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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 204 of 1999

Gerishon Seth Agonya v David A. Majani & another [2001] KECA 192 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
23 March 2001
1,385 words in judgment
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal restored a KSh 180,000 accident award against the lorry owner, confirming owners answer for crashes caused by poor vehicle maintenance.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is a second appeal to the Court of Appeal at Kisumu against the judgment of Tanui J in the High Court at Kakamega, which had allowed the respondents' first appeal and set aside the trial magistrate's award to the appellant of general damages of K.Shs.180,000 with costs and interest. The claim arose from an accident on 4th February 1993 in which a lorry owned by the first respondent and driven by the second respondent, carrying casual workers hired to ferry sand, suffered brake failure while descending towards a river and landed on an embankment, trapping the appellant, who suffered a fractured left tibia and a permanent disability assessed at 25%. The trial magistrate found the claim proved on a balance of probabilities and disbelieved the suggestion that the appellant had jumped from the lorry. The first appellate judge held that neither the second respondent's negligence nor the injuries had been proved. Allowing the appeal in part, the Court of Appeal noted that the first appellate judge, while absolving the second respondent, made no reference to the first respondent's negligence as pleaded, and that the second respondent's own evidence of brake failure supported the averment that the owner had failed to maintain the lorry and permitted it to be driven in that state. The Court held the first respondent certainly to blame and the second respondent possibly not negligent. It varied the superior court's setting-aside order to apply to the second respondent only, left the trial court's orders standing against the first respondent, and awarded the appellant the costs of the appeal against the first respondent.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the first appellate judge erred in disbelieving the appellant's evidence in preference to that of the second respondent notwithstanding the material before him, including uncontested documentary evidence.
  2. 2.Whether the first respondent, as owner of lorry registration NO. KAU 097, was negligent in failing to maintain it in sound mechanical and serviceable condition and in permitting the second respondent to drive it in that state.
  3. 3.Whether the second respondent, the driver, was negligent in relation to the accident.
  4. 4.To what extent the order of the superior court setting aside the orders of the trial court should stand.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the first respondent (owner) was negligent in failing to maintain lorry KAU 097 and in permitting the second respondent to drive it in that state.

Holding

Yes. The first respondent was certainly to blame for the accident; the first appellate judge made no reference to his pleaded negligence, and the second respondent's own evidence of brake failure supported the averment.

Reasoning

The second respondent's evidence was that the lorry's brakes failed as it was driven downhill towards the river, causing it to land on the embankment and trap the appellant. That evidence squarely supported the appellant's pleaded particulars that the owner failed to maintain the lorry and permitted it to be driven in that condition. The first appellate judge, while absolving the driver, made no reference to the owner's pleaded negligence, so the setting-aside order could not stand against the owner.

p. 2
02

Whether the second respondent (driver) was negligent in relation to the accident.

Holding

He may not have been; the first appellate judge's absolution of the driver was left undisturbed and the superior court's setting-aside order was varied to apply to him only.

Reasoning

The first appellate judge had held that the appellant failed to prove the second respondent's negligence or the injuries on a balance of probabilities. The Court of Appeal did not disturb that finding; it noted only that the driver may not have been guilty of negligence, and confined the variation of the superior court's order to the second respondent, leaving the trial court's orders standing against the owner.

p. 3
03

Whether the first appellate judge erred in disbelieving the appellant's evidence in preference to that of the second respondent despite uncontested documentary evidence.

Holding

The appeal was allowed to the extent that the superior court's order was varied; the trial court's award of K.Shs.180,000 with costs and interest stands against the first respondent.

Reasoning

The appellant's principal complaint was that the first appellate judge preferred the second respondent's evidence despite uncontested documentary evidence, including the police abstract and the medical report. The Court found that the second respondent's own evidence supported the claim against the owner, and that the trial magistrate's award, set aside on first appeal, should stand against the first respondent while the setting-aside applies to the driver only.

p. 2

Legal principles established

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  • A first appellate court that determines a negligence claim must address the negligence pleaded against every party; where it absolves one party but makes no reference to the negligence pleaded against another, the second appellate court will interfere and restore the trial court's orders against that other party.
  • An owner who fails to maintain his vehicle in sound mechanical and serviceable condition and permits it to be driven in that state is liable in negligence for the resulting accident even where the driver is absolved; the driver's own evidence of brake failure can establish the owner's negligence.
  • A defence never pleaded, such as that the plaintiff jumped from the vehicle, cannot be relied upon to defeat the plaintiff's case; it should have been included in the joint defence.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The order of the superior court setting aside the orders of the trial court, with costs to the respondents both in that court and in the court of first instance, is varied so as to apply to the second respondent only.
  2. 2.As regards the first respondent, the orders of the superior court setting aside the orders of the trial court still stand, so the trial court's decree and costs stand against the first respondent.
  3. 3.The appellant shall have the costs of this appeal as against the first respondent.

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Kakamega
KAK. H.C.C.A. NO. 30 OF 1998
Jurisdiction invoked
Second appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court at Kakamega; the judgment does not expressly cite the constitutional or statutory provision conferring jurisdiction.

Relief refused

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Reinstatement in full of the trial court's decree against both respondents, i.e. setting aside the superior court's order as against the second respondent (the driver).

The second respondent may not have been guilty of negligence in relation to the accident; the first appellate judge's absolution of him was left undisturbed and the setting-aside order was confined to him.

p. 3

Costs

The appellant shall have the costs of this appeal as against the first respondent; the superior court's order awarding the respondents costs both in that court and in the court of first instance was varied to apply to the second respondent only, leaving the trial court's costs award against the first respondent intact.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

Hence, whereas the second respondent may not have been guilty of negligence in relation to the material accident, the first respondent was certainly to blame for it.
p. 3Apportionment of liability between owner and driver
we would allow the appellant's appeal to the extent that the order of the superior court setting aside the orders of the trial court with costs to the respondents herein both in that court and in the court of first instance is varied so as to apply to second respondent only but as regards the first appellant, those orders still stand.
p. 3Disposition - variation of the superior court's order (final orders)
The appellant shall have the costs of this appeal as against the first respondent. It is so ordered.
p. 3Costs of the appeal (final orders)
It is noteworthy that whereas in his judgment dated and delivered on 26th May, 1999, the learned first appellate judge absolved the second respondent herein of any negligence in relation to the material motorvehicle accident, he made no reference to the first respondent's negligence as pleaded by the appellant in his plaint in the court of first instance.
p. 2First appellate court's failure to determine pleaded negligence
Nonetheless, if this were so, nothing could have been easier than including this fact in paragraph 6 of the respondents' joint defence in the court of first instance
p. 2Unpleaded defence cannot be relied upon
the learned trial magistrate proceeded to hold that on the material before her, the appellant had on a balance of probabilities proved his case and awarded him general damages in the sum of K.Shs.180,000/= together with costs and interest.
p. 2Trial court's finding and award restored against the first respondent

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The operative order refers to 'the first appellant' where only one appellant exists and the context shows the first respondent (David A. Majani) is meant; the immediately preceding sentences state that the first respondent was certainly to blame and that the first appellate court did not absolve him.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Gerishon Seth Agonya v David A. Majani & another [2001] KECA 192 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2001). Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1999. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2001/192/eng@2001-03-23

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.