Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal (High Court ruling of Shields J dated 27 October 1986)· [1995] KECA 15 (KLR)

Habib Bank A. G. Zurich v Pop-In (Kenya) LTD. & 3 others [1995] KECA 15 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
8 December 1995
1,436 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~6 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled that borrowers who admit default cannot stop a property sale just because they dispute how much the bank is demanding.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
Pop-In (Kenya) Ltd borrowed Shs 10,000,000 from Habib Bank AG Zurich under a floating debenture dated 21 January 1981, further secured by two charges over Nairobi properties given by its directors and shareholders. On default the bank appointed a receiver and manager and served statutory notices demanding over Shs 17 million before exercising its statutory power of sale. The respondents sued, seeking termination of the receivership, restoration of the business, damages and an injunction against sale. Shields J granted the second, third and fourth respondents a temporary injunction, holding that the demand was excessive, that interest was not chargeable, and that the chargors had a prima facie case; he dismissed the company's own application. The bank appealed. Allowing the appeal on 8 December 1995, the Court of Appeal (Kwach JA, with Tunoi and the third member concurring) held that Shields J had completely misapprehended the law: the securities expressly charged interest and the receivership agency clause was standard. Crucially, the court reaffirmed that a dispute as to the exact amount owed under a mortgage is not a ground to restrain a mortgagee who has served a valid statutory notice, following Pharmac Kanji Shah and Lavuna. The court set aside the injunction order, dismissed the injunction application, and awarded the bank the costs of the application and of the appeal.

Key legal issues

#
01

Whether a dispute over the amount owed under a mortgage justifies an injunction against exercise of the statutory power of sale

Holding

No; where default is admitted and statutory notice has been served, the mortgagee cannot be restrained merely because the exact amount due is disputed.

Reasoning

Kwach JA reiterated the settled position, drawing on Pharmac Kanji Shah, Lavuna and Halsbury's Laws of England, that equity will not restrain a chargee exercising a valid statutory power of sale merely because the chargeor disputes the quantum of the debt. The respondents admitted default and service of the statutory notices, so the judge's contrary view was a misapprehension of the law producing a perverse decision.

p. 2
02

Whether interest was chargeable on the loan under the debenture and charges

Holding

Yes; the securities expressly provided for interest, and the judge's contrary finding was totally erroneous both on the terms of the securities and as a matter of commercial practice.

Reasoning

Although the securities were in standard form, Shields J accepted the respondents' submission that interest was not chargeable. Kwach JA held this was plainly wrong on the express terms of the securities and contrary to commercial practice, undermining the judge's conclusion that the demand was excessive and that the chargors had a prima facie case.

p. 2
03

Whether the company could lawfully be made to pay the receiver and manager's remuneration

Holding

Yes; under the standard agency clause in the debenture, the receiver and manager is the agent of the company, which bears his remuneration.

Reasoning

The judge had questioned the legality of requiring the first respondent to pay the receiver's remuneration. Kwach JA explained that the debenture contained the standard clause making the receiver the agent of the company; the judge's conclusion rested on the clause not having been brought to his attention. This formed part of the court's view that the judge misapprehended the law.

p. 2

Legal principles established

#
  • A court should not grant an injunction restraining a mortgagee from exercising its statutory power of sale solely on the ground that there is a dispute as to the amount due under the mortgage, where default is admitted and a valid statutory notice has been served.
  • A receiver and manager appointed under a standard debenture is the agent of the company, and the company may lawfully bear the receiver's remuneration.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.Appeal allowed
  2. 2.Order of Shields J granting the temporary injunction set aside
  3. 3.Substituted order dismissing the application for injunction brought by the second, third and fourth respondents
  4. 4.Costs of the injunction application to the appellant
  5. 5.Costs of the appeal granted to the appellant
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal against an interlocutory ruling of the High Court (specific statutory basis not stated in the judgment)

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Later judgments citing this (1)

#

Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Habib Bank A. G. Zurich v Pop-In (Kenya) LTD. & 3 others [1995] KECA 15 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1995). Civil Appeal (High Court ruling of Shields J dated 27 October 1986). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1995/15/eng@1995-01-18

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.