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Court of AppealAllowedCivil Appeal No. 161 of 2002· [2015] KECA 960 (KLR)

Lucy Njeri Njoroge v Kaiyahe Njoroge

Court of Appeal of Kenya
30 January 2015
6,294 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled a property sale agreement stayed valid because the seller couldn't use a tribunal to escape it, and the buyer must complete payment.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This second appeal concerned a 1990 sale agreement between brother and sister for a half share of land in Ngong township. The appellant paid Kshs.210,000 of the Kshs.350,000 price; the balance was never completed. The respondent, who had sold to repay a bank loan, instead invoked the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, obtained a Business Premises Rent Tribunal order terminating a purported tenancy, and sued for vacant possession and rent arrears. The trial magistrate and, on first appeal, Waki J held the sale agreement frustrated by the respondent's forced sale of another property to repay the loan, and that a tenancy arose from the appellant's failure to challenge the termination notice. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It held the alleged frustrating event was self-induced and foreseeable, and produced nothing radically different from the parties' contemplation; the agreement was never rescinded because the respondent neither notified the appellant nor refunded the deposit; no tenancy existed, so the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the vendor/purchaser relationship and its orders were null and void ab initio and incapable of enforcement notwithstanding the absence of a challenge. The sale agreement therefore remained valid and enforceable. The Court set aside the High Court judgment, declared the Tribunal ruling a nullity, and ordered specific performance of the sale agreement upon payment of the balance, with funds held by advocates and in court to be released to the respondent. Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellant against the respondent.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether non-payment of the balance of the purchase price frustrated the sale agreement

Holding

No. The alleged frustrating event (the respondent's unilateral repayment of the bank loan) was self-induced and foreseeable, and the outcome was not radically different from what was contemplated.

Reasoning

The court applied Davis Contractors: frustration requires an event without default of either party rendering performance radically different. The respondent chose to repay the loan himself, an act of self-induced frustration which estopped him from pleading frustration. His resort to alternative repayment was foreseeable, and the loan was ultimately repaid, so nothing radically different occurred.

p. 5
02

Whether the agreement was rescinded

Holding

No. Rescission requires notification to the defaulting party and restitution; the respondent neither notified the appellant nor refunded the deposit.

Reasoning

Relying on Black's Law Dictionary and Kenya Airways v Satwant Singh Flora, the court held rescission is a unilateral unmaking accompanied by restitution. Instead of rescinding, the respondent used a termination notice over a non-existent tenancy to avoid refunding the deposit, so no rescission occurred.

p. 7
03

Whether a tenancy arose from the appellant's failure to challenge the termination notice

Holding

No. There was no tenancy to terminate; the sale agreement remained in existence and the notice was inapplicable to the appellant.

Reasoning

No written lease under five years was produced, no rent was paid, and the sale agreement had not been terminated. The Tribunal proceedings sought to terminate a non-existent tenancy, so no purpose would be served by requiring the appellant to respond to the notice.

p. 8
04

Whether the Business Premises Tribunal had jurisdiction

Holding

No. Its mandate is limited to controlled tenancies and does not extend to vendor/purchaser contractual arrangements; its orders were null and void ab initio.

Reasoning

Applying Lillian S v Caltex on jurisdiction and Barnard/Anisminic/Choitram on nullity of tribunal orders made without jurisdiction, the court held the appellant was not a controlled tenant, so the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and its orders were incapable of enforcement despite not having been challenged.

p. 9
05

Whether the parties remain bound by the sale agreement

Holding

Yes. The agreement, never frustrated, rescinded or terminated, remains valid and enforceable; specific performance was ordered upon payment of the balance.

Reasoning

Since no completion date was stipulated and time was not of essence, the agreement subsists until mutually terminated. Had the lower courts considered its terms, they would have ordered specific performance or allowed termination with recovery of sums paid as a civil debt.

p. 9

Legal principles established

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  • The Business Premises Rent Tribunal's jurisdiction is confined to controlled tenancies and does not extend to vendor/purchaser relationships; orders made without jurisdiction are null and void and incapable of enforcement.
  • Frustration cannot be founded on a self-induced event; a party responsible for the alleged frustrating event is estopped from pleading frustration.
  • Rescission requires notification to the other party and restitution of partial performance; without notice and refund, an agreement cannot be held rescinded.
  • An appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact by the first appellate court unless they are not based on evidence, are a misapprehension of the evidence, or the judge acted on a wrong principle.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is allowed
  2. 2.The ruling of the Business Premises Tribunal of 3rd January 1994 is declared null and void, and of no consequence
  3. 3.The judgment of the High Court dated 19th April 2002 is set aside and substituted with an order allowing the appellant's appeal against the judgment and decree of the Principal Magistrate dated 22nd December 1997 in Principal Magistrate's Court Civil Suit No 947 of 1994
  4. 4.Upon payment of the balance of the purchase price, an order of specific performance of the Sale Agreement dated 7th September 1990 shall issue
  5. 5.Payment of the sums shall be by way of release to the respondent of Kshs.60,000/= paid to the appellant's advocate and Kshs.80,000/= deposited in court as security
  6. 6.Costs of the appeal to be borne by the respondent

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels, and Catering Establishments) ActCap 301 (generally)
  • Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels, and Catering Establishments) ActSection 3
  • Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels, and Catering Establishments) ActSection 10

Cases cited (14)

  • Mapis (K) Ltd vs Kenya Railways Corporation
    Court of Appeal No. 14 of 2005 (unreported)

    Something illegal ab initio cannot be the basis of relief sought from the court

  • Kenya Airways vs Satwant Singh Flora
    Civil Appeal No 54 of 2005

    Nature of the doctrine of frustration; rescission effected by notification and refund of deposit

  • Gatere Njamunyu vs Joseck Njue Nyaga
    [1983] eKLR

    Vendor entitled to rescind on purchaser's failure to pay balance 14 months later

  • Ephantus Mwangi & Another vs Duncan Mwangi Wambugu
    (1982-88) 1 KAR 278

    Second appellate court will not interfere with first appellate findings of fact unless unsupported by evidence or wrong principle

  • Davis Contractors Ltd vs Farehum U.D.C.
    (1956) AC 696

    Test for frustration: obligation becomes radically different without default of either party

  • Maritime National Fish vs Ocean Trawlers
    [1935] AC 524

    Self-induced frustration where a party elects an allocation causing the frustrating event

  • Howard & Company (Africa) Ltd vs Burton
    [1964] EA 157

    Frustration cannot apply where the event arises from the act or self-election of the party invoking it; radically different test

  • Bank Line Ltd vs Arthur Capel & Company
    [1919] AC 425

    Doctrine of frustration inapplicable to self-induced events

  • Taylor vs Caldwell
    (1863) 3 B & S 826

    Frustration where the subject matter is destroyed and unavailable

  • The Sea Angel
    [2007] EWCA Civ 547, [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 517

    Foreseeability of an event bears on whether it may lead to frustration

  • The Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S' vs Caltex Oil Kenya Ltd
    [1989] KLR 1

    Jurisdiction is everything; a court without jurisdiction must down its tools

  • Barnard vs National Dock Labour Board
    [1953] 1 All ER 1113

    Courts may intervene by declaration and injunction where a statutory tribunal acts unlawfully

  • Anisminic vs Foreign Compensation Commission
    [1969] 1 All ER 208

    Orders of tribunals acting without jurisdiction are nullities

  • Choitram & Others vs Mystery Model Hair Saloon
    (1972) EA 525

    Court may declare tribunal orders made without jurisdiction a nullity and restrain their enforcement

On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 14 of 1998
Jurisdiction invoked
Second appeal to the Court of Appeal against the judgment of the High Court (statutory first appellate jurisdiction; no specific constitutional provision cited)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Lucy Njeri Njoroge v Kaiyahe Njoroge", Case Analysis (2015). Civil Appeal No. 161 of 2002. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2015/960/eng@2015-01-30

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.