JOHNSTONE AGGREY OCHOLA v NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED [2000] KECA 217 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a lawyer sitting in court without instructions to proceed is legally absent, so a client can seek to revive a dismissed case.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction under Order IXB rule 8 to vacate the dismissal of the Bank's suit - i.e., whether the dismissal fell under Order IXB rule 4(1) or Order XVI rule 4.
The dismissal was not made under Order XVI rule 4, which presupposes a prior grant of time to produce evidence that was never made; Order IXB rule 4(1) applies only at a first-instance hearing. Where an adjournment is refused, a party in whose absence an adverse order is made may move under Order IXB rule 8 to set aside, vary or review it, so the Judge had jurisdiction.
The Court read Order XVI rule 4 together with rule 1 of the same Order: rule 4 catches a party who, after being granted time to produce evidence, fails to do so. No such time had been granted here, and setting a suit down for hearing is an administrative, not judicial, step. Since the Bank's counsel was refused an adjournment on the day the suit first came up, Order XVI rule 3 left the Bank free to invoke Order IXB rule 8, whose setting-aside power extends to part-heard suits.
Whether counsel's physical presence in court, without instructions to proceed with the hearing, constitutes 'attendance' or 'appearance' within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Attendance and appearance connote counsel's presence in court ready to do something to progress the case under instructions; they are not mere physical presence. Counsel with only general instructions, unable to proceed for want of the client's instructions, does not constitute attendance in law, so the Bank's suit could not properly be dismissed under Order IXB rule 4(1).
Relying on In re Mahon, Din Mohamed, Shah Kachra Merag, Finaughty v. Prinsloo and its own decision in Juliane Ulrike Stamon, the Court held there is no distinction between 'appearance' and 'attendance'. The Bank's counsel had general instructions only; without her client she could do nothing to advance the suit and her role was frustrated. The Court distinguished Herman Mugachia, where counsel had told his client not to attend - culpable default - whereas here the failure lay in the absence of instructions, not counsel's contumacy.
Whether the Bank's delay in applying to set aside the dismissal order should have defeated the application.
The delay was not fully explained but was not such as to prejudice the appellant beyond monetary compensation by an award of costs; the trial Judge had ordered thrown away costs, and delay therefore did not displace his discretion to set aside the dismissal.
The dismissal was on 4 May 1998 and the Bank filed its application on 16 December 1998. The appellant argued the delay was unexplained and fatal. The Court accepted the delay was not fully explained but measured prejudice practically: any prejudice was compensable in costs, and the trial Judge had in fact awarded thrown away costs. Delay alone, without consequential prejudice, did not vitiate the order setting aside the dismissal.
Whether a corporate party attends court through its designated officer, such that the officer's non-attendance is the company's non-attendance.
A legal person acts through its officers; the officers instruct counsel, and the non-attendance of the officer designated to handle a particular case is, in law, the non-attendance of the company itself.
Correcting the trial Judge's repeated references to the non-attendance of 'the Plaintiff's witness', the Court observed that the absent person was an officer of the Bank, not a mere witness. Because a corporation has no physical existence, its presence in litigation is through the officers who instruct counsel. This observation underpins the Court's conclusion that the Bank could not be treated as present and ready to proceed through counsel alone.
Legal principles established
#- Order IXB rule 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules applies only when a suit comes on for hearing on first instance; once a hearing has commenced, its prosecution is governed by Orders XVI and XVII.
- Where an adjournment is refused, whether on the first hearing day or on any adjourned day, a party in whose absence an adverse order is made may move under Order IXB rule 8 to set aside, vary or review that order; the power extends to part-heard suits.
- 'Attendance' and 'appearance' under the rules of practice do not denote mere physical presence; they connote counsel's presence in court, ready and instructed to do something to progress the case. Counsel who cannot proceed for want of instructions does not constitute attendance in law.
- Order XVI rule 4 presupposes that a party has failed, after being granted time under Order XVI rule 1, to produce evidence; without such a prior grant of time the rule has no application.
- A corporate party acts through its officers; the non-attendance of the officer designated to handle a particular case is, in law, the non-attendance of the company itself.
Court orders
#- 1.Appeal dismissed.
- 2.No order as to costs.
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
- H.C.C.C. No. 628 of 1995
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Not expressly stated in the judgment; first appeal to the Court of Appeal from a ruling of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (the Bank's application below was expressed to be brought under Order IXB rule 8, Order XLIX rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act).
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "JOHNSTONE AGGREY OCHOLA v NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED [2000] KECA 217 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2000). Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1999. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2000/217/eng@2000-03-10
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.