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Court of AppealAllowedCivil Appeal No. 178 of 2002· [2005] KECA 143 (KLR)

Kiunga & 2 others v Mwaura & another (Civil Appeal 178 of 2002) [2005] KECA 143 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
16 September 2005
2,206 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled that a company cannot be wound up without both sides first being heard, and struck down the order.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Court of Appeal, in a single joint judgment of Tunoi, O’Kubasu and Waki JJ.A, allowed an appeal against a winding-up order made on 29 May 2002 by Ransley, Commissioner of Assize, in Winding-Up Cause No. 1 of 2000 at Nairobi. The dispute had its roots in a partnership formed in 1963 by twenty-one persons who bought the Terrace Hotel in central Nairobi and later two further properties. In 1997 a company, Terrace Hotels Ltd, whose named directors included the two respondents, sued the appellants claiming ownership of the partnership properties; its injunction application failed and the main suit was never pursued. The appellants then filed a suit seeking a declaration that the company was a sham and its winding up. The respondents nonetheless petitioned for the company's winding up. After several interlocutory orders issued largely suo motu, the Commissioner, on a date fixed for hearing and with both counsel present, ordered the company wound up without hearing any party, appointed its auditors as liquidators and directed an enquiry into shareholding, assets and liabilities. Holding that the appeal turned on whether the appellants were afforded a fair hearing, the court reaffirmed that the right to be heard is a valued right; nothing in the Companies Act or the Winding-up Rules donates power to determine a petition summarily, and no application for summary determination was before the court. Rule 203 imports the ordinary practice and procedure of the court. The order was a serious breach of procedure amounting to a denial of justice. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order, remitted the petition for hearing before any Judge other than Ransley, and ordered the respondents to bear the costs of the appeal.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the appellants were afforded a fair hearing before the superior court made the winding-up order

Holding

They were not. The order was made on a date fixed for the hearing of the petition, in the presence of both advocates, but without hearing either of them; that was a serious breach of procedure amounting to a denial of justice, and the order cannot be sustained.

Reasoning

The appellants had a considerable interest in the outcome: they had instructed an advocate to oppose the petition and to urge the court to consider pending suits between the same parties raising weighty issues of fact and law. Neither the Companies Act nor the Winding-up Rules empower a court to determine such a petition summarily, and no application for summary determination was before the court. Rule 203 imports the ordinary practice and procedure of the court unless the court otherwise directs, and no reason was given for the procedure adopted, including interlocutory orders no party had requested.

p. 4
02

Whether the Companies Act or the Winding-up Rules donate power to determine a winding-up petition summarily without hearing the parties

Holding

No. Nothing in the Act or the Rules donates such a power; nor was any application for summary determination before the court. The respondent's reliance on the court's general control of proceedings under section 211 of the Companies Act could not displace the right to be heard.

Reasoning

Counsel for the respondents argued that under section 211 of the Companies Act the court, being in full picture of the company's affairs, could wind it up without submissions, particularly as both sides appeared to want winding up and the liquidator would protect all shareholders. The court rejected this: no provision confers a power of summary determination, the applicable procedure is that of the court under Rule 203 absent a contrary direction, and the prejudice to the appellants' rights could not be cured by the liquidator's supervisory role.

p. 4
03

What consequential orders flow from the breach of the right to be heard

Holding

The appeal was allowed, the order of 29 May 2002 was set aside, and the petition was remitted for hearing in accordance with the law before any Judge other than Ransley C.A (as he then was), with the costs of the appeal borne by the respondents.

Reasoning

Having found a fundamental breach of the right to be heard, the court treated the order as unsustainable rather than curable. Because the winding-up cause itself remained undetermined, the petition had to be heard afresh; the procedural taint also informed the direction that the hearing be before a different judge, and the respondents, in whose favour the impugned order had been made, were ordered to bear the costs of the appeal.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • A party whose rights or interests stand to be affected by an order, including a winding-up order, must be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order is made.
  • A court has no power to determine a winding-up petition summarily without hearing the parties; neither the Companies Act nor the Winding-up Rules donate such a power, and absent an application for summary determination the petition must be heard in the ordinary way.
  • A winding-up order made in breach of the right to be heard is a denial of justice and cannot stand; it must be set aside.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal allowed
  2. 2.The order made on 29th May 2002 in Winding-Up Cause No. 1 of 2000 set aside
  3. 3.The winding-up petition remitted to the superior court for hearing in accordance with the law, before any Judge other than Ransley C.A (as he then was)
  4. 4.The costs of the appeal to be borne by the respondents

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Companies ActCap 486, section 219(f)
  • Companies Actsection 211
  • Companies (Winding up) RulesRule 203
  • Civil Procedure Act and Rulesprovisions not specified (referred to in ground 5 of the memorandum of appeal)

Cases cited (1)

  • Matiba vs. Attorney General
    [1995 – 1998] 1 EA 192
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Winding-Up Cause No. 1 of 2000
Jurisdiction invoked
Not expressly invoked in the judgment; the appeal lay from the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Winding-Up Cause No. 1 of 2000) under the Court of Appeal's ordinary appellate jurisdiction

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (4)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Kiunga & 2 others v Mwaura & another (Civil Appeal 178 of 2002) [2005] KECA 143 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2005). Civil Appeal No. 178 of 2002. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2005/143/eng@2005-09-16

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.