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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Application No. NAI 6 of 2016· [2016] KECA 715 (KLR)

Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commision & another (Civil Application 6 of 2016) [2016] KECA 715 (KLR)

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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal refused to remove a judge from a case, ruling that old grievances without hard evidence of bias don't justify a judge stepping aside.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a ruling of a seven-judge bench of the Court of Appeal at Nairobi on a notice of motion dated 12th February 2016 by which Justice Philip K. Tunoi and Justice David A. Onyancha sought the recusal of the Presiding Judge, Hon. Justice G.B.M. Kariuki, and Hon. Justice Makhandia from hearing their appeal against the High Court judgment in Petition No. 244 of 2015, which held that the retirement age of all judges of the superior courts is 70 years. The application against Justice Makhandia was dealt with separately in Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2016 (Rawal v JSC). As to the Presiding Judge, the applicants relied on his 1994 conviction and fine for contempt of court in the People case (Republic v Makali), decided by a bench that included the 1st applicant, and on his alleged failure to disclose that matter. Applying the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing under Articles 50(1) and 25(c) and the objective test for apparent bias, the court traced the jurisprudence from Tumaini v Republic through R v Gough to Porter v Magill and Taylor v Lawrence, and held that a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The 22-year-old conviction, the judge's recollection of it, and the non-disclosure complaint did not establish reasonable grounds for apprehension of bias, particularly as the appeal concerned an issue of constitutional interpretation not personal to the applicants. The motion was dismissed with costs to the respondents. The ruling binds lower courts on the objective fair-minded and informed observer test for recusal.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the Presiding Judge's conviction and fine for contempt 22 years earlier, in a bench that included the 1st applicant, establishes a real possibility of bias

Holding

It does not. No evidence was adduced of any likelihood of retaliation, vindictiveness or want of impartiality, and the application failed the fair-minded and informed observer test.

Reasoning

The court traced the jurisprudence from Tumaini v Republic through R v Gough to Porter v Magill and Taylor v Lawrence, adopting the fair-minded and informed observer test. The only grounds advanced were the 22-year-old contempt conviction and the judge's recall of it. The court found that memory of past events is not evidence of bitterness, that no reasonable grounds for apprehension were stated, and that a reasonable observer knowing the facts would not conclude a real possibility of bias, particularly as the appeal turned on interpretation of the retirement age, an issue not personal to the applicant.

p. 8
02

The constitutional right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal

Holding

The right to a fair hearing under Articles 50(1) and 25(c) is absolute and cannot be limited, but its invocation does not dispense with the requirement to establish bias on objective evidence.

Reasoning

The court acknowledged that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, and that the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal is non-derogable. However, it emphasised that the test for apparent bias is objective, that facts constituting bias must be specifically alleged and established, and that mere apprehension or perception without evidentiary foundation does not satisfy the constitutional standard. Recusal remains a matter to be assessed on the material placed before the court.

p. 6
03

The duty of judicial officers to disqualify themselves where impartiality might reasonably be questioned under the Judicial Service Code of Conduct and Ethics

Holding

Rule 5 of the Code requires disqualification where impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including personal bias or prejudice, but the circumstances here did not trigger that duty.

Reasoning

The court noted that the Judicial Service Code of Conduct and Ethics, made pursuant to Section 5(1) of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003, obliges judicial officers to disqualify themselves where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned or where they hold personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. The court nonetheless found that had evidence of a real possibility of bias been shown the judge would have stepped aside; absent such evidence, the Code's disqualification threshold was not met.

p. 9

Legal principles established

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  • The governing test for apparent bias/recusal is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.
  • Facts constituting bias must be specifically alleged and established; a mere apprehension or assertion of bias without evidence is insufficient to compel recusal.
  • A judge's prior adjudication of a matter in which a litigant was a party, without more, does not ground a real possibility of bias against that litigant years later.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Dismissal of the notice of motion dated 12th February 2016 seeking recusal of the Presiding Judge, Hon. Justice G.B.M. Kariuki
  2. 2.Costs of the application to the respondents

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 50(1)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 25(c)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 163(1)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 167(1)
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 171
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Article 172
  • Constitution of Kenya, 2010Schedule Six (transitional provisions)
  • The Judicature Act, Cap 9Section 9
  • Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003Section 5(1)
  • Judicial Service Code of Conduct and EthicsRule 10(1)
  • Judicial Service Code of Conduct and EthicsRule 5

Cases cited (9)

  • Tumaini v. Republic
    [1972] EA LR 441
  • Attorney General v. Times Newspapers
    [1947] 2 WLR 273
  • Gharib v. Naaman
    [1999] 2 EA 88
  • R.F.S. v. J.D.S.
    [2013] eKLR
  • Republic versus David Makali & 3 Others (the People case)
    Criminal Application Nos. Nai 4 & 5 of 1994 (consolidated)
  • R v. Gough
    [1993] AC 646
  • Porter v. Magill
    [2002] 1 All ER 465
  • Taylor v. Lawrence
    [2003] QB 528
  • Hon. Lady Justice Kalpana H. Rawal v. JSC & 4 Others
    Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2016
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Petition No. 244 of 2015
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under Article 164 of the Constitution over the appeal from the High Court judgment; the present ruling is interlocutory on the recusal application within that appeal.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (3)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commision & another (Civil Application 6 of 2016) [2016] KECA 715 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2016). Civil Application No. NAI 6 of 2016. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2016/715/eng@2016-03-11

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.