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Court of AppealDismissedReference under rule 109(5) of the Court of Appeal for East Africa Rules, 1972, arising from Civil Case No 786 of 1971· [1978] KECA 27 (KLR)

Rogan-Kamper v Grosvenor [1978] KECA 27 (KLR)

Court of Appeal for East Africa
1 March 1978
1,666 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's appellate court confirmed that judges reviewing taxed legal fees may only step in when the amount is unreasonably high or low—not merely different.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This was a reference to the full Court of Appeal for East Africa under rule 109(5) of the Court of Appeal for East Africa Rules, 1972, concerning the taxation of a bill of costs. The appellant had claimed Shs 15,000/- as an instructions fee and Shs 15,000/- as a brief fee for senior counsel. The taxing officer reduced these to Shs 12,000/- and Shs 14,000/- respectively. On a reference under rule 109(2), Law JA further reduced the figures to Shs 8,000/- and Shs 10,000/-, holding that, allowing for inflation, the taxing officer had allowed unreasonably large amounts so the bill was manifestly excessive, guided by comparable cases in which markedly lower fees had been allowed. The full court (Madan JA writing, Wambuzi JA and Wicks CJ concurring) dismissed the reference with costs. It held that the expressions 'manifestly excessive' and 'manifestly inadequate' in rule 109(2) convey the same concept of reasonableness as paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule: that which is manifestly excessive or inadequate cannot be reasonable, and vice versa. A judge on a reference may not substitute his own figure unless the taxed sum falls outside the bracket of reasonableness, and there is no reference on a question of quantum only. The court also rejected the argument that comparable cases cannot guide taxation, and cautioned that increasing instructions fees may render legitimate litigation inaccessible to ordinary citizens. It further held that the new Rules had not altered the former law, so pre-Rules authorities such as Pioneer Investment Trust v Amarchand remain guidance.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the tests of reasonableness (taxing officer) and manifest excess or inadequacy (judge on reference) are synonymous

Holding

They are synonymous; both connote the same datum point, so the taxing officer and the reviewing judge work with a similar approach.

Reasoning

The court construed rule 109(2) together with paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule. Something manifestly excessive or inadequate cannot be reasonable, and something reasonable cannot be manifestly excessive or inadequate. The expressions therefore share the same datum point, meaning a judge on reference applies the reasonableness standard, intervening only where the taxed bill falls outside the bracket of reasonableness in all the circumstances.

p. 2
02

Scope of the judge's power on a rule 109(2) reference

Holding

The judge may make only such deduction or addition as will render the bill reasonable, and only where the bill as taxed is in all the circumstances manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate; there is no reference on a question of quantum only.

Reasoning

The court read rule 109(2) and (5) as confining both the judge and the full court: the judge's jurisdiction is limited to correcting a bill that is manifestly excessive or inadequate, and the court's power on a rule 109(5) reference is limited to varying, discharging or reversing that limited decision. The judge will not substitute his own figure unless the taxed sum is outside reasonable limits.

p. 1
03

Whether comparable cases may guide the assessment of a reasonable bill of costs

Holding

Comparable cases can guide the taxing officer and the court, and recent comparables may justify a finding that a taxed bill is manifestly excessive even allowing for inflation.

Reasoning

Rejecting a contrary contention, the court held that although these matters differ from case to case, comparable cases remain a legitimate guide. Law JA had found the taxing officer allowed almost double the fees allowed in recent comparable cases, and that making allowance for inflation the bill was manifestly excessive. The court also cautioned against fee inflation that prices legitimate litigation out of the reach of ordinary citizens.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • On a reference under rule 109(2), a judge may not substitute his own figure for that allowed by the taxing officer unless the taxed sum is outside reasonable limits so as to be manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate.
  • The expressions 'manifestly excessive' and 'manifestly inadequate' in rule 109(2) and the concept of reasonableness in paragraph 9(2) of the Third Schedule connote the same datum point.
  • The court on a rule 109(5) reference may do no more than vary, discharge or reverse the limited decision of a judge given under sub-rule (2).

Court orders

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  1. 1.The reference to the full court is dismissed with costs
On appeal from
High Court at Nairobi
Civil Case No 786 of 1971
Jurisdiction invoked
Rule 109(5) of the Court of Appeal for East Africa Rules, 1972

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Rogan-Kamper v Grosvenor [1978] KECA 27 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1978). Reference under rule 109(5) of the Court of Appeal for East Africa Rules, 1972, arising from Civil Case No 786 of 1971. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1978/27/eng@1978-03-01

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.