Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal 253 of 2002· [2007] KECA 235 (KLR)

TROPICAL FOOD PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BANK (THE PTA BANK) [2007] KECA 235 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
12 October 2007
4,691 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~19 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that consent orders can be set aside for mistake, and courts cannot be given arbitration powers the parties' contract never gave them.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
TFPI, a fish exporter, sued PTA Bank for breach of a USD 250,000 Facility Agreement and sought injunctive relief. On first appearance on 1st November 2001, counsel recorded a consent order referring the dispute to a single arbitrator agreed by the parties, with the court to appoint an arbitrator in default of agreement. The Bank's advocates subsequently realised the agreement's arbitration clause provided for ICC arbitration under English law, with the ICC Secretariat as appointing authority, and applied under sections 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order XLIV rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules to review that part of the consent order. Mwera J. allowed the review, holding both counsel had acted under a mutual mistake in overlooking the arbitration clause, and set aside the consent order. TFPI appealed, contending there was no mutual mistake, that misinterpretation is not mistake, that the consent order varied and superseded the arbitration clause, and that the entire order could not be set aside when only part was challenged. The Court of Appeal, applying Mbogo v Shah on interference with discretion, upheld the Judge's factual finding that both advocates acted under a mutual mistake. Relying on Flora Wasike v Wamboko, Hirani v Kassam and Solle v Butcher, the Court affirmed that consent orders are prima facie binding but may be set aside on mistake or other sufficient reason, the categories being open. It further held that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court where none exists, making the court-appointment component of the consent order erroneous. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Key legal issues

#
01

Grounds for setting aside a consent order

Holding

A consent order may be set aside on grounds including fraud, mistake, collusion, agreement contrary to the policy of the court, absence or ignorance of sufficient material facts, and any other sufficient reason; the categories are not closed.

Reasoning

The Court adopted the summary of grounds distilled by the learned Judge, guided by Flora Wasike v Wamboko and Hirani v Kassam. It endorsed the principle that an order made with the consent of counsel is prima facie binding but may be discharged where obtained by fraud, collusion, or where consent was given in misapprehension or ignorance of material facts, or for a reason which would enable the court to set aside an agreement.

p. 6
02

Mistake as a ground of equitable relief

Holding

A contract or consent order may be set aside in equity where parties laboured under a common misapprehension as to facts or their respective rights, provided the misapprehension was fundamental and the party seeking relief was not at fault.

Reasoning

The Court relied on Lord Denning's exposition in Solle v Butcher and Treitel's commentary, holding that equity grants relief for mistake whether of primary or secondary fact, without distinguishing mutual from unilateral mistake. The Judge was entitled to believe the respondent's advocate that she had overlooked the ICC arbitration clause when recording the consent.

p. 7
03

Appointment of arbitrator and jurisdiction

Holding

Where the parties' agreement designates the ICC as the appointing authority, the court errs in accepting a consent order empowering it to appoint an arbitrator; parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court where none exists.

Reasoning

The Facility Agreement's Clause XIV provided for arbitration under ICC Rules with the Secretariat of the International Court of Arbitration as appointing authority. The consent order deviated from this by allowing the court to appoint an arbitrator in default of agreement. Since the court was not seized of the suit by virtue of the arbitration clause, and no appearance had been entered, the portion of the consent order inviting court intervention was erroneous.

p. 8
04

Interference with judicial discretion on appeal

Holding

An appellate court will not interfere with a lower court's exercise of discretion unless satisfied the decision is clearly wrong, based on misdirection, wrong matters considered, or failure to consider relevant matters resulting in a wrong conclusion.

Reasoning

The Court applied the classic statements of Sir Clement De Lestang V-P and Sir Charles Newbold P. in Mbogo v Shah. It held that the choice by the Judge of which witness to believe on questions of fact was one with which the appellate court had no reason to interfere, and found no error of principle in the Judge's reliance on mistake and 'any other sufficient reason'.

p. 6

Legal principles established

#
  • A consent order recorded in court is binding and may be varied or discharged only on grounds such as fraud, collusion, mistake, ignorance of material facts or any other sufficient reason; the categories are not closed.
  • An appellate court will not interfere with a lower court's exercise of discretion unless satisfied that the decision is clearly wrong or that the judge misdirected himself, acted on wrong matters, or failed to consider relevant matters and arrived at a wrong conclusion.
  • Parties cannot by consent confer jurisdiction on a court where none exists.
  • Equity will relieve a party pleading mistake without distinguishing between mistake of fact or law, or whether it was common, mutual or unilateral.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.The appeal is dismissed with costs

Authorities

#

Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Actsection 3A
  • Civil Procedure Actsection 80
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder XLIV rules 1 and 2
  • Arbitration Actsection 6
  • Treaty for the establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States

Cases cited (8)

  • Flora Wasike vs. Wamboko
    (1982 – 88) KAR 625
  • Nairobi City Council vs. Thabiti Enterprises Ltd
    C.A. 264/96 (ur)
  • Mbogo & Another v Shah
    [1968] EA 93
  • Hirani v Kassam
    (1952) 19 EACA 131
  • Solle v Butcher
    [1949] 2 All ER 1107
  • Moynes v Cooper
    [1956] 1 All ER 450
  • Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd.
  • Torrance v. Bolton
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya, Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 1534 of 2001
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over an appeal from the High Court in a civil matter

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "TROPICAL FOOD PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BANK (THE PTA BANK) [2007] KECA 235 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2007). Civil Appeal 253 of 2002. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2007/235/eng@2007-10-12

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.