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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal 149 of 1991· [1995] KECA 31 (KLR)

ochieng & 2 others as Trading as Aquiline Agencies v First National Bank of Chicago (Civil Appeal 149 of 1991) [1995] KECA 31 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
20 September 1995
3,717 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed judges can refuse late amendments to lawsuits that would unfairly wipe out a defendant's time-limit defence.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellants sued the respondent bank for inducing breach of contract between them and Print-Pak (Tanzania) Limited. After the plaint was struck out by Rauf J in 1989, the Court of Appeal on 8 June 1990 recalled the plaint and ordered amendments, noting the plaint lacked allegations of malice and particulars. At hearing before Shields J, the defendant took a preliminary point that no claim for general damages for inducing breach of contract lay and that special damages had to be pleaded. The judge, of his own motion, stayed dismissal and gave the plaintiffs time to amend to plead special damages. Their application to add a claim of some Shs 8.65 million was refused: the judge found the application was made in bad faith, the figure could not be 'plucked out of the air', and Order VIA rule 3(5) does not permit an amendment curing a defective cause of action where limitation has barred the claim. Shah JA, sitting alone, dismissed the appeal. He applied Mbogo v Shah on non-interference with discretion, adopted Lord Griffiths' reasoning in Ketteman v Hansel Properties as sound law in Kenya, and held that allowing the amendment six years after accrual would deprive the defendant of its limitation defence. He found the plaintiffs' conduct of the case so slovenly that a fair trial would be impossible and observed that justice works both ways. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether special damages must be specifically pleaded before proof

Holding

Yes - special damages must be pleaded with particularity; only after amendment may a plaintiff proceed to prove them

Reasoning

The court restated the principle from Savannah Development, Charles Sande and Coast Bus Service that special damages must be pleaded with particularity; where particulars are unknown when suit is filed, they can only be introduced by amending the plaint. In Charles Sande the claim could not proceed without amendment even absent objection. However, the issue here was not proof but whether the plaintiffs were entitled at that late stage to amend.

p. 4
02

Whether the trial judge's refusal to allow the amendment introducing a special damages claim should be interfered with

Holding

No - the discretion was properly exercised on sound grounds: bad faith, failure to show how the loss was calculated, uselessness of the amendment, and deprivation of the limitation defence

Reasoning

Applying Mbogo v Shah, the appellate court will not disturb discretionary rulings unless the judge misdirected himself or was clearly wrong. Shields J was entitled to find bad faith (possibly to avoid court fees), to insist that the figure not be plucked from the air, and to hold that allowing a claim of about Shs 9 million six years after accrual would deprive the defendant of limitation. Adopting Ketteman v Hansel Properties, late amendments raising distinct matters need not be allowed; justice works both ways.

p. 5

Legal principles established

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  • An appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial judge unless he misdirected himself and arrived at a wrong decision, or it is manifest from the case as a whole that he was clearly wrong and there has been mis justice
  • An amendment to add a special damages claim will be refused where it is made years after the cause of action arose and would deprive the defendant of its right to plead limitation
  • Order VIA rule 3(5) does not permit an amendment to cure a defective cause of action where the statute of limitations would have barred the claim

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed with costs

Authorities

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Legislation

  • Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Cap 9)section 3(2)
  • Civil Procedure Rules (Order VI A)rule 3(5)
  • Limitation Acts

Cases cited (9)

  • Mbogo & Another vs. Shah
    [1968] E.A. 93
  • Savannah Development Company Limited vs Posts & Telecommunications Corporation & Another
    Civil Appeal No. 160 of 1991 (unreported)
  • Charles Sande vs Kenya Co-operative Creameries Limited
    Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1992 (unreported)
  • Kenya Bus Services vs Mavende
    (1991) 2 KAR 232
  • Coast Bus Service Ltd. vs Sisco & Murunga Danii & 3 Others
    Civil Appeal No. 192 of 1992 (unreported)
  • Hyams vs Stuart King (a firm)
    [1908] 2 KB 696
  • Perestrello vs United Paint Company Limited
    [1969] 3 All E.R. 479
  • Ketteman vs Hansel Properties Limited
    (1988) 1 All ER 35
  • Ransley and Another vs K.N.C.C. Ltd
    Civil Application No. NAI 116 of 1988 (unreported)
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 3818 of 1985
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Cap 9)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (7)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "ochieng & 2 others as Trading as Aquiline Agencies v First National Bank of Chicago (Civil Appeal 149 of 1991) [1995] KECA 31 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1995). Civil Appeal 149 of 1991. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1995/31/eng@1995-09-20

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.