Walter Joe Mburu v Abdul Shakoor Sheikh & 3 others [2015] KECA 848 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal refused to accept new evidence in a decade-old land case, warning that unexplained delay and weak material will sink such applications.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Whether additional evidence should be received under rule 29(1)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules
The application failed: the decade-long unexplained delay, the tentative and inconclusive nature of the EACC letters, and the fact that the suit was dismissed on a point of law without evidence all militated against reception of the material.
The Court restated the Aga Khan v Munyambu principles: leave will generally be given where the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained at trial, would probably have an important influence on the result, and is apparently credible. The letters here were 'mere letters', exploratory and of nil probative value, and unrelated to the limitation point on which the suit was struck out. Discretion was also exercised against the applicant for inordinate, unexplained delay.
Whether a point-of-law dismissal forecloses an additional-evidence application
Yes, ordinarily: where a matter is decided on a point of law without any evidence tendered, there is no evidence to add to, so an application for additional evidence cannot ordinarily lie.
The Court agreed with the 3rd respondent that the suit against the 3rd respondent was struck out on limitation, a pure point of law, without evidence being taken. The only conceivable relevance would be evidence showing the claim was within time; the applicant instead sought to introduce totally different material unrelated to that point, which could not assist.
Legal principles established
#- Reception of additional evidence on appeal is discretionary and delay in bringing the application is a relevant consideration against granting leave.
- Where a matter is decided on a point of law without any evidence having been tendered, an application for adduction of additional evidence cannot ordinarily lie.
- Additional evidence must meet the rule 29(1)(b) threshold of being unobtainable with reasonable diligence, probably having an important influence on the result, and being apparently credible; tentative, inconclusive material does not qualify.
Court orders
#- 1.The registrar or deputy registrar directed to rectify the decree dated 4th March 2002 and issued on 22nd July 2002 to conform with the ruling of Ransley, J dated 14th March
- 2.The notice of appeal filed on the 19th March deemed to have been properly filed
- 3.The application for the taking of additional evidence dismissed with costs to the 3rd respondent
- 4.The very old appeal to be fixed for hearing as is on priority basis
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
- HCCC No. 1191 of 1999
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Appellate jurisdiction under the Court of Appeal Rules (rules 29, 30 and 31 of the Rules of Court); the judgment does not cite a specific constitutional provision.
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Later judgments citing this (2)
#Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.
- Nahashon Akunga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Returning Officer & the 3rd Respondent (Election Petition)[2017] KEHC 2851 (KLR)30 Oct 2017
- ISAYA OYOO OPAP v ORANGE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT & another[2017] KEHC 4949 (KLR)17 May 2017
Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Walter Joe Mburu v Abdul Shakoor Sheikh & 3 others [2015] KECA 848 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2015). Civil Appeal No. 195 of 2002. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2015/848/eng@2015-03-20
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.