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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Application No. 75 of 2006

Kerescent Masinde v Concepta Namaemba Masinde & another [2006] KECA 35 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
1 December 2006
1,258 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that any delay in filing an appeal must be explained, and a strong case alone cannot save an unexplained delay.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a ruling of the Court of Appeal at Kisumu (Omolo, Githinji and Waki JJA) on a reference from a single Judge's decision refusing Kerescent Masinde's application under Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules for extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal and record of appeal out of time against the judgment of Kariuki J of the High Court at Kakamega delivered on 11th March 2005. The single Judge accepted the applicant's explanation for the delay between the judgment and 27th January 2006, when the applicant learned of the judgment, but refused the extension because of an unexplained delay of about 42 days between that date and the filing of the motion on 10th March 2006. Before the full Court, counsel for the applicant argued that the 42-day delay was not inordinate and that the single Judge had overlooked a draft memorandum of appeal on file. The full Court held that a reference does not permit it to substitute its own discretion for that of the single Judge; interference is only justified where the Judge took into account an irrelevant factor, ignored a relevant one, applied a wrong principle, misapprehended the evidence or law, or reached a decision no reasonable judge could reach. The Court reaffirmed that any delay, of whatever length, must be explained, and that the prospects of the intended appeal cannot be elevated above all other considerations. The reference was dismissed with costs, affirming the single Judge's decision.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the full Court on a reference could interfere with the single Judge's exercise of discretion in refusing extension of time
  2. 2.Whether an unexplained delay of about 42 days was inordinate and disentitled the applicant to extension of time
  3. 3.Whether the probability of the intended appeal succeeding could override an unexplained delay

Key legal issues

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01

The proper basis for interference with a single Judge's discretion on a reference

Holding

The full Court is not entitled to substitute its own view of the discretion for that of the single Judge; interference is only permitted on the established grounds of wrong principle, irrelevant or ignored factors, misapprehension, or plainly wrong decision.

Reasoning

The applicant argued only that the 42-day delay was not inordinate, but that invites the full Court to re-exercise the discretion, which is impermissible. Citing Samuel Kinyua Mutugi v Eutychus Muthui, the Court restated the limited grounds for interference and held that the single Judge had committed none of the identified errors.

p. 2
02

Whether unexplained delay defeats an extension-of-time application notwithstanding a potentially meritorious appeal

Holding

An unexplained delay, whatever its length, leaves no material on which the single Judge can exercise discretion; the merits of the intended appeal are only one factor and cannot override unexplained delay.

Reasoning

The single Judge had found as a fact that there was an unexplained 42-day delay; the applicant's counsel conceded no explanation was offered in the affidavit or elsewhere. While the chances of success may be considered, it would be wrong to subordinate all other considerations to them; the factors must be weighed together, and the single Judge's choice not to exercise his discretion on account of the unexplained delay could not be disturbed.

p. 2

Legal principles established

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  • A full Court on a reference may only interfere with a single Judge's exercise of discretion where the Judge took into account an irrelevant factor, failed to take into account a relevant factor, applied a wrong principle of law, misapprehended the evidence and law, or reached a decision no reasonable judge could have reached.
  • Whenever there is a delay of whatever length in seeking extension of time, some explanation must be proffered for the delay.
  • The probability of an appeal succeeding cannot be elevated above all other considerations; all factors must be weighed against one another.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The reference to the full Court is dismissed with costs

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Kakamega
H.C.C.A. No. 49 of 1992
Jurisdiction invoked
Reference to the full Court from a single Judge's decision under Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules (extension of time)

Relief refused

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Extension of time to file and serve the notice of appeal and the record of appeal

The single Judge's exercise of discretion could not be interfered with; the applicant offered no explanation for the 42-day delay after learning of the judgment

p. 2

Costs

The reference was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

We are not entitled to substitute his exercise of discretion with ours and for us to interfere, it must be shown to us that in coming to his decision, the learned single Judge took into account an irrelevant factor or that he failed to take into account a relevant factor or that he applied a wrong principle of law
p. 2Principles governing interference with a single Judge's discretion on a reference
whenever there is a delay of whatever length, some explanation must be proferred for the same
p. 2Duty to explain any delay in extension-of-time applications
it would be wrong to elevate that requirement above all others and hold that where there is probability of the appeal succeeding, all other considerations must be subordinated to it
p. 2Merits of intended appeal are one factor among many
the reference before us fails and we order that it be and is hereby dismissed with costs
p. 2Final orders - dismissal of the reference

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Kerescent Masinde v Concepta Namaemba Masinde & another [2006] KECA 35 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2006). Civil Application No. 75 of 2006. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2006/35/eng@2006-12-01

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.