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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 238 of 2012 (consolidated with Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2012)· [2016] KECA 505 (KLR)

Kenya Sugar Board v Mumias Sugar Company Limited & 2 others [2016] KECA 505 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
14 June 2016
4,214 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that consent orders procured by fraud can be set aside, and that a company in receivership can still sue when it protects its own interests.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This consolidated appeal arose from a ruling of the High Court at Bungoma (Muchelule, J.) delivered on 7th May 2012 in HCCC No. 66 of 2011, refusing to set aside consent orders recorded in a suit brought by Mumias Sugar Company Limited (MSC) against Busia Sugar Company Limited (BSC) seeking leave to sell charged land by private treaty. Kenya Sugar Board (KSB), the debenture holder over all of BSC's assets, and BSC itself applied to set aside the consents, alleging fraud, lack of instructions to BSC's advocate, forgery of the second consent, and collusion between MSC and the Receiver/Manager, Jones Ndubi, who was an employee of MSC. The Court of Appeal (Musinga, Gatembu Kairu and Murgor, JJ.A.) held that the presumption that a consent order binds the parties is rebuttable, and that the presumption was rebutted here: BSC was under receivership and unaware of the suit, KSB as debenture holder was never informed, the advocate recorded the consent without instructions, the signature on the second consent was forged, and the trial court wrongly assumed the suit land had been registered in the name of third-party purchaser Kaplony Limited when prohibitory orders and a prior setting aside of the sale existed. The Court allowed both appeals and set aside the High Court ruling. On the competence of BSC's appeal filed while under receivership, the Court, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia, held that receivership does not divest directors of the power to pursue proceedings in the company's interest, and rule 104(b) barred the late competence objection. MSC was ordered to bear KSB's costs of the appeals and the High Court suit; no costs were awarded to BSC and Busia Outgrowers Company Limited.

Key legal issues

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01

Setting aside of consent orders for fraud

Holding

The consent orders were vitiated by fraud: BSC was unaware of the suit, its advocate acted without instructions, the Receiver colluded with MSC against the debenture holder, and the second consent bore a forged signature. The trial judge should have set them aside.

Reasoning

The Court found that MSC knew BSC was under receivership and that KSB held a debenture over all its assets, yet sued without notice to KSB. The Receiver, an employee of MSC, acted in concert with MSC. The advocate recording the consent had no instructions from BSC, and the signature on the second consent was plainly forged. The Land Registrar also could not comply because prohibitory orders existed. The trial court's discretion was therefore exercised on wrong premises and had to be interfered with.

p. 6
02

Trial court's reliance on third-party registration

Holding

The trial judge erred in declining to interfere because the suit land was allegedly registered in the name of Kaplony Limited; there was no evidence of such registration and the purported sale had in fact been set aside.

Reasoning

Apart from the Land Registrar's letter stating he could not transfer the land due to prohibitory orders, the trial court itself had on 10th October 2011 set aside the purported sale and reinstated BSC as registered proprietor. Correspondence between Kaplony and KSB about a sugar project conferred no proprietary rights and did not estop KSB from claiming the land.

p. 6
03

Capacity of a company under receivership to file an appeal

Holding

BSC's appeal was competent despite the receivership, since the directors retain power to pursue an action in the company's interest that does not prejudice the debenture holder, and no timely competence objection was raised.

Reasoning

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia and Newhart Developments, the Court held that a receiver and manager does not usurp all functions of the board. Here the Receiver could not have sanctioned an appeal challenging his own actions, so the directors' residual power subsisted. Further, rule 104(b) barred a late competence objection where no application under rule 84 had been made since the 2014 consolidation.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • A consent judgment may only be set aside on grounds of fraud, collusion, or any reason which would enable the court to set aside an agreement; the presumption that a consent order recorded with counsel's consent binds the parties is rebuttable.
  • The power given to a receiver to bring proceedings is an enabling provision that does not divest the directors of the company of their power to pursue a right of action in the company's interest where it does not prejudicially affect the debenture holder's charged assets.
  • Under rule 104(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, a respondent may not, without leave of the Court, raise an objection to the competence of an appeal which could have been raised by application under rule 84.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal lodged by KSB is allowed
  2. 2.The ruling delivered by the trial court on 7th May 2012 in Bungoma HCCC No. 66 of 2011 is set aside
  3. 3.MSC shall bear KSB's costs of the appeal as well as the costs in the High Court matter
  4. 4.No order as to costs in favour of BSC and Busia Outgrowers Company Limited
  5. 5.Appeal No. 230 of 2012 by BSC is competent and is allowed, with MSC to bear KSB's costs of that appeal and the costs in the High Court

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Court of Appeal RulesRule 104(b)
  • Court of Appeal RulesRule 84

Cases cited (6)

  • BROOK BOND LIEBIG (T) LTD v MALYA
    [1975] E.A. 266
  • WASIKE v WAMBOKO
    [1988] KLR 429
  • HIRANI v KASSAM
    [1952] 19 EACA 131
  • SAMUEL KAMAU MACHARIA & ANOTHER v KENYA COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED & 2 OTHERS
    [2012] eKLR
  • HAWKESBURY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED v LANDMARK FINANCE PTY LTD
    [1969] 2 NSWR 782
  • NEWHART DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED v COOPERATIVE COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED
    [1978] 2 ALLER 896 (CA)
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Bungoma
HCCC No. 66 of 2011
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the High Court under the Constitution and the Court of Appeal's Rules (rule 104(b) invoked on competence objections)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Kenya Sugar Board v Mumias Sugar Company Limited & 2 others [2016] KECA 505 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2016). Civil Appeal No. 238 of 2012 (consolidated with Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2012). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2016/505/eng@2016-06-14

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.