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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No. 139 of 1999· [2000] KECA 217 (KLR)

JOHNSTONE AGGREY OCHOLA v NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED [2000] KECA 217 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
10 March 2000
3,282 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a lawyer sitting in court without instructions to proceed is legally absent, so a client can seek to revive a dismissed case.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Court of Appeal (Tunoi, Bosire and O'Kubasu JJ.A) dismissed an appeal by Johnstone Aggrey Ochola against a ruling of Ole Keiwua J delivered on 24 February 1999 in H.C.C.C. No. 628 of 1995, by which the National Bank of Kenya was allowed to revive its suit that had been dismissed on 4 May 1998. When the suit was called on for hearing, the Bank's counsel was present but sought an adjournment because she had been unable to reach her client and lacked instructions; the adjournment was refused without reasons and the suit was dismissed with costs. The Bank then applied under Order IXB rule 8, Order XLIX rule 5 and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act to vacate the dismissal, and the trial judge allowed the application, provoking this appeal. The central question was whether the judge had jurisdiction under Order IXB rule 8. The Court held that Order IXB rule 4(1) applies only when a suit first comes on for hearing, while Order XVI rule 4 presupposes a prior grant of time to produce evidence, which had never been made; consequently neither provision barred the application. Where an adjournment is refused, a party in whose absence an adverse order is made may move under Order IXB rule 8 to set aside, vary or review it. 'Attendance' or 'appearance' does not mean mere physical presence but counsel's presence, ready and instructed to do something to progress the case; counsel who cannot proceed for lack of instructions does not constitute attendance in law. The Bank's delay in applying was not such as to prejudice the appellant beyond an award of costs. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction under Order IXB rule 8 to vacate the dismissal of the Bank's suit - i.e., whether the dismissal fell under Order IXB rule 4(1) or Order XVI rule 4.

Holding

The dismissal was not made under Order XVI rule 4, which presupposes a prior grant of time to produce evidence that was never made; Order IXB rule 4(1) applies only at a first-instance hearing. Where an adjournment is refused, a party in whose absence an adverse order is made may move under Order IXB rule 8 to set aside, vary or review it, so the Judge had jurisdiction.

Reasoning

The Court read Order XVI rule 4 together with rule 1 of the same Order: rule 4 catches a party who, after being granted time to produce evidence, fails to do so. No such time had been granted here, and setting a suit down for hearing is an administrative, not judicial, step. Since the Bank's counsel was refused an adjournment on the day the suit first came up, Order XVI rule 3 left the Bank free to invoke Order IXB rule 8, whose setting-aside power extends to part-heard suits.

p. 2
02

Whether counsel's physical presence in court, without instructions to proceed with the hearing, constitutes 'attendance' or 'appearance' within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Holding

Attendance and appearance connote counsel's presence in court ready to do something to progress the case under instructions; they are not mere physical presence. Counsel with only general instructions, unable to proceed for want of the client's instructions, does not constitute attendance in law, so the Bank's suit could not properly be dismissed under Order IXB rule 4(1).

Reasoning

Relying on In re Mahon, Din Mohamed, Shah Kachra Merag, Finaughty v. Prinsloo and its own decision in Juliane Ulrike Stamon, the Court held there is no distinction between 'appearance' and 'attendance'. The Bank's counsel had general instructions only; without her client she could do nothing to advance the suit and her role was frustrated. The Court distinguished Herman Mugachia, where counsel had told his client not to attend - culpable default - whereas here the failure lay in the absence of instructions, not counsel's contumacy.

p. 3
03

Whether the Bank's delay in applying to set aside the dismissal order should have defeated the application.

Holding

The delay was not fully explained but was not such as to prejudice the appellant beyond monetary compensation by an award of costs; the trial Judge had ordered thrown away costs, and delay therefore did not displace his discretion to set aside the dismissal.

Reasoning

The dismissal was on 4 May 1998 and the Bank filed its application on 16 December 1998. The appellant argued the delay was unexplained and fatal. The Court accepted the delay was not fully explained but measured prejudice practically: any prejudice was compensable in costs, and the trial Judge had in fact awarded thrown away costs. Delay alone, without consequential prejudice, did not vitiate the order setting aside the dismissal.

p. 5
04

Whether a corporate party attends court through its designated officer, such that the officer's non-attendance is the company's non-attendance.

Holding

A legal person acts through its officers; the officers instruct counsel, and the non-attendance of the officer designated to handle a particular case is, in law, the non-attendance of the company itself.

Reasoning

Correcting the trial Judge's repeated references to the non-attendance of 'the Plaintiff's witness', the Court observed that the absent person was an officer of the Bank, not a mere witness. Because a corporation has no physical existence, its presence in litigation is through the officers who instruct counsel. This observation underpins the Court's conclusion that the Bank could not be treated as present and ready to proceed through counsel alone.

p. 5

Legal principles established

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  • Order IXB rule 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules applies only when a suit comes on for hearing on first instance; once a hearing has commenced, its prosecution is governed by Orders XVI and XVII.
  • Where an adjournment is refused, whether on the first hearing day or on any adjourned day, a party in whose absence an adverse order is made may move under Order IXB rule 8 to set aside, vary or review that order; the power extends to part-heard suits.
  • 'Attendance' and 'appearance' under the rules of practice do not denote mere physical presence; they connote counsel's presence in court, ready and instructed to do something to progress the case. Counsel who cannot proceed for want of instructions does not constitute attendance in law.
  • Order XVI rule 4 presupposes that a party has failed, after being granted time under Order XVI rule 1, to produce evidence; without such a prior grant of time the rule has no application.
  • A corporate party acts through its officers; the non-attendance of the officer designated to handle a particular case is, in law, the non-attendance of the company itself.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed.
  2. 2.No order as to costs.

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order IXB rule 4(1)
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order IXB rule 1
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order IXB rule 8
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order XVI rule 1
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order XVI rule 3
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order XVI rule 4
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order XVII
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order XLIX rule 5
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Kenya)Order III rule (1)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Kenya)Section 3A
  • Indian Civil Procedure Codereferenced on the meaning of 'appearance' (via Sarkar's Law of Civil Procedure, 8th Ed., Vol. 1)

Cases cited (11)

  • Brooke Bond Liebig (I) Limited v. Mallya
    [1975] EA 266
  • Herman Mugachia v. Hamisi Mwakibundu & Another
    [1982-88] 1 KAR 666
  • Lobo v. Saleh S. Dhiyebi
    [1961] EA 223
  • In re Mahon
    [1893] 1 Ch. 507
  • Juliane Ulrike Stamon v. Tiwi Beach Hotel Ltd.
    Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1996 (unreported)
  • Din Mohamed v. Lalaji Visram & Co.
    [1937] 4 EACA 1
  • Shah Kachra Merag v. Gandhi & Co.
    [1975] EA 466
  • Finaughty v. Prinsloo
    [1958] EA 657
  • Sodha v. Hemraj
    [1952] 7 Uganda Law Reports 11
  • The EL Amira
    [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 539
  • Mobbs v. Powell
    [1965] V.R. 222
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 628 of 1995
Jurisdiction invoked
Not expressly stated in the judgment; first appeal to the Court of Appeal from a ruling of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (the Bank's application below was expressed to be brought under Order IXB rule 8, Order XLIX rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act).

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "JOHNSTONE AGGREY OCHOLA v NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED [2000] KECA 217 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2000). Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1999. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2000/217/eng@2000-03-10

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.