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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No. 194 of 1998

INDUSTRIAL HARDWARE (KENYA) LTD & 5 OTHERS vs STANDARD CHARTERED BANK KENYA LTD [1999] KECA 174 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
26 March 1999
913 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that 'liberty to apply' clauses cannot reopen a consent order, and defaulting borrowers cannot block mortgage sales.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Court of Appeal (Gicheru, Kwach and Lakha, JJ.A.) dismissed an appeal against a ruling of Kuloba J dated 1st July 1998 in H.C.C.C. No. 577 of 1997. Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd had lent Industrial Hardware (Kenya) Ltd Shs 16,200,000 secured by a legal charge over a Nairobi property, personal guarantees of the five individual appellants, and a debenture. On default the bank moved to exercise its statutory power of sale. The plaintiffs sought an interim injunction, but on 22nd May 1997 a consent order was recorded before Kuloba J under which the plaintiffs were to pay Shs 17,000,000 within 100 days, with the disputed balance to be settled after accounts. The plaintiffs made no payment and instead filed repeated injunction applications whenever a sale was scheduled. On 1st July 1998 they revived the original injunction application, effectively asking the Judge to set aside the consent order; the application was dismissed and they appealed. The Court of Appeal held, following Cristel v Cristel [1951] 2 All ER 574, that a 'liberty to apply' clause does not confer a right to vary or set aside an order, and that no injunction could lie to restrain a mortgagee's statutory power of sale where default, indebtedness and due notices were undisputed. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the bank. This ruling binds subordinate courts and the High Court on both propositions.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the 'liberty to apply' clause in the consent order entitled the plaintiffs to apply to set aside or vary the consent order
  2. 2.Whether there was any legal basis for an injunction restraining the mortgagee from exercising its statutory power of sale

Key legal issues

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01

Effect of a 'liberty to apply' clause in a consent order

Holding

The clause does not entitle a party to apply to set aside or vary the consent order.

Reasoning

Adopting the English Court of Appeal decision in Cristel v Cristel, the court held that 'liberty to apply' means only that, when the order is drawn up, its working out may involve matters on which a decision of the court may be necessary. It confers no right to reopen or vary the order itself. Counsel's contrary submission was rejected as legally incorrect.

p. 2
02

Availability of an injunction to restrain exercise of a mortgagee's statutory power of sale

Holding

No injunction lies where default and indebtedness are not denied and the necessary notices have been served.

Reasoning

The court, referring to Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 32 (4th Edition), paragraph 725, found no legal basis for restraining the mortgagee. The plaintiffs had defaulted on the loan secured by the charge and guarantees, had not complied with the consent order, and had pursued a strategy of filing frivolous injunction applications to frustrate the sale.

p. 2

Legal principles established

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  • A 'liberty to apply' clause in an order does not confer any right to ask the court to vary or set aside the order; it applies only to matters arising in the working out of the order.
  • A mortgagor cannot obtain an injunction restraining a mortgagee from exercising its statutory power of sale where default and indebtedness are not denied and the necessary notices have been served.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed
  2. 2.Costs of the appeal to the defendant (Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd)

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 577 of 1997
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court (not expressly stated in the judgment)

Relief refused

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Setting aside or varying the consent order of 22nd May 1997

The liberty to apply clause did not confer a right to vary the order

p. 2

Injunction restraining the defendant from selling the property or enforcing the guarantees

Default and indebtedness were not denied and the necessary notices had been served; no legal basis for an injunction

p. 2

Costs

Appeal dismissed with costs to the defendant.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

That is the correct position in law and the liberty to apply clause in the consent order did not entitle the plaintiffs to apply to set aside or vary the consent order.
p. 2Liberty to apply clause
all they were trying to do was to restrain a mortgagee from exercising its statutory power of sale in a case where default and indebtedness were not denied and the necessary notices had been served
p. 2Injunction against mortgagee's statutory power of sale
we are firmly of the opinion that there is no substance in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs to the defendant.
p. 2Final orders - dismissal and costs

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "INDUSTRIAL HARDWARE (KENYA) LTD & 5 OTHERS vs STANDARD CHARTERED BANK KENYA LTD [1999] KECA 174 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1999). Civil Appeal No. 194 of 1998. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1999/174/eng@1999-03-26

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.