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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal 35 of 2007· [2012] KECA 68 (KLR)

George Arunga Sino T/A Jone Brooks Cons Ultants Limited v Patrick J.O. & Geofrey D.O. Yogo T/A Atieno, Yogo & Co. Advocates [2012] KECA 68 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
11 October 2012
6,198 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled that a client cannot dodge advocates' fees by claiming its own licensing was illegal, and judges cannot invent their own fee figures instead of ordering retaxation.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a Court of Appeal at Kisumu judgment (Onyango Otieno, Karanja and Koome JJA) in an appeal and cross-appeal against Warsame J's ruling of 22nd November 2006 substituting the taxing master's award of Kshs.1,170,756 with Kshs.300,000 as instructions fees in an advocate/client taxation. The appellant, an auctioneer trading as Jone Brooks Consultants Limited, argued that a limited liability company cannot be licensed as an auctioneer, so the respondents were entitled to no fees; and that the matter, begun by notice of motion, was not a suit so Schedule VI 1(l) applied. The cross-appeal complained that the Judge's figure of Kshs.300,000 had no legal basis and that the amount claimed (Kshs.41 million) should have formed the basis of instructions fee. The Court rejected the illegality argument: the licence stood in George Arunga Sino's name, and equity demanded he pay for services rendered at his request, particularly as he had partly paid. It held that proceedings commenced by notice of motion are a suit under Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act and Schedule VI of the Remuneration Order, so Schedule VI(1)(b) applied. Instructions fee is pegged on the amount the client instructed the advocate to claim, determinable from the pleadings, and is earned once the advocate acts on instructions regardless of the stage reached. Following Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates, the Judge erred in substituting his own arbitrary figure instead of remitting the bill for retaxation. The appeal was allowed, the High Court decision set aside, the bill remitted to a different taxing master for afresh taxation, with each party bearing its own costs of the appeal. This binds subordinate courts and taxing masters on the correct approach to taxation references.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the appellant could avoid liability for advocates' fees because a limited liability company cannot be licensed as an auctioneer

Holding

The contention was untenable; the licence was in George Arunga Sino's name and equity demanded payment for services rendered at his request, especially as he had partly paid and participated in the taxation

Reasoning

The court found the licence No. 0191 was issued to George Arunga Sino personally, Jone Brooks Consultants Limited being merely a business name. The appellant instructed the respondents, received services, made payments, and submitted to taxation before raising the illegality. The court held he could not benefit from his own wrongdoing nor renege after presenting himself as an auctioneer, distinguishing the earlier withdrawn appeal against Co-operative Bank where the company itself sought to benefit from its own wrongdoing.

p. 6
02

Whether proceedings commenced by notice of motion are a suit within Schedule VI of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order

Holding

Yes; the definition of suit in Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act and Schedule VI(1)(a) and (b), which expressly cover proceedings commenced by notice of motion, compelled the conclusion that the matter was a suit

Reasoning

Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act defines a suit as all civil proceedings commenced in any manner prescribed. Schedule VI(1)(a) of the 1997 Remuneration Order expressly covers proceedings commenced by plaint, petition, originating summons or notice of motion. The learned Judge erred in relegating the matter to Schedule VI 1(l) (matters not provided for); the amount in dispute was ascertainable from the pleadings.

p. 6
03

The proper basis for assessing instructions fee

Holding

Instructions fee is pegged on the amount the client instructed the advocate to claim, which is determinable from the pleadings, not the amount later found due

Reasoning

The Remuneration Order provides that the value of the subject matter can be determined from the pleadings, judgment or settlement. Where a client instructs an advocate to claim a specific amount, the advocate works toward realising that amount and his fee is pegged on it even if the suit is ultimately dismissed. The learned Judge's statement that Kshs.41 million was 'a mere claim' was wrong, as was his contradictory access-to-justice statement given the Order's mandatory minimums.

p. 8
04

Whether the High Court Judge could substitute his own figure of Kshs.300,000 instead of remitting for retaxation

Holding

No; the Judge should have referred the bill back to a taxing master with directions, and his figure was arbitrary and unsupported by any provision

Reasoning

Following Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates, it is not in the province of a judge to retax a bill; where the taxing master erred in principle the bill should be referred back for taxation by the same or another taxing officer with directions. The Judge also failed to state how he arrived at Kshs.300,000, which the court found arbitrary and unsupported by the guidelines in the Remuneration Order.

p. 9
05

Whether an advocate who ceased acting after preparing and filing documents remains entitled to the full instructions fee

Holding

Yes; the instructions fee was earned immediately the advocate perused the documents and filed the notice of motion, and ceasing to act did not affect entitlement

Reasoning

Relying on the persuasive High Court decision in First American Bank of Kenya v Shah, the court adopted the position that instructions fee is an independent and static item not affected by the stage a suit has reached. Had the advocate continued, he would have been entitled to getting up charges; but the full instructions fee attached upon filing the notice of motion and bill of costs.

Legal principles established

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  • A matter commenced by way of notice of motion is in law a suit for purposes of taxation under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order
  • Instructions fee is assessed on the value of the subject matter as claimed and determinable from the pleadings, not on the amount ultimately awarded
  • A judge who finds that the taxing master erred in principle must refer the bill back for retaxation and may not substitute his own figure
  • Instructions fee is an independent and static item earned once the advocate acts on instructions, unaffected by the stage the suit reaches or by the advocate ceasing to act
  • A client cannot rely on his own incapacity or irregularity in licensing to escape paying for services rendered at his own request; equity demands payment

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal allowed
  2. 2.Decision of the learned Judge of the High Court set aside
  3. 3.Advocates Bill of Costs remitted to any taxing master other than W.B. Mokaya (Mrs) for afresh taxation on instructions fee under the specified schedule
  4. 4.Each party to meet its own costs of the appeal

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Advocates (Remuneration) OrderRule 13(1), (2) and (3)
  • Advocates (Remuneration) OrderRule 11(1)
  • Advocates (Remuneration) OrderRule 11(2)
  • Advocates (Remuneration) OrderRule 106
  • Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order, 1997Schedule VI(1)(a)
  • Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order, 1997Schedule VI(1)(b)
  • Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order, 1997Schedule VI 1(l)
  • Civil Procedure ActSection 2
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 1 rule 1

Cases cited (3)

  • Jone Brooks Consultants Limited v. Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 308 of 2006
  • Joreth Limited v. Kigano & Associates, Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1999
  • First American Bank of Kenya v. Shah & Others
    (2002) 1 EA 64
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Kisumu
H.C. Misc. Appl. No. 150 of 2006
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order referral framework (Rule 11) from a High Court reference decision

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (2)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "George Arunga Sino T/A Jone Brooks Cons Ultants Limited v Patrick J.O. & Geofrey D.O. Yogo T/A Atieno, Yogo & Co. Advocates [2012] KECA 68 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2012). Civil Appeal 35 of 2007. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2012/68/eng@2012-10-11

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.