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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal 72 of 1998· [1998] KECA 12 (KLR)

Nasir Ibrahim Ali & 2 others v Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni & another [1998] KECA 12 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
11 September 1998
9,639 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~39 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that courts can appoint a receiver over a company's assets without hearing the other side, but only in exceptional circumstances.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This was an appeal against a ruling of Kuloba, J in the High Court (H.C.C.C. No. 418 of 1998) dismissing the appellants' application under Order VI rule 13(1)(a) to strike out the respondent Pattni's plaint as disclosing no cause of action against the third defendant company, and extending ex parte orders appointing Michael Scanlon as interim receiver-manager of the Kenya Duty Free Complex pending the inter partes hearing. The respondent alleged he had contracted to buy 100% of the shares in the company plus all its assets for US$13,750,000, and feared dissipation of assets by the first defendant who controlled the company from Dubai. Shah, JA, delivering the leading judgment, held that the High Court had jurisdiction under section 63(d) of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, reinforced by inherent powers, to appoint a receiver where just and convenient, including ex parte in appropriate circumstances under quia timet principles; that the company was properly joined as a co-defendant given the substance of the pleadings; and that questions of forgery, fraud and cause of action were for the inter partes hearing and trial. Omolo, JA concurred, adding that ex parte receivership should be reserved for exceptional circumstances. Gicheru, JA dissented, holding on Salomon v Salomon principles that the plaint disclosed no cause of action against the company and that the judge erred by relying on affidavit material rather than the pleadings; he would have struck out the plaint against the third appellant and set aside the receivership. By majority the appeal was dismissed with costs, certified for two counsel for the first respondent, the second respondent's costs on a one-counsel basis.

Key legal issues

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01

Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver

Holding

The High Court has power to appoint a receiver under section 63(d) and Order 40 where just and convenient, even where the plaintiff claims a right to, rather than title in, the company's property.

Reasoning

The court traced the 'just and convenient' standard to section 25(8) of the English Judicature Act 1973 and noted Indian authority both ways, preferring the view that a receiver may be appointed to manage a company's business. The power is reinforced by the High Court's inherent powers and may be exercised ex debito justitiae where circumstances warrant.

p. 6
02

Ex parte appointment of a receiver

Holding

An ex parte appointment of an interim receiver is within the court's powers in appropriate circumstances, particularly to prevent dissipation of assets under quia timet principles.

Reasoning

The first defendant was not resident in Kenya and controlled the company from Dubai, so the plaintiff feared assets would be moved beyond the court's reach if served first. The court endorsed the need for freezing and seizure orders to cope with modern technology-enabled dissipation, describing the interim receiver as a 'nuclear weapon of the law'.

p. 7
03

Joinder of the company as third defendant

Holding

The company was properly joined as a co-defendant where the plaint alleged purchase of 100% shares plus all the company's assets and a term that the board would transfer management to the plaintiff.

Reasoning

The court looked to substance: a company acts through its directors, and a remedy against directors affecting the company wholly justifies its joinder. If the plaintiff succeeded, the company would plainly be an affected party, and Atkin's Encyclopaedia form 16 shows the company may be joined to be bound by an interlocutory injunction.

p. 8
04

Whether fraud and cause-of-action questions could be decided on the application

Holding

Allegations of forgery, fraud and non-disclosure of cause of action were matters for the inter partes hearing and the trial, not for determination on the materials before the appellate court.

Reasoning

The court noted the plaintiff's application had not yet been heard inter partes and that findings of fact from the superior court would better guide a final appellate court. It adopted Lord Finlay's dictum in Frazer v Balfour that constitutional or grave questions should be decided on complete and satisfactory facts.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • The High Court may appoint a receiver under section 63(d) of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, including ex parte, where it appears just and convenient, and such appointment is not confined to claims against property.
  • Ex parte appointment of a receiver is permissible but should be undertaken only in exceptional circumstances with great care and caution.
  • Where a plaint seeks a remedy against directors that affects the company wholly, the company may properly be joined as a co-defendant in a suit for specific performance of a sale of shares.
  • Preliminary objections cannot be raised where any fact has to be ascertained or where what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed with costs
  2. 2.Costs certified for two counsel in respect of the first respondent
  3. 3.Appellants to pay costs of both respondents, those of the second respondent on a one-counsel basis

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21)Section 63(d)
  • Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21)Section 3A
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder XL rule 1
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder VI rule 13(1)(a)
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder XXXIX rules 1, 2, 3 and 9
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 1 rules 3 and 5
  • Civil Procedure RulesOrder 2 rules 21 and 27
  • Judicature Act 1973 (England)Section 25(8)
  • Companies Act (Cap 486)Section 15
  • Companies Act (Cap 486)Section 16(2)
  • Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Cap 9)Section 3(2)

Cases cited (8)

  • Kailash Chandra v. Sadar Munsif
    (1925) 52 Cal. 513
  • Rattan Lai, Advocate v. Jagadhri Light Railway Company Limited
    A.I.R. 1946 Vol. 33
  • Mudialiar & another vs. K.M. Samarapuri and others
    A.I.R 1950 Vol. 37
  • Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. vs Westend Distributors Ltd.
    (1969) E.A 696
  • Frazer V. Balfour
    (1918) 34 T.L.R 502
  • Richards vs Naum
    (1966) 3 All E.R. 812
  • D.T. DOBIE & CO. (K) LTD. V JOSEPH MBERIA MUCHINA AND ANOTHER
    Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1978 (Unreported)
  • Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.
    [1895-9] All E.R. Rep. 33
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 418 of 1998
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Cap 9), section 3(2) invoked in the dissent; appeal against orders of the High Court under Order VI rule 13(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Nasir Ibrahim Ali & 2 others v Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni & another [1998] KECA 12 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1998). Civil Appeal 72 of 1998. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1998/12/eng@1998-09-11

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.