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Court of AppealPartially AllowedNot stated in the judgment (single-judge application under Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules; superior court record HCCC No. 148 of 2004)

Standard Assurance Ltd v Bernard Otieno Rapuoda [2005] KECA 32 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
16 December 2005
2,180 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal forgave a missed appeal deadline caused by court mix-ups, but stressed that parties must act promptly once a filing is late.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a ruling of the Court of Appeal at Nairobi by W.S. Deverell, JA, sitting singly, on an application under rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules for extension of time. Standard Assurance Kenya Ltd, the intended appellant, sought to appeal against the ruling of B.K. Tanui J delivered on 31st May 2005 in HCCC No.148 of 2004, striking out its defence in a suit by B.O. Rapuoda claiming, under section 10(2) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap 405), payment of the Shs.2.1 million decretal amount in HCCC No.242 of 2002, which arose from injuries Rapuoda suffered in an accident involving an Isuzu tanker, registration KAG 399A, allegedly owned by Ken Investments Ltd and driven by F.O. Onyoni. The Notice of Appeal was lodged eight days out of time and misstated the delivery date of the ruling as 27th instead of 31st May 2005, because the notified delivery date passed without notice of any change and the Kisumu court file could not be traced. The application itself was filed about two months late, explained only by counsel's distraction with stay-of-execution applications - 'far from a cogent reason'. Applying the rule 4 factors - the length of and reason for the delay, the arguability (not the merits) of the intended appeal, and prejudice - the judge found two issues arguable, namely the identity of the insured and whether the notice required by section 10(2)(a) of Cap 405 was given, found no particular prejudice to the respondent beyond prolonged uncertainty, and granted the extension. The applicant was permitted to lodge a fresh Notice of Appeal within 7 days, replacing the previous notices deemed withdrawn under rule 82(a), and to institute the appeal by lodging the Memorandum and Record of Appeal within 60 days, with no order as to costs.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether to extend time under rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules for the applicant to lodge a Notice of Appeal out of time against the ruling of B.K. Tanui J in HCCC No. 148 of 2004.
  2. 2.The length of, and the explanation for, the delay - both the eight days by which the Notice of Appeal was filed late and the approximately two months taken to file the extension application itself.
  3. 3.Whether there is any merit in the intended appeal, confined to whether the issues raised are arguable rather than deciding them.
  4. 4.Whether there is any relevant prejudice likely to be suffered by the respondent if the extension is granted.
  5. 5.What orders should issue and whether costs of the application should be awarded.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the eight-day delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal and the erroneous statement of the date of the ruling were satisfactorily explained

Holding

Yes. The delay flowed from the court file being untraceable at the Kisumu registry until 22nd June 2005, and from the ruling having been delivered on 31st May 2005, four days after the notified date of 27th May and without notice of the change, so the advocates honestly assumed the wrong date and inserted it in the Notice of Appeal. Weighing all factors, the court concluded the extension should be granted.

Reasoning

The ruling was noticed for delivery on 27th May 2005 but was in fact delivered on 31st May 2005 in the absence of the applicant's advocates and without any notice of the change of date; the Kisumu court file could not be traced for filing until 22nd June 2005. The wrong date in the Notice of Appeal was therefore an honest assumption by counsel rather than bad faith. These errors did not disqualify the applicant, and on weighing all the rule 4 factors the court held the ends of justice required that the arguable appeal not be shut out.

p. 2
02

Whether the two-month delay in filing the extension application itself, after learning the Notice of Appeal was out of time, was excused

Holding

No cogent reason was given - counsel's stated distraction by stay-of-execution applications was 'far from a cogent reason' - but the lapse was not treated as fatal once the other factors favoured extension.

Reasoning

The Notice of Appeal was lodged on 22nd June 2005, yet the rule 4 application was not filed until 19th August 2005, approximately two months after the applicant knew the Notice was out of time. The explanation, that counsel for the Nairobi firm was distracted by filing and prosecuting stay applications before Warsame J, was rejected as far from cogent. The court treated promptness as an obligation on an intended appellant once the defect is known, but did not regard the lapse as disqualifying, ultimately weighing all factors in favour of granting the extension.

p. 3
03

Whether the intended appeal raises arguable issues

Holding

Two issues are arguable: who was the person or entity insured by Standard Assurance, and whether the notice required by section 10(2)(a) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap 405) as a precondition to the insurer's liability was given. The court decides arguability only, not the merits.

Reasoning

The intended appeal challenges the ruling striking out the insurance company's defence in the claim to make it pay the Shs.2.1 million decretal amount, plus costs and interest, recovered against Ken Investments Ltd and F.O. Onyoni in HCCC No.242 of 2002. The court identified two live questions: the identity of the insured under the Standard Assurance policy, and whether the insurer received notice of the proceedings before or within fourteen days of commencement as required by section 10(2)(a) of Cap 405. Because an extension application tests arguability alone, the court expressly declined to decide these questions and found both arguable.

p. 4
04

Whether the respondent would suffer relevant prejudice if the extension were granted

Holding

No particular prejudice; the only effect would be prolonging the respondent's uncertainty as to whether his only remedy is against the defendants in HCCC No.242 of 2002 or whether he also has an additional statutory remedy against the insurer.

Reasoning

Prejudice was identified as the final factor in the exercise of the court's unfettered rule 4 discretion. The only disadvantage identified was that the extension would prolong the respondent's uncertainty about whether his sole remedy lies against the judgment debtors in HCCC No.242 of 2002, the defendants in the accident suit, or whether he additionally has a remedy against the insurer under section 10(2) of Cap 405. That was held not to constitute particular prejudice, so the application was allowed, with no order as to costs given the respondent's non-appearance and the applicant's own errors.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • Once a litigant learns that its Notice of Appeal was filed out of time, it is under a duty to apply promptly for an extension of time; unexplained inaction in making the application weighs against it.
  • On an extension-of-time application the court does not decide the substantive issues in the intended appeal; its enquiry is confined to whether those issues are arguable.
  • The rule 4 discretion is unfettered and is exercised by weighing the length of and reason for the delay, the arguability of the intended appeal (which is of only possible relevance), and whether the respondent will suffer relevant prejudice; mere prolongation of a respondent's uncertainty is not particular prejudice.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The applicant may lodge a fresh Notice of Appeal, which shall replace any previous notices of appeal, which are deemed to be withdrawn under rule 82(a).
  2. 2.The fresh Notice of Appeal shall be filed within 7 days of the delivery of the order and shall be served by the applicant in accordance with rule 76.
  3. 3.The intended appeal shall be instituted by lodging the Memorandum and Record of Appeal within 60 days of the date when the fresh Notice of Appeal is lodged.
  4. 4.No order as to costs of the application.

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority

Wrote the judgment

On appeal from
High Court of Kenya (file held at the Kisumu High Court Registry)
HCCC No. 148 of 2004
Jurisdiction invoked
Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules - the 'unfettered discretion under rule 4' of a single Judge of Appeal to extend time for doing anything required by the Rules, here the fourteen days allowed by rule 74(2) for lodging a Notice of Appeal

Relief refused

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The remaining prayers of the eight separate orders sought, including the application to amend the existing Notice of Appeal

The court confined itself to the limited orders actually needed, substituting a fresh Notice of Appeal for the defective one instead of granting the full slate of prayers

p. 4

Costs of the application

The respondent filed no affidavit in reply and did not appear, and the need for the application was caused by errors on the side of the applicant

p. 4

Costs

No order as to costs of the application - each party to bear its own costs. Verbatim: 'there shall be no order as to costs of this application', because the respondent filed no affidavit in reply, did not appear at the hearing, and the need for the application was caused by errors on the side of the applicant.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

Once it is learnt that a Notice of appeal has been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon the intended appellant through its advocates to act promptly without undue delay in making application for extension of time.
p. 3Duty of promptness once an out-of-time filing is known
On an application for extension such as this it is not for me to decide these issues. I am merely required to consider whether or not there are arguable issues.
p. 4Scope of the rule 4 enquiry - arguability, not the merits
The final matter for my consideration in the exercise of my unfettered discretion under rule 4 is whether there is any relevant prejudice likely to be suffered by the respondent Mr. Rapuoda if I grant the extension sought.
p. 4Prejudice as a factor in the unfettered rule 4 discretion
Having weighed up all of the above I have come to the conclusion that an extension should be granted.
p. 4Result - extension of time granted
That the applicant may lodge a fresh Notice of Appeal, which shall replace any previous notices of appeal, which are deemed to be withdrawn under rule 82 (a).
p. 4Final orders - fresh Notice of Appeal to replace the defective one, deemed withdrawn under rule 82(a)
The respondent having filed no affidavit in reply and not having appeared at the hearing of this application and the need for this application having been caused by errors on the side of the applicant there shall be no order as to costs of this application.
p. 4Final orders - no order as to costs of the application

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment states that the Notice of Appeal 'was lodged by the respondent herein', yet elsewhere attributes the eight-day delay and the wrong date to 'the advocates for the applicants' and treats the applicant insurance company as the intended appellant; the word 'respondent' in the first passage appears to be a slip for 'applicant'.

minor

Muriu/Miriu Mungai & Co are described as 'the advocates for the respondent' in one passage, but elsewhere as the applicant's advocates - 'the applicant's advocates were the Nairobi based firm of Miriu, Mungai & Co Advocates' and 'Mr. P Munge Murage, the applicant's advocate on record' - an internal inconsistency as to whom the firm acted for.

minor

Inconsistent spellings within the judgment: the firm appears as both 'Muriu Mungai & Co' and 'Miriu, Mungai & Co', and the second defendant in the underlying suit as both 'F.O.Onyoni' and 'F.O.Onyonyo'.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Standard Assurance Ltd v Bernard Otieno Rapuoda [2005] KECA 32 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2005). Not stated in the judgment (single-judge application under Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules; superior court record HCCC No. 148 of 2004). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2005/32/eng@2005-12-16

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.