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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No. 244 of 1999· [2002] KECA 1 (KLR)

(tunoi, O’kubasu & Keiwua Jj A) v Savage & 4 Others

Court of Appeal of Kenya
15 February 2002
2,351 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal upheld an order stopping a developer from building a petrol station in a residential Nairobi estate pending full trial.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is an interlocutory appeal against a ruling of the High Court (Mitey J) delivered on 8 March 1999 granting a temporary injunction restraining the appellant, Michael Gitau Waweru, from continuing with unauthorised development on LR No 7413/5 and the subdivision known as LR No 7413/26 at Mukoma Road, within the Mukoma, Kisembe and Kikeni Estates off Magadi Road, Nairobi, an area designated residential. The respondents, residents and proprietors in the estates, sued the appellant and the City Council of Nairobi, alleging that a petrol station and a commercial centre were being developed in breach of the Land Planning Act (Cap 303) and the residential zoning, and that the Director of City Planning had confirmed the development was not authorised. Simultaneously with the plaint they sought, under Order XXXIX rules 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules, temporary injunctions; ex parte orders granted by Ang'awa J on 8 October 1998 were extended until the inter partes hearing, when Mitey J granted prayers 3, 4 and 5, finding a prima facie case, that damages would not adequately compensate the residents because what they sought to prevent transcends monetary valuation, and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant. The appellant advanced thirteen grounds, abandoning the first, contending principally that the injunction was draconian, that development permission had been granted, and that the Commissioner of Lands should have been joined. The Court of Appeal (Tunoi, O'Kubasu and Keiwua JJ A) restated the Giella v Cassman Brown principles, held that the judge's discretion could not be faulted, that the injunction merely preserved the status quo, and that the permission and joinder questions were for the trial court. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents, the City Council bearing its own costs.

Key legal issues

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01

What principles govern the grant of a temporary injunction?

Holding

The settled Giella v Cassman Brown test applies: the applicant must show a prima facie case with probability of success; that damages would not adequately compensate him if the injunction is refused and he ultimately succeeds; and, if the court is in doubt on either limb, the balance of convenience.

Reasoning

The court reaffirmed that these principles are well settled and clearly spelt out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd. It verified that the learned judge had applied them: he found a prima facie case, no prejudice to the appellant, that damages would not adequately compensate the respondents because what they sought to prevent transcends monetary valuation, and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant.

p. 5
02

Was the High Court judge's exercise of discretion in granting the temporary injunction proper?

Holding

Yes. The judge had the correct principles in mind and could not be faulted; the temporary injunction was properly granted to maintain the status quo until the final determination of the suit.

Reasoning

The appellant bore the burden of showing that the judge misdirected himself in the exercise of his discretionary jurisdiction, which was not demonstrated. The judge expressly found a prima facie case, absence of prejudice to the appellant, inadequacy of damages as a remedy, and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant. The Court of Appeal, having considered the nature of the suit, the material before the judge and the arguments on appeal, found no basis for interfering.

p. 5
03

Was the injunction 'draconian' as contended by the appellant?

Holding

No. The injunction merely stopped any further development pending the final determination of the suit in the superior court.

Reasoning

The court considered the complaint that the orders had far-reaching effect but saw nothing draconian in orders that simply held the development in check until trial. This accorded with the respondents' contention that, the land being residential property, all matters were to be held in check until final determination, so that the status quo was maintained pending a full trial.

p. 4
04

Could the appeal court determine whether development permission had been granted, or whether the Commissioner of Lands should have been joined?

Holding

No. Both questions are matters for the trial court at the hearing of the suit.

Reasoning

Emphasising that it was dealing with an interlocutory appeal, the court cautioned against prejudging issues in a way that would prejudice the trial, even reminding counsel that he was at risk of arguing the main suit. The appellant's attempt to show that permission to build the petrol station and subdivide had been granted, and the complaint about non-joinder of the Commissioner of Lands, were accordingly left for determination at the full trial.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • An applicant for a temporary injunction must satisfy the Giella test: a prima facie case with probability of success; that damages would not adequately compensate; and, if the court is in doubt on either, the balance of convenience.
  • An appellate court will not disturb a judge's exercise of discretion in granting a temporary injunction where the judge applied the correct principles and no misdirection is shown.
  • A temporary injunction is properly granted to maintain the status quo until the final determination of the suit.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is dismissed.
  2. 2.The appellant to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal (appeal 'dismissed with costs to the respondents').
  3. 3.City Council of Nairobi to bear its own costs.
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya (superior court)
Jurisdiction invoked
Not expressly stated in the judgment; the matter was before the Court of Appeal as an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the superior court (High Court).

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "(tunoi, O’kubasu & Keiwua Jj A) v Savage & 4 Others", Case Analysis (2002). Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1999. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2002/1/eng@2002-02-15

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.