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Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 25 of 2000· [2000] KECA 250 (KLR)

Narok County Council v 1. Trans Mara County Council 2. Kenya Association of Tour Operators

Court of Appeal
7 April 2000
3,249 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~13 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal cancelled a Kshs 108 million judgment, ruling that dividing county council revenues belongs to the Minister, not the High Court.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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Trans Mara County Council, carved out of the Narok County Council in 1994, sued the Narok County Council and the Kenya Association of Tour Operators (KATO), the agent collecting Maasai Mara Game Reserve entry fees, seeking a declaration of entitlement to entry fees collected in its area of jurisdiction from 4th August 1994, injunctions, a refund of all monies collected, damages and costs. Narok County Council and KATO objected that the dispute fell to be resolved under section 270 of the Local Government Act, under which apportionment of rights, liabilities, property and assets between local authorities is to be agreed between them or, in default, directed by the Minister for Local Government. Mbaluto J dismissed the objections, holding that the High Court's unlimited original jurisdiction under section 60(1) of the Constitution could be ousted only by an express constitutional provision, citing a dictum attributed to Miller v Miller, and ultimately entered judgment for Trans Mara for Kshs 108,769,557/10, apportioning revenue 68:32 between the councils. Akiwumi JA allowed the appeal. He held that no such dictum exists in Miller v Miller; section 60(1) itself contemplates jurisdiction conferred or limited by other law, expressly or by necessary implication, as the Rent Restriction Act illustrates. Sections 269 and 270 mandatorily assign apportionment to the local authorities and, failing agreement, to the Minister, ousting the High Court's jurisdiction to apportion; the court's role is confined to judicial review of the implementation of the statutory scheme. The Minister had taken over the dispute and appointed a Commission of Distribution of Assets and Liabilities. The High Court judgment was declared a nullity and set aside, with costs to Narok County Council in both courts.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the High Court's unlimited original jurisdiction under section 60(1) of the Constitution can be ousted only by an express constitutional provision.

Holding

No. It may be conferred or limited by the Constitution or any other law, by express provision or by necessary implication.

Reasoning

The judge below relied on a dictum attributed to Miller v Miller that the unlimited original jurisdiction of the High Court can be ousted only by an express constitutional provision, but this Court records that no such dictum exists in its judgment in that appeal. Section 60(1) itself defines the High Court's jurisdiction to include such other jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by the Constitution or any other law. The Rent Restriction Act illustrates limitation by necessary implication: tribunal jurisdiction, appeals only in specified cases and a bar on parallel court proceedings restrict the High Court's jurisdiction without express ouster.

p. 3
02

Whether sections 269 and 270 of the Local Government Act oust the High Court's jurisdiction to apportion assets and revenue between local authorities.

Holding

Yes. Apportionment must be agreed between the local authorities concerned or, in default, directed by the Minister; the High Court cannot usurp that function and is confined to judicial review.

Reasoning

Section 270(b) read with section 269 requires that, where part of a local government area becomes the area of another authority, matters such as fees be apportioned between the local authorities concerned on a fair and equitable basis, as agreed between them or, in default of agreement, as directed by the Minister. Although neither the authorities nor the Minister exercises judicial power, they are the organs mandatorily required to act. A High Court judge who undertakes the apportionment himself usurps the Minister's powers; the proper course for the court is judicial review of the implementation of the statutory scheme.

p. 3
03

The effect of the Minister for Local Government's intervention under section 270 of the Local Government Act.

Holding

The Minister had taken over the dispute and appointed a Commission of Distribution of Assets and Liabilities; the suit was overtaken by events and the judge's assumption of the apportionment task was without jurisdiction.

Reasoning

Gazette Notice No. 2183 of 2nd May 1997, made under section 270, appointed a Commission of Distribution of Assets and Liabilities between the two councils, and the Minister's letter of 11th March 1996 stated that, in default of amicable agreement, he had taken over the dispute and that directions would issue in due course. Both documents were drawn to the judge's attention but ignored. The Court holds that the suit had been overtaken by events and that the judge's assumption of the apportionment task was what he was not entitled to do.

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04

The legal consequence of the High Court judgment of 4th June 1998.

Holding

The judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, is a nullity, and was set aside with costs to the appellant.

Reasoning

Because the judge, in his judgment of 4th June 1998, apportioned the revenue from Maasai Mara Game Reserve entry fees between the two councils in the ratio 68:32 and awarded Trans Mara Kshs 108,769,557/10 with costs and interest, he did what he had no jurisdiction to embark upon. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity: the appeal was allowed, the judgment was declared a nullity and set aside, with costs to the appellant in this Court and in the High Court.

p. 5

Legal principles established

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  • The unlimited original jurisdiction of the High Court in civil matters may be limited or ousted by statute not only by express provision but also by necessary implication.
  • Where a statute mandatorily assigns the apportionment of rights, liabilities, property and assets between local authorities to the authorities themselves and, in default of agreement, to the Minister, the High Court has no jurisdiction to carry out that apportionment; its role is confined to enforcing implementation of the statutory scheme through judicial review.
  • A judgment delivered by a court acting without jurisdiction is a nullity and will be set aside on appeal.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal allowed.
  2. 2.The judgment of the learned Judge (Mbaluto J, delivered 4th June 1998) declared a nullity and set aside.
  3. 3.Costs of the appeal in the Court of Appeal and of the suit in the High Court awarded to the Narok County Council.
On appeal from
High Court
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court; the judgment does not cite the provision conferring the appellate jurisdiction. The dispute turns on section 60(1) of the (former) Constitution and sections 269 and 270 of the Local Government Act.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Narok County Council v 1. Trans Mara County Council 2. Kenya Association of Tour Operators", Case Analysis (2000). Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2000. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2000/250/eng@2000-04-07

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.