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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No. 304 of 2006· [2008] KECA 58 (KLR)

Benson Mbuchu Gichuki v Evans Kamende Munjua & 2 others [2008] KECA 58 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
21 November 2008
5,338 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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·~21 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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The Court of Appeal confirmed that a consent judgment in Kenya is binding like a contract and can only be set aside for reasons that would undo a contract, supported by evidence.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant, a professional arbitrator, was appointed sole arbitrator in a dispute between the first two respondents' firm, Uplands Agencies, and Norwegian Peoples Aid. He awarded the respondents over Ksh.16 million, charging a fee of Ksh.4,184,761. Cheques issued by the respondents for his fees were dishonoured. NPA successfully applied to set the award aside on grounds of misconduct, and the parties settled. The appellant then sued for the balance of his fee; his application for summary judgment was dismissed, but the parties recorded a handwritten consent judgment compromising the claim at Ksh.700,000. Part of that amount was paid or recovered in execution, though the record shows repeated efforts by the respondents to frustrate execution. Four years later the appellant applied for review of the consent decree, alleging fraud, collusion (including with the judge), undue influence, coercion and economic duress. Ang'awa J dismissed the application, holding there was nothing to review, the consent was free of undue influence and the delay was inordinate. The Court of Appeal, in a unanimous first-appeal judgment, affirmed. It restated that a consent judgment has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds justifying setting aside a contract; that the appellant's allegations were wholly unsupported by evidence; that four years of unexplained delay was unreasonable under Order 44 rule 1; and that the appellant had benefited from the consent decree through part payment and execution. It also clarified that Osiemo J had not struck out the defence. The court dismissed the appeal but, recognising the respondents' obstruction of execution, ordered each party to bear its own costs and confirmed the appellant's liberty to execute for the balance of the decretal amount.

Key legal issues

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01

Grounds for review of a consent judgment

Holding

A consent judgment is treated as a contract between the parties and can only be reviewed or set aside on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract; the appellant's allegations of fraud, coercion and undue influence were unsupported by any evidence.

Reasoning

The court adopted the Flora N. Wasiki principle that consent orders have contractual effect. The appellant produced no cogent evidence of fraud or duress; he also entered the consent voluntarily despite having the option of proceeding to full trial, and had already received part payment. Allegations of collusion between the respondents and the judge were baseless.

p. 8
02

Delay in applying for review

Holding

A review application brought four years after the consent judgment, with no explanation and no date of discovery of the alleged fraud, was made with unreasonable delay and could not succeed.

Reasoning

Order 44 rule 1 requires review applications without unreasonable delay. The delay runs from the discovery of the mistake or fraud relied upon; the appellant never told the court when he allegedly discovered the fraud, coercion or undue influence, and made no attempt to explain the four-year delay.

p. 8
03

Whether the defence had been struck out

Holding

Osiemo J did not strike out the defence; he merely allowed the review application on the ground that the defence had allegedly been sneaked into the file and called for investigation of that allegation.

Reasoning

The court examined Osiemo J's ruling of 29th March 1999 and found he allowed the review because the applicant was unaware of the defence when arguing summary judgment, and referred the alleged registry irregularity for investigation. He did not strike out the defence, and probably could not before the investigations were known.

p. 7
04

Approach to interference with discretionary decisions on a first appeal

Holding

On a first appeal the court reconsiders facts afresh, but will only interfere with the exercise of discretion if the judge considered irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant matters, or was plainly wrong.

Reasoning

Citing Mbogo v Shah, the court reaffirmed that appellate interference with discretion requires proof that the judge misdirected herself or was plainly wrong. Finding no such error, and noting the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the consent document signed in her presence, the court declined to interfere.

Legal principles established

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  • A consent judgment or order has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting a contract aside, or if certain conditions remain to be fulfilled which are not carried out
  • An application for review must be made to the court which passed the decree without unreasonable delay, and the delay is measured from the discovery of the ground relied upon
  • Serious allegations such as fraud cannot suffice in law without evidence in support of them

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is dismissed
  2. 2.Each party shall bear its own costs
  3. 3.The appellant is at liberty to execute for whatever is the balance of the decretal amount arising from the consent judgment

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Actsection 80
  • Civil Procedure Actsection 3A
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 44 rule 1
  • Evidence Actsection 47
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 9A rule 3(1)

Cases cited (5)

  • Selle vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others
    (1968) EA 123
  • Mbogo & another vs. Shah
    (1968) EA 93
  • Flora N. Wasike vs. Destimo Wamboko
    (1982 – 88) I KAR 625
  • J.M. Mwakio vs. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
    Civ. Apps 28 of 1982 and 69 of 1983
  • Purcell vs. FC Trigal Ltd
    (1970) 3 All ER 671
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C. Suit No. 16 of 1998
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal as a first appeal from the High Court (the judgment does not cite a specific constitutional provision)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Benson Mbuchu Gichuki v Evans Kamende Munjua & 2 others [2008] KECA 58 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2008). Civil Appeal No. 304 of 2006. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2008/58/eng@2008-11-21

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.