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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No 351 of 2002· [2007] KECA 486 (KLR)

Situma v Cherongo (Civil Appeal 351 of 2002) [2007] KECA 486 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
31 July 2007
2,578 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal dismissed a squatter's land claim, confirming that demand letters don't stop the 12-year adverse possession clock.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a first appeal to the Court of Appeal from the judgment of Ongundi J dated 26th March 1996, dismissing a claim by Joseph Matafari Situma and the estate of Dismas Matafari Situma to be declared entitled to LR Bungoma/Kamukuywa/298 by adverse possession, following a sale agreement of 1971 under which the deceased took possession after paying part of the purchase price. The Court held that the failure to obtain Land Control Board consent rendered the agreement void under section 6(1) of the Land Control Act six months after it was made, whereupon the deceased's possession became adverse, applying Samuel Miki Waweru v Jane Njeri Richu. However, the deceased was in adverse possession for only about 8 years before his death in 1979, short of the 12-year minimum, so the estate acquired no title. The appellant's personal claim also failed: before his father's death he possessed through his father without the requisite animus possidendi and independent possession of an identifiable portion, and after the death his adverse possession ran only about 9 years. Importantly, the Court found as a matter of law that the superior court erred in holding that letters demanding possession interrupted the running of time; following Githu v Ndeete and Mount Carmel Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd, such letters do not stop time running until the squatter vacates or acknowledges the owner's title. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed, with no orders as to costs, each party bearing its own costs. The decision on limitation is the judgment's enduring binding proposition for lower courts.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether letters demanding possession interrupt the running of time for adverse possession

Holding

They do not. The superior court erred in finding that letters written to the deceased interrupted the running of time

Reasoning

Relying on Githu v Ndeete, Megarry & Wade and Mount Carmel Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd, the Court held that a letter demanding delivery up of possession cannot in law make the recipient cease to be in possession. Time continues to run unless the squatter vacates or acknowledges the owner's title; the owner must sue within the limitation period.

p. 5
02

Whether the estate acquired title by adverse possession

Holding

No. The deceased was in adverse possession for only about 8 years before death, less than the 12-year statutory minimum

Reasoning

Dismas Matafari Situma was in adverse possession from about 12th June 1971 until his death on 31st May 1979, a period short of 12 years. Under section 9(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act the right of action accrued to the appellant on death, but the deceased had not acquired title, so the estate is not entitled to the land. The estate was also not made a party to the appeal.

p. 3
03

Whether the appellant proved an independent personal claim by adverse possession

Holding

No. Before his father's death his possession was through his father without independent animus possidendi; after the death his adverse possession was only about 9 years

Reasoning

The appellant's possession before 1979 was communal occupation through his father, with no evidence of subdivision or allocation of a specific share, and lacking the requisite intention to possess to the exclusion of all others. Possession from 1st June 1979 to 11th April 1988 was adverse but fell about 3 years short of the 12-year minimum.

p. 4
04

Effect of failure to obtain Land Control Board consent on the sale agreement

Holding

The agreement became void for all purposes under section 6(1) of the Land Control Act six months after it was made, and possession thereafter became adverse

Reasoning

Section 8 of the Land Control Act requires application for consent within six months of the agreement. No application was made, so under section 6(1) the contract became void for all purposes. Applying Samuel Miki Waweru v Jane Njeri Richu, the vendor's permission was terminated by operation of law and the continued possession became adverse from about 11th September 1971.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • A letter from the true owner demanding possession from a squatter in factual possession does not stop time running under the Limitation of Actions Act; time continues until the squatter vacates or acknowledges the owner's title
  • Where a purchaser is permitted into possession pending completion and the controlled transaction becomes void under section 6(1) of the Land Control Act, the continued possession becomes adverse from the time the transaction becomes void
  • A claimant to title by adverse possession must prove exclusive physical possession of an identifiable portion of the land independent of any other person's possession, coupled with the requisite animus possidendi to the exclusion of the world at large

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed
  2. 2.No orders as to costs

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Land Control Actsection 6(1)
  • Land Control Actsection 8
  • Limitation of Actions Actsection 9(2)
  • Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22)section 7
  • English Limitation Act 1980section 15(1)

Cases cited (4)

  • Samuel Miki Waweru v Jane Njeri Richu
    Civil Appeal No 122 of 2001 (unreported)
  • Githu v Ndeete
    [1984] KLR 776
  • Japye (Oxford) Ltd vs Graham
    [2003] 1 AC 419
  • Mount Carmel Investments Ltd vs Peter Thurlow Ltd
    [1988] 1 WLR 1078
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya (superior court)
not stated
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal's appellate jurisdiction (specific provision not stated in the judgment)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Situma v Cherongo (Civil Appeal 351 of 2002) [2007] KECA 486 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2007). Civil Appeal No 351 of 2002. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2007/486/eng@2007-07-31

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.