation.
Kenya's international obligations regarding the ICC warrants
Kenya acted in violation of its international obligations, its Constitution and legislation by inviting President Al Bashir and failing to arrest and surrender him pursuant to the ICC warrants.
By ratifying the Rome Statute in 2005 and enacting the International Crimes Act in 2008, Kenya bound itself under section 3 of the Act to comply with and implement the Rome Statute, whose provisions have the force of law in Kenya. Kenya received the warrants and requests for cooperation yet invited President Al Bashir to the Constitution promulgation on 27th August 2010 and failed to arrest him. The Court also found the appeal was not moot since the warrants remain outstanding and can still be executed unless rescinded by the ICC.
Legal principles established
#- A request for cooperation of whatever nature, including provisional arrest, must in the first instance emanate from the ICC to the State through known channels, and not from a private applicant; consequently a High Court Judge has jurisdiction under section 32 of the International Crimes Act to issue a provisional warrant only where an ICC warrant is in force and the statutory criteria are met.
- The 'applicant' for a provisional warrant of arrest under section 32 of the International Crimes Act may be any person other than the Minister, including the ODPP and civil-society litigants; the respondent therefore had locus standi.
- A provisional warrant of arrest under section 32 of the International Crimes Act may issue only in cases of genuine urgency, and becomes stale where the urgency on which the application is predicated has dissipated by the time it is issued.
- A State official, including a serving Head of State, cannot rely on immunity to escape accountability for international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; immunity does not attach to acts amounting to international crimes which violate jus cogens norms.
- Kenya, as a State Party to the Rome Statute bound by the Statute, the UN Charter, customary international law and its own International Crimes Act, was obliged to cooperate with the ICC and to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir when he was on Kenyan territory notwithstanding Sudan's non-membership of the Rome Statute, because the Security Council referral under Resolution 1593 brought the Darfur situation within the ICC's jurisdiction.
- The general rules of international law made part of Kenyan law by Article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution are customary international law and peremptory (jus cogens) norms which are obligatory on State and non-State actors without the need for ratification.
Court orders
#- 1.Appeal allowed in so far as the orders granting the provisional warrant of arrest and directing the Minister to effect it were concerned, there being no jurisdiction to issue them
- 2.No orders as to costs of the appeal
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya
- Judicial Review Application (provisional warrant application) decided with Misc. Crim. Appl. No. 685 of 2010
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution and the Civil Procedure Act over an appeal from the High Court; appeal concerned the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction under sections 32 and 33 of the International Crimes Act, No. 16 of 2008
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Attorney General & 2 others v Kenya Section of International Commission of Jurists (Civil Appeal 105 of 2012 & Criminal Appeal 274 of 2011 (Consolidated)) [2018] KECA 790 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Civil Appeal (consolidated) from Nairobi High Court Judicial Review Application No. 409 of 2010 and Misc. Crim. Appl. No. 685 of 2010. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2018/790/eng@2018-02-16
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.