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Court of AppealDismissed· [2004] KECA 33 (KLR)

Wairagu & 2 others v Republic [2004] KECA 33 (KLR)

High Court of Kenya
27 February 2004
1,797 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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A Kenyan court refused to undo an order both sides had agreed to, holding it can only be changed for fraud or mistake.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a High Court of Kenya ruling delivered by F. Azangalala, Judge, on 27 February 2004, dismissing the Plaintiff's Notice of Motion dated 18 November 2003. The motion sought review of the consent order of 23 May 2002 in a long-running mortgage dispute, alternatively revocation of the appointment of the Plaintiff's arbitrator Owen Njenga Koimburi, his replacement by Hezekiah W Gichohi, and consequential orders that Gichohi scrutinise the mortgage account and that the arbitrators file detailed reports for oral examination. The consent order, following earlier consent orders of 17 February 2000 and 7 June 2000, appointed Koimburi and Harilal Nathwani to scrutinise the mortgage deed, charge, letter of offer, statements of account and interest calculations and to file reports to be tested by viva voce evidence. The Plaintiff alleged that Koimburi refused to consider receipts of 1987 and 1988 evidencing payments (she asserted an earlier scrutiny had found an overpayment of Kshs 845,042.41), that the defendant had compromised him through its advocates' letter of 2 July 2003, and that his report misrepresented the facts. She relied on Flora N Wasike v Destimo Wamboko and Kimata v Wakibiru, and on Order 44 and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Sections 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act. Mr McCourt opposed for the defendant, arguing no fraud, mistake or misrepresentation attended the consent and that the proposed replacement arbitrator was a debtor of the defendant. Framing one issue - whether the consent order could be reviewed on the material availed - the court held that a consent order binds and can be varied or discharged only on grounds justifying setting aside a contract: fraud, collusion, an agreement contrary to public policy, or consent given without sufficient material facts, in misapprehension or in ignorance of material facts. None was alleged or established; Koimburi was the Plaintiff's own preference, and his mandate was scrutiny, not advocacy. The application was dismissed with costs.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the consent order of 23rd May, 2002 could be reviewed on the material availed by the Plaintiff

Holding

No. The grounds for reviewing a consent judgment must be grounds that would justify setting aside a contract - fraud, mistake or misrepresentation - or, per the passage adopted from Hiran v Kassam, fraud, collusion, an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or consent given without sufficient material facts, in misapprehension or in ignorance of material facts. None was alleged or established, so the application failed.

Reasoning

The court applied Flora N Wasike v Destimo Wamboko and the passage quoted in Hiran v Kassam: an order made in the presence and with the consent of counsel binds the parties and those claiming under them and cannot be varied or discharged except for fraud, collusion, an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or consent given without sufficient material facts, in misapprehension or in ignorance of material facts. The Plaintiff's own advocates had consented; she alleged no vitiating factor and Koimburi was her own preference. Her complaints concerned the arbitrator's conduct of the scrutiny, not the validity of the consent.

p. 3
02

Whether Owen Njenga Koimburi's appointment as the Plaintiff's arbitrator could be revoked and he be replaced with Hezekiah W Gichohi

Holding

No. The appointment was part of the consent judgment and could be set aside only on the contract-setting-aside grounds. The alleged compromise rested on his refusal to consider the 1987 and 1988 receipts, which was a matter for the scrutiny process and the viva voce examination of his report, not a ground to undo the consent order.

Reasoning

The court held that the complaint about the rejected receipts has nothing to do with the consent order appointing the arbitrator. No fraud or compromise was established; the alleged bias arising from the defendant's advocates' letter of 2nd July, 2003 was not made out on the material. The proposed replacement, Hezekiah W Gichohi, was objected to as a debtor of the defendant, but the application failed at the threshold of the review grounds and the replacement could not be ordered.

p. 3
03

Whether a party-appointed arbitrator acts as his appointer's advocate in the scrutiny

Holding

No. The arbitrator's mandate under the consent order was impartial scrutiny of the mortgage documents and accounts, culminating in a detailed report to be tested by viva voce evidence; he assumed no role of urging the appointing party's cause, and grievances about which documents he considered could not ground a review of the consent order.

Reasoning

The court found the Plaintiff had completely misapprehended the arbitrator's role, believing he was to urge her cause during the scrutiny; he assumed no such role. Any mistake in the report could be raised when the report was presented by viva voce evidence, as the consent order contemplated, rather than by seeking to displace the consent order that conferred the mandate.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • A consent judgment or order may be reviewed or set aside only on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake or misrepresentation - or, elaborated, fraud, collusion, an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or consent given without sufficient material facts, in misapprehension or in ignorance of material facts
  • An order made in the presence and with the consent of counsel binds all parties to the proceedings and those claiming under them, and cannot be varied or discharged except on the limited recognised grounds
  • The appointment of an arbitrator made under a consent order is part of the consent judgment and may be revoked only on the same limited grounds

Court orders

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  1. 1.The Plaintiff's application by way of Notice of Motion dated 18th November, 2003 is dismissed
  2. 2.The dismissal is with costs - the costs of the application awarded against the Plaintiff

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 44 Rule 1(b)
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 44 Rule 1(1) (as cited in Kimata & Another v Wakibiru)
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 45 Rule 1
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 45 Rule 15(1)(a) and (b)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21) Laws of KenyaSection 3A
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21) Laws of KenyaSection 80
  • Arbitration Act, No. 4 of 1995 Laws of KenyaSection 13(3)
  • Arbitration Act, No. 4 of 1995 Laws of KenyaSection 16(1)
  • Arbitration Act, No. 4 of 1995 Laws of KenyaSection 19

Cases cited (3)

  • FLORA N WASIKE vs DESTIMO WAMBOKO
    (1982 – 88) 1 KAR 625
  • KIMATA & ANOTHER vs WAKIBIRU
    (1986) KLR 578
  • HIRAN VS KASSAM
    (1952) 19 EACA 131
Jurisdiction invoked
Sections 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21); Order 44 Rule 1(b) and Order 45 Rules 1 and 15(1)(a) and (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules; Sections 13(3), 16(1) and 19 of the Arbitration Act, No. 4 of 1995 - invoked for review of a consent order and revocation of an arbitrator's appointment

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Wairagu & 2 others v Republic [2004] KECA 33 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2004). . Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2004/33/eng@2004-09-21

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.