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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal (from Civil Case No 2436 of 1978)· [1981] KECA 24 (KLR)

Jessie Mwangi Gachago v Attorney General [1981] KECA 24 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
13 March 1981
2,016 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a third party in a lawsuit cannot be judged against for skipping a defence they were never ordered to file.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This Court of Appeal appeal arose from third party proceedings in Civil Case No 2436 of 1978, where the Attorney-General, sued by Beluf Establishment for the alleged loss of 360 bags of coffee, issued third party notices under Order I rule 14 seeking indemnity from three persons, including the appellant, Jessie Mwangi Gachago. The appellant entered appearance to the third party notice but filed no defence. On a summons for directions under Order I rule 18, the Attorney-General sought judgment against the appellant for failure to file a defence; Nyarangi J granted all prayers 'as prayed'. Law JA, delivering the leading judgment with which Madan JA and Simpson JA agreed, held that a third party cannot be in default of defence unless he has been ordered to serve a defence and failed to do so. The appellant had never been so ordered and had indicated an intention to defend. The wide discretion under rule 18 to give judgment against a third party applies only where the third party has no defence, on admission or default, which was not the case here. The court further held that a defendant who has entered appearance will not as a general rule be debarred from defending, that judgment against a third party should not be entered until the defendant's liability to the plaintiff is established, and that the judge's 'as prayed' directions were too vague on the timing of the trial and the incidence of costs to be enforceable. The appeal was allowed, the ruling set aside, and substituted directions ordered, with the appellant given the costs of the application and of the appeal.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether a third party can be in default of defence without an order to file a defence

Holding

No - the appellant was never ordered to file a defence and was therefore not in default.

Reasoning

The court held that a third party cannot be in default of defence unless ordered to serve one and failing or refusing to do so. The appellant had entered appearance and expressed through counsel a desire to file a defence; no order required a defence from him. Reliance was placed on Gloucestershire Banking Co v Phillips, where a defendant who appears and, when properly called upon, makes no defence may have judgment signed against him. That was not this case.

p. 2
02

Scope of the judge's discretion on a summons for directions under Order I rule 18

Holding

The discretion to give judgment against a third party applies only where the third party has no defence, on admission or default; it did not apply here.

Reasoning

While Sango Bay Estates confirms a judge may on a summons for directions decide a third party has no defence and give judgment against him, that presupposes satisfaction that there is no defence, either on admission or default. Here the appellant was not in default and his advocate stated he had a defence and was anxious to plead it. There was therefore no justification for entering judgment against him.

p. 2
03

Timing of trial of third party issues and clarity of directions

Holding

The judge's blanket 'as prayed' order was too vague; third party issues are usually tried at or after the trial of the main suit, and directions must be clear.

Reasoning

The learned judge simply ordered 'as prayed' without specifying when the liability issue between the defendant and the other third parties would be tried, or which of the three third parties would bear the costs. Directions must be absolutely clear, beyond possibility of mistake, and third party issues are ordinarily tried at or after the trial of the suit between plaintiff and defendant.

p. 3
04

Enforceability of the extracted order and futility of judgment before the defendant's liability is decided

Holding

The extracted order was indefinite and not specifically enforceable by execution without a further crystallising order; judgment against a third party before the defendant's liability is decided is futile.

Reasoning

Madan JA examined the extracted order and found it indefinite, leaving blanks and an unspecified amount, so it was not specifically enforceable by execution without a further order crystallising the precise liability. Even assuming it complied with Order XX rule 6(1) read with rule 7(6), it demonstrated the futility of entering judgment against a third party before the defendant's liability in the main suit is decided.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • A third party is not in default of defence unless ordered to serve a defence and fails or refuses to do so.
  • A defendant who has entered appearance to third party proceedings will not, as a general rule, be debarred from defending.
  • Judgment against a third party should not be entered until the defendant's liability to the plaintiff in the main suit has been established.
  • Directions on a summons for directions must be absolutely clear and beyond possibility of mistake.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Application for judgment to be entered against Jessie Mwangi Gachago dismissed
  2. 2.Jessie Mwangi Gachago to file a defence to the third party notice dated November 17, 1978 and the plaint attached thereto within four weeks
  3. 3.Issue of liability between the defendant and the three third parties to be tried on a date to be fixed or agreed after disposal of Civil Suit No 2436 of 1978
  4. 4.Costs of the application to be costs in the cause between the defendant and the third parties
  5. 5.Appellant to have the costs of and occasioned by the hearing of the summons for directions before Nyarangi J, but no certificate for the costs of Queen's Counsel
  6. 6.Appellant to have the costs of the appeal, but no certificate for two advocates
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Civil Case No 2436 of 1978
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over an interlocutory ruling of the High Court (no specific provision stated in the judgment)

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Jessie Mwangi Gachago v Attorney General [1981] KECA 24 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1981). Civil Appeal (from Civil Case No 2436 of 1978). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1981/24/eng@1981-03-13

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.