William Gatuhi Murathe v Gakuru Gathimbi
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that filing a counterclaim to recover land stops the adverse possession clock, so the owner regained his property.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Whether a counterclaim for recovery of land interrupts adverse possession
Yes - the institution of a counterclaim, having the same effect as a cross suit, stops time running in favour of the adverse possessor
Relying on the Court's unanimous decision in Kiritu v Kabura, which adopted Potter JA's position in Githu v Ndeete and the passage from Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property, the Court held that an owner asserts his right by taking legal proceedings, and that filing suit for recovery of land stops time under section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act. A counterclaim is such an action.
When the respondent's adverse possession began and whether twelve years had accrued
Adverse possession could at the earliest have begun in December 1972 when the sale agreement became void for want of Land Control Board consent; by the appellant's counterclaim in 1979 less than eight (or at most seven) years had run
Before the agreement became void, the respondent's occupation, if any, was with the consent of the vendor, so it was not adverse. Even computing from 1972, twelve years would only have matured in 1985, well after the 1979 counterclaim interrupted the running of time. The learned judge erred in finding twelve years' possession without determining when possession began.
Whether the learned judge erred in relying on Pugh v Heath
The judge misapplied Pugh v Heath, preferring counsel's submissions over the judgment itself, and failed to consider the effect of the counterclaim as an interruption of adverse possession
Pugh v Heath concerned a mortgagee's right to recover possession after foreclosure, not adverse possession as against a registered proprietor. The judge relied on counsel's submissions in that case rather than its actual holding, and did not consider whether the counterclaim constituted an interruption of the respondent's possession period.
Legal principles established
#- The filing of a suit for recovery of land, including by way of counterclaim, stops time from running for the purposes of adverse possession under the Limitation of Actions Act
- A counterclaim has the same effect as a cross suit and interrupts the adverse possessor's period of possession
- Where a sale of agricultural land becomes void for want of Land Control Board consent, the purchaser's possession only becomes adverse when the agreement fails to materialise and he continues in occupation
Court orders
#- 1.The judgment of the learned judge and its related decree are set aside
- 2.The appellant, as the registered proprietor of the suit land, shall have vacant possession of the suit land
- 3.The costs of this appeal and of the court below are awarded to the appellant
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
- H.C.C.C. No. 920 of 1979
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court (statutory appellate jurisdiction)
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Later judgments citing this (1)
#Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.
- Maureen Waithera Mwenje & 1 other v David Kinyanjui Njenga & 2 others[2021] KECA 384 (KLR)23 Jul 2021
Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "William Gatuhi Murathe v Gakuru Gathimbi", Case Analysis (1998). Civil Appeal 49 of 1996. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1998/26/eng@1998-03-06
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.